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fuzzfuzz 搜索

Agent Skill

fuzz 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

总安装

218

周安装

9

GitHub Stars

9

下载量

71
CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:fuzz(fuzz 搜索)
来源仓库:https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code
仓库路径:skills/fuzz
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill fuzz
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill fuzz

简介

fuzz 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息。

  • 适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中根据关键词快速定位候选结果。
  • 通过 npx skills add 命令从指定仓库安装,需确认权限和维护状态。
  • 使用前应核实是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写操作。
  • 建议结合原始 README 和项目实际情况验证具体用法。

SKILL.md

Fuzz Input Generation

Generate intelligent, context-aware fuzz test inputs by analyzing input parsing code. Produces boundary values, type confusion inputs, encoding edge cases, format-specific attacks, and injection payloads tailored to the specific parser and data types in scope. Output is structured JSON test case sets ready for integration with test harnesses.

Supported Flags

Read ../../shared/schemas/flags.md for the full flag specification.

FlagFuzz Behavior
--scopeIdentifies which input handlers to generate fuzz inputs for. Default changed.
--depth quickStandard boundary values and common injection strings only.
--depth standardContext-aware inputs based on code analysis of the parser.
--depth deepStandard + format-specific attacks, encoding mutations, and chained payloads.
--depth expertDeep + adversarial inputs designed to bypass specific validation logic found in code.
--severityGenerate inputs targeting vulnerabilities at or above this severity.
--formatDefault json. Use text for human-readable listing.

Workflow

Step 1: Identify Input Handlers

Locate input parsing and processing code in scope:

  1. API endpoint handlers: Functions that read request body, query params, headers.
  2. File parsers: Functions that parse uploaded files, config files, data imports.
  3. CLI argument parsers: Argument parsing with argparse, commander, cobra, clap.
  4. Message consumers: Functions processing messages from queues, WebSockets, SSE.
  5. Deserialization points: JSON.parse, XML parsing, YAML loading, protobuf decoding.
  6. Database query builders: Functions constructing queries from user input.

For each handler, identify:

  • Expected input type (string, number, array, object, file).
  • Validation rules (regex, schema, type checks, length limits).
  • How the input is used downstream (SQL, shell, HTML, file path, URL, regex).

Step 2: Analyze Input Constraints

Read the code to understand what the parser expects and what it guards against:

  1. Type expectations: What types does the code assume? Where are type coercions?
  2. Length limits: Are there explicit length checks? What happens at max length?
  3. Character restrictions: Are certain characters filtered or escaped? Which ones?
  4. Format requirements: Does the input need to match a pattern (email, URL, date)?
  5. Range constraints: Numeric bounds, enum values, allowed file extensions.
  6. Nested structure: How deep can objects/arrays nest? Are there recursion limits?

Step 3: Generate Boundary Value Inputs

For each input field, generate boundary value test cases:

Input TypeBoundary Values
StringEmpty "", single char "a", max length, max length + 1, unicode BOM, null bytes "\x00"
Number0, -1, MAX_INT, MIN_INT, MAX_INT+1, NaN, Infinity, -Infinity, float precision edge cases
ArrayEmpty [], single element, very large array (10000+), nested arrays, mixed types
ObjectEmpty {}, deeply nested (100+ levels), circular reference attempt, prototype keys
Booleantrue, false, 0, 1, "", "false", null, undefined
DateEpoch 0, negative timestamp, far future, invalid dates (Feb 30), timezone edge cases
FileEmpty file, 0-byte, huge file, wrong extension, polyglot file, symlink

Step 4: Generate Type Confusion Inputs

Inputs designed to exploit type coercion and type assumption bugs:

Generate inputs that send the wrong type: string where number expected, array where string expected, object with toString override, deeply nested arrays, null where required, boolean where string expected, numeric string where number expected, and prototype/constructor pollution objects (__proto__, constructor.prototype).

Step 5: Generate Encoding Edge Cases

Inputs exploiting encoding and character set handling:

  1. Unicode: Normalization forms (NFC, NFD, NFKC, NFKD), homoglyphs, right-to-left override, zero-width characters.
  2. URL encoding: Double encoding (%2527), mixed encoding, overlong UTF-8.
  3. HTML entities: Named (&), numeric (&), hex (&), surrogate pairs.
  4. Null bytes: Mid-string null bytes for truncation attacks.
  5. Line endings: \r\n, \r, \n, \x0b, \x0c, \x85, \u2028, \u2029.
  6. Case mapping: Turkish locale I/i dotless variants, German ß/SS.

