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研究检索敏感数据clawhub未标认证来源可访问clear审计提醒

shadows-security-scanner阴影安全扫描仪

Agent Skill

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

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13,782

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下载量

4,459
OpenClaw

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

MIT-0

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:shadows-security-scanner(阴影安全扫描仪)
来源仓库:https://github.com/nakedoshadow/shadows-security-scanner
安装命令:
openclaw skills install shadows-security-scanner
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 OpenClaw 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

ClawHubOpenClaw
openclaw skills install shadows-security-scanner

简介

基于七阶段安全审计管道(侦察至报告)的系统化安全检查工具。

  • 适合全面评估应用安全、API 风险与 OWASP 合规性。
  • 通过 clawhub 安装并使用 openclaw skills install shadows-security-scanner 命令启用。
  • 不能将扫描结果直接作为最终结论,需人工复核关键发现。
  • 建议在使用前确认其对生产系统的最小影响与脱敏机制。

SKILL.md

name
security-scanner
description
7-phase security audit pipeline — reconnaissance, dependency scan, application tests, API security, hardening check, OWASP verification, report. Use before production deployments or post-incident.
metadata
{ "openclaw": { "emoji": "🛡️", "homepage": "https://clawhub.ai/NakedoShadow", "requires": { "bins": ["git"], "anyBins": ["npm", "pip", "pip3", "cargo"] }, "os": ["darwin", "linux", "win32"] } }

Security Scanner — 7-Phase Audit Pipeline

Version: 1.1.0 | Author: Shadows Company | License: MIT


WHEN TO TRIGGER

  • Before any production deployment
  • After a security incident
  • Regular scheduled audit (monthly recommended)
  • New dependency or library added
  • User says "security audit", "check for vulnerabilities", "scan security"
  • Code review for security-sensitive features (auth, payments, data handling)

WHEN NOT TO TRIGGER

  • Simple UI changes with no data handling
  • Documentation-only changes

PREREQUISITES

Required:

  • git — Used in Phase 6 to scan git history for leaked secrets via git log --all -p. Detection: which git or git --version.

Optional (auto-detected for dependency scanning in Phase 2):

  • npm — Node.js package manager. Runs npm audit --json for JavaScript/TypeScript projects. Detected via which npm and presence of package.json.
  • pip / pip3 — Python package manager. Runs pip audit for Python projects. Detected via which pip or which pip3 and presence of requirements.txt or pyproject.toml.
  • cargo — Rust package manager. Runs cargo audit for Rust projects. Detected via which cargo and presence of Cargo.toml.
  • curl — Used optionally in Phase 5 for HTTP security header checks. Only invoked when the user provides a target URL. Detected via which curl.

If no package manager is detected, Phase 2 is skipped with a note in the report.


PROTOCOL — 7 PHASES

Phase 1 — RECONNAISSANCE

Map the attack surface:

  1. List all entry points (routes, APIs, webhooks, forms)
  2. Identify data flows (user input -> storage -> output)
  3. Map authentication and authorization boundaries
  4. Identify external service integrations
  5. Check for exposed ports and services
# Node.js — find all route definitions
grep -rn "app\.\(get\|post\|put\|delete\|patch\)" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" -l

# Python — find all route definitions
grep -rn "@app\.\(route\|get\|post\)" --include="*.py" -l

Phase 2 — DEPENDENCY SCAN

Check for known vulnerabilities in dependencies:

# Node.js — requires npm
npm audit --json 2>/dev/null || echo "npm audit not available — install npm or skip Phase 2"

# Python — requires pip-audit (pip install pip-audit)
pip audit 2>/dev/null || echo "pip audit not available — install pip-audit or skip Phase 2"

# Rust — requires cargo-audit (cargo install cargo-audit)
cargo audit 2>/dev/null || echo "cargo-audit not available — install cargo-audit or skip Phase 2"

For each vulnerability found:

  • Severity (Critical/High/Medium/Low)
  • CVE identifier
  • Affected package and version
  • Available fix version
  • Is it exploitable in this context?
NOTE: npm audit and pip audit make network calls to vulnerability databases (registry.npmjs.org, pypi.org/pyup.io). These are read-only queries.

Phase 3 — APPLICATION SECURITY TESTS

Check OWASP Top 10:

  1. Injection (SQL, NoSQL, OS, LDAP)

- Search for string concatenation in queries - Verify parameterized queries are used

   grep -rn "f['\"].*SELECT\|f['\"].*INSERT\|f['\"].*UPDATE" --include="*.py"
   grep -rn "query.*\+\|exec.*\+" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts"
  1. Broken Authentication

- Check session management: grep -rn "session\|cookie\|jwt\|token" --include="*.py" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" | grep -i "expir\|ttl\|maxage" - Verify MFA implementation if applicable

  1. Sensitive Data Exposure

- Search for hardcoded secrets:

   grep -rniE "(password|secret|api_key|token|private_key)\s*[:=]\s*['\"][^'\"]{8,}" --include="*.py" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" --include="*.env"

- Check HTTPS enforcement, HSTS headers

  1. XSS — Search for unsanitized user input in HTML output:
   grep -rn "innerHTML\|dangerouslySetInnerHTML\|v-html\|\|safe" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" --include="*.jsx" --include="*.tsx" --include="*.html" --include="*.py"
  1. CSRF — Verify anti-CSRF tokens on state-changing endpoints
  2. Insecure Deserialization — Search for dangerous deserialization:
   grep -rn "eval(\|pickle\.loads\|yaml\.load(" --include="*.py" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts"

Phase 4 — API SECURITY

For each API endpoint:

  1. Authentication required? (JWT, API key, session)
  2. Authorization enforced? (role checks, ownership validation)
  3. Rate limiting configured?
  4. Input validation present? (schema validation, type checking)
  5. Response doesn't leak internal details? (stack traces, DB structure)
  6. CORS properly configured?

