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defense-in-depth纵深防御

Agent Skill

defense-in-depth 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

总安装

285

周安装

12

GitHub Stars

160

下载量

208
CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

3

许可证

MIT

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:defense-in-depth(纵深防御)
来源仓库:https://github.com/yonatangross/orchestkit
仓库路径:skills/defense-in-depth
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/yonatangross/orchestkit --skill defense-in-depth
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。不同来源提供的安装方式可能略有差异;本站展示可直接复制的安装命令,安装前请核对来源页面。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/yonatangross/orchestkit --skill defense-in-depth

简介

用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息以支持纵深防御策略。defense-in-depth 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

  • 适合在需要根据关键词或任务场景快速定位候选结果时使用。
  • 可结合来源仓库和原始 README 进一步核验具体用法。
  • 安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态及是否触发联网或命令执行。
  • 注意该技能可能涉及敏感信息访问,请确保授权合规。

SKILL.md

Defense in Depth for AI Systems

Overview

Defense in depth applies multiple security layers so that if one fails, others still protect the system. For AI applications, this means validating at every boundary: edge, gateway, input, authorization, data, LLM, output, and observability.

Core Principle: No single security control should be the only thing protecting sensitive operations.

The 8-Layer Security Architecture

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Layer 0: EDGE           │  WAF, Rate Limiting, DDoS, Bot Detection    │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 1: GATEWAY        │  JWT Verify, Extract Claims, Build Context  │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 2: INPUT          │  Schema Validation, PII Detection, Injection│
│                          │  + Tavily Prompt Injection Firewall (opt.)  │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 3: AUTHORIZATION  │  RBAC/ABAC, Tenant Check, Resource Access   │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 4: DATA ACCESS    │  Parameterized Queries, Tenant Filter       │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 5: LLM            │  Prompt Building (no IDs), Context Separation│
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 6: OUTPUT         │  Schema Validation, Guardrails, Hallucination│
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 7: STORAGE        │  Attribution, Audit Trail, Encryption       │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Layer 8: OBSERVABILITY  │  Logging (sanitized), Tracing, Metrics      │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Layer Details

Layer 0: Edge Protection

Purpose: Stop attacks before they reach your application.

  • WAF rules for OWASP Top 10
  • Rate limiting per user/IP
  • DDoS protection
  • Bot detection
  • Geo-blocking if required

Layer 1: Gateway / Authentication

Purpose: Verify identity and build request context.

@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RequestContext:
    """Immutable context that flows through the system"""
    # Identity
    user_id: UUID
    tenant_id: UUID
    session_id: str
    permissions: frozenset[str]

    # Tracing
    request_id: str
    trace_id: str

    # Metadata
    timestamp: datetime
    client_ip: str

Layer 2: Input Validation

Purpose: Reject bad input early.

  • Schema validation: Pydantic/Zod for structure
  • Content validation: PII detection, malware scan
  • Injection defense: SQL, XSS, prompt injection patterns
  • External scanning (optional): Tavily prompt injection firewall for web-sourced content — pre-filters RAG inputs before they reach the LLM layer

Layer 3: Authorization

Purpose: Verify permission for the specific action and resource.

async def authorize(ctx: RequestContext, action: str, resource: Resource) -> bool:
    # 1. Check permission exists
    if action not in ctx.permissions:
        raise Forbidden("Missing permission")

    # 2. Check tenant ownership
    if resource.tenant_id != ctx.tenant_id:
        raise Forbidden("Cross-tenant access denied")

    # 3. Check resource-level access
    if not await check_resource_access(ctx.user_id, resource):
        raise Forbidden("No access to resource")

    return True

Layer 4: Data Access

Purpose: Ensure all queries are tenant-scoped.

class TenantScopedRepository:
    def __init__(self, ctx: RequestContext):
        self.ctx = ctx
        self._base_filter = {"tenant_id": ctx.tenant_id}

    async def find(self, query: dict) -> list[Model]:
        # ALWAYS merge tenant filter
        safe_query = {**self._base_filter, **query}
        return await self.db.find(safe_query)

Layer 5: LLM Orchestration

Purpose: Build prompts with content only, no identifiers.