Step 6: Generate Context-Aware Injection Payloads

Based on how the input is used downstream (identified in Step 1), generate targeted payloads:

Sink ContextPayload Category
SQL querySQL injection: UNION, boolean blind, time blind, stacked queries, comment-based
Shell commandCommand injection: semicolons, pipes, backticks, $(), newlines
HTML outputXSS: script tags, event handlers, SVG/MathML, template injection
File pathPath traversal: ../, null bytes, long paths, reserved names (CON, NUL)
URL constructionSSRF: localhost variants, IPv6, DNS rebinding, scheme confusion
Regex inputReDoS: catastrophic backtracking patterns, exponential quantifiers
XML parserXXE: external entity, parameter entity, SSRF via DTD
LDAP queryLDAP injection: wildcards, boolean operators, null bytes
Header valueHeader injection: CRLF, response splitting
JSON parserJSON interoperability: duplicate keys, large numbers, deep nesting

Step 7: Generate Format-Specific Attacks

At --depth deep and above, generate inputs targeting specific file/data formats:

  1. JSON: Duplicate keys (parser-dependent behavior), comments, trailing commas, BOM prefix.
  2. XML: Billion laughs, quadratic blowup, external entities, CDATA abuse.
  3. YAML: Anchor bombs, merge keys, tag deserialization (!!python/object).
  4. CSV: Formula injection (=CMD()), field separator in values, newlines in quoted fields.
  5. JWT: Algorithm none, key confusion (RS256/HS256), expired but valid signature.
  6. GraphQL: Deep nesting, alias flooding, batch query abuse, introspection.
  7. Multipart: Boundary manipulation, filename traversal, content-type mismatch.

Step 8: Output Test Case Sets

Organize all generated inputs into structured JSON test case sets:

{
  "target": {
    "file": "src/api/users.ts",
    "function": "createUser",
    "input_field": "email",
    "expected_type": "string",
    "downstream_use": ["sql_query", "html_email"]
  },
  "generated_at": "2026-02-14T10:30:00Z",
  "total_cases": 85,
  "test_cases": [
    {
      "id": "FUZZ-001",
      "category": "boundary",
      "label": "empty_string",
      "input": "",
      "expected_behavior": "validation_error",
      "targets_cwe": "CWE-20"
    },
    {
      "id": "FUZZ-002",
      "category": "injection_sql",
      "label": "union_select",
      "input": "test@test.com' UNION SELECT * FROM users--",
      "expected_behavior": "parameterized_query_prevents_injection",
      "targets_cwe": "CWE-89"
    }
  ]
}

Write test case files to .appsec/fuzz/ organized by target.

Output Format

Fuzz inputs are not findings themselves but may reference CWEs they target.

Finding ID prefix: FUZZ (e.g., FUZZ-001) for test case identification.

  • metadata.tool: "fuzz"

If fuzz testing reveals an actual vulnerability (input causes unexpected behavior), emit a finding using ../../shared/schemas/findings.md.

Pragmatism Notes

  • Generate inputs relevant to the actual technology. Do not generate SQL injection payloads for code that never touches a database.
  • Respect the --depth flag. Quick depth should produce 10-20 inputs. Expert depth can produce hundreds.
  • Label each input clearly so testers understand what it targets and what behavior to expect.
  • Mark intentionally dangerous inputs (e.g., billion laughs XML) with a warning about resource consumption.
  • These are test inputs, not exploit code. Frame output as defensive testing material.
  • If the code already has strong validation visible in the source, generate inputs that specifically test the validation boundaries.
  • Include both inputs that should be rejected (malicious) and inputs that should be accepted (edge case valid) to test for false positives in validation.

适合场景

01

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

03

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

36.38%
按下载量换算26

Claude

28.67%
按下载量换算20

Cursor

17.68%
按下载量换算13

Gemini CLI

8.12%
按下载量换算6

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

可疑

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

执行命令

安装流程涉及命令执行,可能通过 npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill fuzz 联网下载 Skill 或依赖。用户安装前应确认命令来源、仓库内容和执行环境。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在 warning/failed 结果,不能写成本站确认安全。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

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