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social-trust-manipulation-detector社会信任操纵探测器

Agent Skill

social-trust-manipulation-detector 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 OpenClaw 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

总安装

14,517

周安装

593

GitHub Stars

公开资料未说明

下载量

4,649
OpenClaw

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

MIT-0

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:social-trust-manipulation-detector(社会信任操纵探测器)
来源仓库:https://github.com/andyxinweiminicloud/social-trust-manipulation-detector
安装命令:
openclaw skills install social-trust-manipulation-detector
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 OpenClaw 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

ClawHubOpenClaw
openclaw skills install social-trust-manipulation-detector

简介

social-trust-manipulation-detector 识别代理市场中协调的社会信任操纵行为。

  • 检测马甲网络、声誉刷量、协同投票等异常活动,评估平台生态健康度。
  • 服务于社区治理与反作弊机制建设,保障公平竞争环境。
  • 算法基于公开行为日志分析,可能存在误判,需人工复核关键结论。
  • 适用宿主包括 OpenClaw,接入前应确认版本、权限和运行环境要求。

SKILL.md

name
social-trust-manipulation-detector
description
>
version
1.0.0
metadata
openclaw
requires
bins
[curl, python3]
env
[]
emoji
🎭
agent_card
capabilities
[social-trust-manipulation-detection, sockpuppet-network-detection, coordinated-upvoting-detection, reputation-gaming-analysis]
attack_surface
[L1]
trust_dimension
rule-adoption
published
clawhub
false
moltbook
false

Your Trust Score Is Real. The Signals Behind It Are Manufactured.

Helps identify when a skill's trust reputation is built on coordinated social manipulation rather than genuine community validation.

Problem

Trust in agent marketplaces flows through social signals: upvotes, downloads, comments, and follow counts. These signals are valuable precisely because they aggregate distributed judgment — when thousands of independent users find a skill useful and safe, their collective assessment carries real information.

The assumption of independence is the attack surface. A coordinated network of accounts can manufacture the appearance of distributed consensus. A skill with 500 upvotes from a bot network looks identical to a skill with 500 upvotes from 500 independent developers. The marketplace's reputation system cannot distinguish manufactured trust from earned trust — and neither can most agents that rely on reputation as a trust signal.

Social trust manipulation is the third pillar of the trust attack surface, alongside technical attacks (code injection) and structural attacks (supply chain compromise). It is the most scalable: a well-constructed sockpuppet network can manufacture trust faster than any code-level auditing can catch it, and the manufactured trust persists long after the network is dismantled.

Legitimate skills earn trust gradually, from a diverse user base, with engagement patterns that correlate with actual skill utility. Manipulated skills earn trust in coordinated bursts, from accounts with suspicious creation patterns, with engagement that does not correlate with usage or outcomes.

What This Detects

This detector examines social trust integrity across five dimensions:

  1. Engagement velocity anomalies — Does the skill's vote/download

trajectory show natural growth curves, or coordinated burst patterns? Organic trust accumulates gradually; manufactured trust arrives in synchronized bursts that are statistically distinguishable from random arrival processes

  1. Account cohort analysis — Do the skill's early upvoters share

creation dates, activity patterns, or cross-voting behavior that suggests coordinated rather than independent operation? Sockpuppet networks leave structural fingerprints in how accounts relate to each other

  1. Engagement-to-utility correlation — Do social signals correlate with

actual skill usage metrics? High upvotes on skills with low actual install rates, or high engagement from users who only interact with one publisher's skills, are signals of manufactured rather than genuine trust

  1. Cross-publisher coordination — Do multiple publishers in a marketplace

show correlated voting patterns, where their respective supporter networks upvote each other's skills at rates that exceed random baseline? Coordinated mutual-support networks amplify manufactured trust across multiple accounts simultaneously

  1. Review authenticity signals — Do comments and reviews on the skill

show the linguistic diversity and specificity expected from independent users, or do they share vocabulary, complaint patterns, or phrasing that suggests template-generated or coordinated content?

