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研究检索敏感数据github未标认证来源可访问许可证需确认审计提醒

supply-chain-auditor供应链审核员

Agent Skill

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

总安装

473

周安装

12

GitHub Stars

公开资料未说明

下载量

97
CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:supply-chain-auditor(供应链审核员)
来源仓库:https://github.com/erezrokah/skills
仓库路径:skills/supply-chain-auditor
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/erezrokah/skills --skill supply-chain-auditor
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/erezrokah/skills --skill supply-chain-auditor

简介

supply-chain-auditor 用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。

  • 适合梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险或生成安全复核清单,支持供应链安全场景。
  • 可分析鉴权逻辑和依赖关系,但不能把工具输出直接当作最终结论。
  • 涉及密钥、令牌或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限和操作边界。
  • 需结合脱敏方式和权限控制,避免对实际系统造成影响。

SKILL.md

Supply Chain Security Auditor

Phase 1: Repo Detection

Detect repository characteristics using Glob and Grep. Record which categories apply — skip inapplicable checks silently.

Signal file(s)Category flag
package.jsonjs
pnpm-lock.yaml OR pnpm-workspace.yamljs-pnpm
yarn.lockjs-yarn
package-lock.jsonjs-npm
bun.lock OR bun.lockbjs-bun
pyproject.toml OR requirements.txt OR setup.pypython
uv.lock OR [tool.uv] in pyproject.tomlpython-uv
Cargo.tomlrust
go.modgo
.github/workflows/*.yml or .github/workflows/*.yamlgithub-actions
.github/dependabot.ymldependabot
renovate.json OR renovate.json5 OR .renovaterc OR .renovaterc.json OR renovate key in package.jsonrenovate
.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md OR .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE/has-pr-template
Dockerfile OR docker-compose.yml OR docker-compose.yamldocker

Fallback: If dependabot not detected, run gh pr list --author 'app/dependabot' --state all --limit 1 — if results, set dependabot-pr-only. Same for renovate with --author 'app/renovate'renovate-pr-only.

Phase 2: Audit Checks

Severity levels: CRITICAL (actively exploitable) · HIGH (one step from exploitation) · MEDIUM (defense-in-depth gap) · LOW (best practice missing) · PASS (no issue)


Category 1: CI Issues — code fixes applied in PR

Findings in this category MUST be fixed with actual code changes committed in the PR branch.

1.1: GitHub Actions SHA Pinning

Applies to: github-actions

Search .github/workflows/*.yml, .github/workflows/*.yaml, and .github/actions/*/action.yml for uses: directives.

  • PASS: 40-char hex SHA (e.g., actions/checkout@a5ac7e51b41094c92402da3b24376905380afc29 # v4)
  • PASS: Local actions (./.github/actions/...)
  • CRITICAL: Tag or branch reference (e.g., actions/checkout@v4, some-org/action@main)

The actions/ org actions must still be pinned — no namespace is inherently safe.

1.2: Dangerous Workflow Triggers

Applies to: github-actions

  1. pull_request_targetCRITICAL if workflow checks out PR head (ref: ${{github.event.pull_request.head.sha}} or ref: ${{github.head_ref}}), HIGH otherwise.
  2. issue_commentHIGH if no author_association permission check found.
  3. workflow_runMEDIUM if it processes artifacts without validation.
  4. workflow_dispatch with ${{github.event.inputs.*}} interpolated in run: steps — MEDIUM (command injection).

1.3: Docker Image Pinning

Applies to: docker

Check Dockerfile and docker-compose.yml/docker-compose.yaml:

  • FROM image:latestHIGH
  • FROM image:tag without @sha256: digest — MEDIUM
  • FROM image@sha256:...PASS

1.4: CI Lock File Usage

Applies to: github-actions AND (js OR python OR rust)

Scan all .github/workflows/*.yml and .github/workflows/*.yaml run: steps for dependency install commands that bypass lockfiles:

  • npm install or npm i without using ci sub-command — HIGH. Fix: replace with npm ci.
  • yarn install (Yarn v1 / Classic) without --frozen-lockfileHIGH. Fix: add --frozen-lockfile. Note: Yarn v2+ (Berry) defaults to immutable installs in CI via enableImmutableInstalls, so yarn install without --immutable is PASS when using Yarn v2+.
  • pnpm install without --frozen-lockfilePASS. pnpm defaults to --frozen-lockfile when the CI environment variable is set (as in GitHub Actions). Adding the flag explicitly is acceptable for clarity but not required.
  • bun install or bun i without using ci sub-command — HIGH. Fix: replace with bun ci.
  • uv sync without --frozenMEDIUM. Fix: add --frozen.
  • cargo install without --lockedMEDIUM. Fix: add --locked.

1.5: Unpinned Dependencies in CI Commands

Applies to: github-actions

Scan run: steps in workflow files for commands that pull and execute unpinned packages at CI time:

  • npx <package>@latest or npx <package> without version pin — HIGH. Fix: pin exact version (e.g., npx package@1.2.3). Recommend adding the tool as a devDependency and running via lockfile instead, since pinning the tool version does not pin its transitive dependencies.
  • bunx <package>@latest or bunx <package> without version pin — HIGH. Fix: pin exact version (e.g., bunx package@1.2.3). Recommend adding the tool as a devDependency and running via lockfile instead, since pinning the tool version does not pin its transitive dependencies.
  • pip install <package> without == version pin in a run: step — HIGH. Fix: pin with == (e.g., pip install package==1.2.3). Recommend adding to requirements.txt with hashes (--require-hashes) or using uv with a lockfile, since pinning does not pin transitive dependencies.
  • npm install -g <package> without version pin — HIGH. Fix: pin exact version (e.g., npm install -g package@1.2.3).
  • go install <package>@latestHIGH. Fix: pin to an exact version (e.g., go install package@v1.2.3). Treat bare go install <package> (no @version suffix) as a finding only when it runs outside the repo module context; in module-aware mode a bare go install resolves from the current module's go.mod/go.sum and is not unpinned. Note: go install always builds from source with the module's go.sum, so transitive dependencies are already verified.
  • curl... | sh or wget... | sh (piped installs) — CRITICAL. Fix: replace with a package manager, or at minimum download to a file, verify a checksum, then execute.

Category 2: Automatic Dependency Updates — recommendations only

Findings in this category MUST NOT be fixed with code changes. Include them as actionable recommendations in the PR description.

2.1: Dependabot Cooldown (docs)

Applies to: dependabot OR dependabot-pr-only

If dependabot-pr-only: HIGH — no config file found, recommend creating .github/dependabot.yml with cooldown setting.

If dependabot: check each updates entry for cooldown.default-days. HIGH if missing, MEDIUM if < 3 days.

2.2: Renovate Minimum Release Age

Applies to: renovate OR renovate-pr-only

If renovate-pr-only: HIGH — no config file found, recommend creating renovate.json with minimumReleaseAge and helpers:pinGitHubActionDigests preset.

If renovate: check config files for:

  1. minimumReleaseAge (top-level or in packageRules) — HIGH if missing, MEDIUM if < 3 days.
  2. helpers:pinGitHubActionDigests in extendsMEDIUM if missing (when github-actions also detected).

Category 3: Dev Dependency Install — recommendations only

Findings in this category MUST NOT be fixed with code changes. Include them as actionable recommendations in the PR description.

3.1: Dependency Version Pinning

Applies to: all repo types with dependencies

Exception — downgrade to PASS when both: (1) a lockfile is committed, AND (2) a minimum release age / cooldown is configured (Dependabot cooldown, Renovate minimumReleaseAge, pnpm minimumReleaseAge, or uv exclude-newer). If only one condition is met, flag as normal.

JS — check all package.json files (root + workspace packages). Flag ^, ~, >=, >, *, latest in dependencies (HIGH) and devDependencies (MEDIUM). Do NOT flag workspace:*/workspace:^/workspace:~ references.

Python — check pyproject.toml, requirements.txt, setup.py, setup.cfg. Flag anything without == pin. HIGH.