  • Identifiers flow AROUND the LLM, not THROUGH it
  • Prompts contain only content text
  • No user_id, tenant_id, document_id in prompt text
  • See llm-safety-patterns skill for details

Layer 6: Output Validation

Purpose: Validate LLM output before use.

  • Schema validation (JSON structure)
  • Content guardrails (toxicity, PII generation)
  • Hallucination detection (grounding check)
  • Code injection prevention

Layer 7: Attribution & Storage

Purpose: Reattach context and store with proper attribution.

  • Attribution is deterministic, not LLM-generated
  • Context from Layer 1 is attached to results
  • Source references from Layer 4 are attached
  • Audit trail recorded

Layer 8: Observability

Purpose: Monitor without leaking sensitive data.

  • Structured logging with sanitization
  • Distributed tracing (Langfuse)
  • Metrics (latency, errors, costs)
  • Alerts for anomalies

Implementation Checklist

Before deploying any AI feature, verify:

  • Layer 0: Rate limiting configured
  • Layer 1: JWT validation active, RequestContext created
  • Layer 2: Pydantic models validate all input
  • Layer 3: Authorization check on every endpoint
  • Layer 4: All queries include tenant_id filter
  • Layer 5: No IDs in LLM prompts (run audit)
  • Layer 6: Output schema validation active
  • Layer 7: Attribution uses context, not LLM output
  • Layer 8: Logging sanitized, tracing enabled

Industry Sources

PatternSourceApplication
Defense in DepthNISTMultiple validation layers
Zero TrustGoogle BeyondCorpEvery request verified
Least PrivilegeAWS IAMMinimal permissions
Complete MediationSaltzer & SchroederEvery access checked

Integration with OrchestKit

This skill integrates with:

  • llm-safety-patterns - Layer 5 details
  • security-checklist - OWASP validations
  • observability-monitoring - Layer 8 details

Related Skills

  • owasp-top-10 - OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities that Layer 0-2 defend against
  • auth-patterns - Detailed authentication/authorization for Layers 1 and 3
  • input-validation - Input validation and sanitization patterns for Layer 2
  • security-scanning - Automated security scanning for ongoing defense validation

Key Decisions

DecisionChoiceRationale
Context objectImmutable dataclassPrevents accidental mutation, ensures consistent identity flow
Tenant isolationQuery-level filteringDefense in depth - application layer + database constraints
LLM prompt securityNo identifiers in promptsIDs flow around LLM, not through it - prevents prompt injection leaks
Audit loggingSanitized structured logsCompliance requirements while preventing PII exposure

Version: 1.0.0 (December 2025)

Capability Details

8-layer-architecture

Keywords: defense in depth, security layers, validation layers, multi-layer Solves:

  • How do I secure my AI application end-to-end?
  • What validation layers do I need?
  • How do I implement defense in depth?

request-context

Keywords: request context, immutable context, context object, user context Solves:

  • How do I pass user identity through the system?
  • How do I create an immutable request context?
  • What should be in the request context?

tenant-isolation

Keywords: multi-tenant, tenant isolation, tenant filter, cross-tenant Solves:

  • How do I ensure tenant isolation?
  • How do I prevent cross-tenant data access?
  • How do I filter queries by tenant?

audit-logging

Keywords: audit log, audit trail, logging, compliance Solves:

  • What should I log for compliance?
  • How do I create audit trails?
  • How do I log without leaking PII?

适合场景

01

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

03

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

04

需要参考平台分布和安装热度时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

补充不同宿主或平台的使用分布数据

能力 5

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

windsurf

31.51%
按下载量换算66

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22.44%
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Claude Code

20.2%
按下载量换算42

Antigravity

11.92%
按下载量换算25

Gemini CLI

8.8%
按下载量换算18

OpenCode

3.2%
按下载量换算7

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

external-service

该 Skill 可能调用第三方服务、云服务或外部模型 API,使用前需要确认账号、额度、数据发送范围和服务条款。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。

来源信息

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