How to Use

Input: Provide one of:

  • A skill identifier to assess the authenticity of its trust signals
  • A publisher account to analyze for coordinated network membership
  • A set of skills to assess for cross-publisher coordination patterns

Output: A manipulation detection report containing:

  • Engagement velocity analysis (organic vs. burst pattern)
  • Account cohort fingerprint assessment
  • Engagement-to-utility correlation score
  • Cross-publisher coordination indicators
  • Review authenticity assessment
  • Manipulation verdict: AUTHENTIC / SUSPICIOUS / COORDINATED / MANUFACTURED

Example

Input: Assess social trust integrity for ai-assistant-toolkit publisher

🎭 SOCIAL TRUST MANIPULATION ASSESSMENT

Publisher: ai-assistant-toolkit
Skills assessed: 4 (productivity-suite, auto-responder, data-fetcher, doc-reader)
Audit timestamp: 2025-09-05T12:00:00Z

Engagement velocity:
  productivity-suite: 0 → 847 upvotes in 72 hours of launch ⚠️
  auto-responder: 0 → 623 upvotes in 48 hours of launch ⚠️
  data-fetcher: 0 → 412 upvotes in 60 hours of launch ⚠️
  Organic baseline for comparable skills: 15-40 upvotes in first 72h
  → Burst pattern detected across all 4 skills

Account cohort analysis:
  First 200 upvoters on productivity-suite:
    Accounts created within 30-day window: 156/200 (78%) ⚠️
    Cross-voting with auto-responder upvoters: 143/200 (71.5%) ⚠️
    Accounts with no other skill interactions: 168/200 (84%) ⚠️
  → Sockpuppet cohort fingerprint detected

Engagement-to-utility correlation:
  productivity-suite: 847 upvotes, 23 installs (ratio: 36.8:1) ⚠️
  auto-responder: 623 upvotes, 18 installs (ratio: 34.6:1) ⚠️
  Organic baseline ratio: 2:1 to 8:1 for comparable skills
  → Upvote-to-install ratio 4-18x above organic baseline

Cross-publisher coordination:
  ai-assistant-toolkit upvoter network also upvoted:
    fastcoder-pro (different publisher): 89% overlap ⚠️
    quick-deploy-kit (different publisher): 76% overlap ⚠️
  → Mutual support network detected across 3 publishers

Review authenticity:
  Top 20 reviews analyzed:
    Unique vocabulary: 34 terms (low for 20 reviews) ⚠️
    Specificity: Generic praise, no feature-specific feedback
    Phrasing patterns: "absolutely essential", "game-changer" × 7 reviews

Manipulation verdict: MANUFACTURED
  All four skills show coordinated burst voting, sockpuppet cohort fingerprints,
  upvote-to-install ratios far above organic baseline, and cross-publisher
  mutual support network membership. Trust signals for this publisher's skills
  do not represent independent community validation.

Recommended actions:
  1. Treat trust score as unauthenticated pending platform investigation
  2. Evaluate skills on technical merit only, disregarding social signals
  3. Report coordination pattern to marketplace moderators
  4. Flag fastcoder-pro and quick-deploy-kit for same network membership
  5. Apply technical audit (supply-chain, permission-creep) before any install

Related Tools

  • clone-farm-detector — Detects content-level cloning for reputation gaming;

social-trust-manipulation-detector catches social-level gaming that can occur even with original, non-cloned content

  • publisher-identity-verifier — Verifies publisher identity integrity;

sockpuppet networks may impersonate multiple independent publishers when they are controlled by a single actor

  • trust-velocity-calculator — Quantifies trust decay from update velocity;

manufactured trust does not decay the same way as earned trust and creates distorted velocity measurements

  • blast-radius-estimator — Estimates propagation impact if a skill is

compromised; skills with manufactured trust may have artificially high install counts that misrepresent actual blast radius

Limitations

Social trust manipulation detection depends on access to engagement metadata (account creation dates, cross-voting patterns, install counts) that many marketplaces do not expose through public APIs. Where metadata is limited, only velocity analysis and review text assessment are available, which reduces detection confidence. Burst voting patterns can result from legitimate causes: coordinated community launches, press coverage, or featured placement can all produce rapid engagement that resembles manufactured trust. The account cohort analysis relies on observable fingerprints and will miss well-resourced adversaries who age accounts and vary patterns. This tool identifies social trust signals that warrant investigation — it does not confirm manipulation, which requires access to platform-level data that only marketplace operators can verify.

适合场景

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02

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

03

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

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能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

补充不同宿主或平台的使用分布数据

能力 5

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

OpenClaw

87.55%
按下载量换算4,070

安全审计

VirusTotal

通过

ClawScan

可疑

Static analysis

未展示

权限和风险

需要联网

该 Skill 可能需要联网访问来源站点、仓库或外部 API;具体网络访问范围需要结合源码和 README 复核。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在 warning/failed 结果,不能写成本站确认安全。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

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