Rust — check Cargo.toml. Flag deps without = prefix or using *. MEDIUM if Cargo.lock committed, HIGH if not.

Go — flag if go.sum not committed. HIGH.

3.2: pnpm Supply Chain Protections

Applies to: js-pnpm

Check pnpm-workspace.yaml:

  1. minimumReleaseAge — recommended 3 or 7 days. HIGH if missing.
  2. blockExoticSubdepsMEDIUM if missing.

3.3: uv Supply Chain Protections

Applies to: python-uv

Check pyproject.toml [tool.uv] and uv.toml for exclude-newer (RFC 3339 datetime). MEDIUM if missing. LOW if present but older than 90 days.

Phase 3: Output Format

Produce a markdown report with:

  • Header: repo name, date, detected ecosystems
  • Summary table: severity counts (CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW/PASS)
  • Category 1 — CI Issues (code fixes applied in this PR): findings grouped by severity, each with: file path (line N), issue description, concrete fix applied
  • Category 2 — Automatic Dependency Updates (recommendations): findings grouped by severity, each with: issue description, recommended action for the user to take
  • Category 3 — Dev Dependency Install (recommendations): findings grouped by severity, each with: issue description, recommended action for the user to take
  • Passed checks list
  • Collapsible "Why This Matters" section with real-world supply chain attack examples (include links and CVEs):

- GitHub Actions: Trivy (CVE-2026-33634), KICS (CVE-2026-33634), LiteLLM (CVE-2026-33634), reviewdog (CVE-2025-30154), tj-actions/changed-files (CVE-2025-30066) - Package registries: Axios npm compromise impacting OpenAI (2026), PyTorch torchtriton (2022), colors.js (CVE-2021-23567, 2022), ua-parser-js (2021), event-stream (2018)

  • Prioritized next steps, split into:

- Already fixed — Category 1 items addressed in this PR - Follow-up actions — Category 2 and 3 items for the user to address

Phase 4: PR Guidance

Duplicate PR Check

Before creating a PR, check for existing supply-chain hardening PRs:

  1. Run: gh pr list --search "supply chain" --state open --limit 5
  2. Run: gh pr list --search "supply chain" --state merged --limit 5
  3. If any open PR title contains "supply chain" or "supply-chain" — do not create a new PR. Inform the user and suggest updating the existing PR.
  4. If a merged PR with a matching title exists from the last 7 days — warn the user and ask for confirmation before proceeding.

PR Creation

Check for a PR template (.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md or .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE/) and follow it if present. Title: security: Harden supply chain <area>.

Code changes (Category 1 only): Create a branch and commit fixes for all Category 1 findings:

  • Pin GitHub Actions to SHA digests (1.1)
  • Fix dangerous workflow triggers (1.2)
  • Pin Docker images to SHA digests (1.3)
  • Add --frozen-lockfile / --locked / ci flags to CI install commands (1.4)
  • Pin or remove unpinned CI dependency references (1.5)

PR description structure:

## Summary
Brief description of supply chain hardening changes.

## Changes Made (CI Fixes)
- List each code change with file path and what was fixed

## Recommendations — Automatic Dependency Updates
> These items require manual follow-up and are NOT included as code changes in this PR.

- [ ] [2.1] ...
- [ ] [2.2] ...

## Recommendations — Dev Dependency Install Protections
> These items require manual follow-up and are NOT included as code changes in this PR.

- [ ] [3.1] ...
- [ ] [3.2] ...
- [ ] [3.3] ...

Only include recommendation sections that have findings. Use checkboxes so users can track follow-up.

Important Notes

  • Never suggest removing lockfiles.
  • When suggesting SHA pinning, look up the actual SHA using gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/git/ref/tags/{tag}. Do not invent SHAs.
  • For monorepos, check all package.json files, not just root.
  • Always include exact file paths and line numbers in findings.
  • When fixing CI install commands (1.4), preserve existing flags — only append the lockfile flag if missing.

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安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

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按下载量换算35

Claude

28.26%
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Cursor

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按下载量换算18

Gemini CLI

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可疑

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敏感数据

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安装前确认

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