Phase 5 — HARDENING CHECK

Verify infrastructure hardening.

HTTP Security Headers (only when user provides a target URL):

# Replace $TARGET_URL with the URL provided by the user
curl -sI "$TARGET_URL" | grep -iE "(strict-transport|content-security|x-frame|x-content-type)"
IMPORTANT: Only run this check when user provides a target URL. Never make network requests to URLs not explicitly provided by the user.

Checklist:

  • [ ] Strict-Transport-Security header present
  • [ ] Content-Security-Policy header present
  • [ ] X-Frame-Options header present
  • [ ] X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff header present
  • [ ] No server version exposed in response headers
  • [ ] Debug mode disabled in production config
  • [ ] Error pages don't leak stack traces (inspect error handlers in code)
  • [ ] File upload restrictions enforced (check upload handlers for size/type validation)

Phase 6 — SECRETS VERIFICATION

# Check git history for leaked secrets (local operation, no network)
git log --all -p | grep -iE "(api[_-]?key|secret|token|password)\s*[:=]\s*['\"]" | head -20

# Verify .gitignore covers sensitive files
cat .gitignore | grep -E "(\.env|secret|credential|\.pem|\.key)"

Verify:

  • [ ] .env files listed in .gitignore
  • [ ] No secrets found in git history
  • [ ] Secrets stored in environment variables or vault
  • [ ] No secrets printed in logs or error messages

Phase 7 — REPORT

Generate a structured security report using the OUTPUT FORMAT below.


LIMITATIONS

Grep-based scanning (Phases 3 and 6) uses pattern matching to detect common vulnerability signatures. This approach has inherent limitations:

False positives:

  • Comments or documentation containing patterns like password = "example" will be flagged
  • Test fixtures with dummy secrets (e.g., api_key = "test_key_123") will trigger alerts
  • String comparisons against constant values (e.g., if method == "SELECT") may be flagged as injection

False negatives:

  • Obfuscated secrets (base64-encoded, split across variables) will not be detected
  • Indirect injection via variable references (e.g., query = build_query(user_input)) is not caught
  • Secrets committed then deleted from history require --all flag and full history scan
  • Framework-specific vulnerability patterns not covered by generic regexes

Recommendation: Complement grep-based scans with dedicated tools:

  • SAST: Semgrep, CodeQL, or Bandit (Python)
  • Secrets: gitleaks, trufflehog, or detect-secrets
  • DAST: OWASP ZAP, Burp Suite, or Nuclei
  • SCA: Snyk, Dependabot, or Trivy

RULES

  1. Never skip phases — even if project seems simple
  2. Evidence-based — every finding must have file:line or command output
  3. Severity accuracy — don't inflate or downplay risks
  4. Actionable remediation — every finding must include HOW to fix
  5. No false security — passing this scan doesn't mean 100% secure

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

  • Commands executed: grep (local pattern matching), git log (local history scan), npm audit / pip audit / cargo audit (dependency vulnerability check), curl (HTTP HEAD request — Phase 5 only).
  • Network access: Phase 2 dependency scanners (npm audit, pip audit) make read-only queries to vulnerability databases. Phase 5 makes ONE outbound HTTP HEAD request via curl to check security headers — only when the user provides a target URL. All other phases are local-only.
  • Data read: Source files, dependency manifests, git history — all within the local repository.
  • File modification: None. This skill is read-only.
  • Persistence: None.
  • Credentials: None required by the skill itself. Scanned output may display secret-like patterns found in the repository — run in a secure terminal.
  • Sandboxing: Not required (no code execution). Standard terminal security applies when displaying scan results.

OUTPUT FORMAT

# Security Audit Report
**Date**: [YYYY-MM-DD]
**Scope**: [project/module name]
**Auditor**: [agent name]

## Executive Summary
- Critical: [count] | High: [count] | Medium: [count] | Low: [count]
- Overall Risk: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]

## Findings

### [CRITICAL/HIGH] Finding Title
- **Category**: [OWASP category]
- **Location**: [file:line]
- **Description**: [what's wrong]
- **Impact**: [what could happen]
- **Remediation**: [how to fix]
- **Status**: [Open/Fixed]

## Dependency Vulnerabilities
| Package | Severity | CVE | Fix Version |
|---------|----------|-----|-------------|
| ...     | ...      | ... | ...         |

## Hardening Status
| Check | Status |
|-------|--------|
| HSTS  | [PASS/FAIL] |
| CSP   | [PASS/FAIL] |
| ...   | ...    |

## Recommendations (Priority Order)
1. [Most critical action]
2. [Second priority]
3. [Third priority]

Published by Shadows Company — "We work in the shadows to serve the Light."

适合场景

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用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

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能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

补充不同宿主或平台的使用分布数据

能力 5

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

OpenClaw

85.66%
按下载量换算3,820

安全审计

VirusTotal

可疑

ClawScan

通过

Static analysis

未展示

权限和风险

敏感数据

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安装前确认

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来源信息

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