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security-incident-reporting安全事件报告

Agent Skill

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

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1,148

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CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

3

许可证

MIT

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:security-incident-reporting(安全事件报告)
来源仓库:https://github.com/dirnbauer/webconsulting-skills
仓库路径:skills/security-incident-reporting
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/dirnbauer/webconsulting-skills --skill security-incident-reporting
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

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复制命令到本机终端执行。不同来源提供的安装方式可能略有差异;本站展示可直接复制的安装命令,安装前请核对来源页面。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/dirnbauer/webconsulting-skills --skill security-incident-reporting

简介

辅助编写标准化安全事件报告文档。security-incident-reporting 属于运维和基础设施类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

  • 结构化呈现时间线、影响范围和处置措施。
  • 支持符合监管要求的格式化输出(如 GDPR、等保)。
  • 敏感信息需脱敏处理,仅用于内部复盘。
  • 可在 Codex、Gemini CLI 等平台生成报告初稿。

SKILL.md

Security Incident Reporting

Comprehensive framework for documenting and analyzing security incidents, drawing from NIST SP 800-61 and SANS methodologies.

When to Use

  • After a security incident (DDoS, breach, vulnerability exploitation)
  • Creating post-mortem documentation
  • Communicating with stakeholders (C-level, legal, security teams)
  • Correlating attack patterns with known CVEs
  • Establishing incident response metrics (MTTR, dwell time)

Related Skills


1. Incident Response Framework

NIST SP 800-61 / SANS Harmonization

PhaseNISTSANSDocumentation Focus
1PreparationPreparationRunbooks, contacts, tools
2Detection & AnalysisIdentificationInitial detection, triage
3ContainmentContainmentIsolation actions, timeline
4EradicationEradicationRoot cause removal
5RecoveryRecoveryService restoration
6Post-IncidentLessons LearnedPost-mortem, improvements

Documentation Principle

Logbuch-Prinzip: Document in real-time during the incident, then consolidate into the post-mortem report. Never create reports retrospectively from memory.

2. Severity Rating Systems

NCISS (National Cyber Incident Scoring System)

LevelScoreDescription
Emergency (1)100Nation-state attack, critical infrastructure
Severe (2)80-99Significant impact, data exfiltration
High (3)60-79Service disruption, potential data loss
Medium (4)40-59Limited impact, contained breach
Low (5)20-39Minor incident, no data loss
Baseline (6)0-19Informational, false positive

DDoS Resiliency Score (DRS)

LevelDescriptionTypical Bandwidth
1-2Simple Floods< 1 Gbps
3-4Sophisticated Multi-Vector1-5 Gbps
5-6Advanced (State-Actor Level)5-100 Gbps
7Extreme (Hyper-Volumetric)> 100 Gbps

CVSS Integration

For vulnerability-based incidents, include CVSS v3.1 base score from the security-audit skill.


3. Incident Report Template

Module A: Metadata & Executive Summary

# Security Incident Report

## Metadata
| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| Incident ID | SIR-2026-001 |
| Classification | Confidential |
| Status | Closed / Active / Under Investigation |
| Detection Time | 2026-01-21 14:32 UTC |
| Resolution Time | 2026-01-21 15:17 UTC |
| MTTR | 45 minutes |
| Severity | High (NCISS: 65) |
| Lead Analyst | Jane Doe |
| Affected Systems | web-cluster-01, cdn-edge-eu |

## Executive Summary (max 200 words)

On [DATE], our monitoring systems detected [INCIDENT TYPE] targeting [SYSTEMS].
The attack [IMPACT DESCRIPTION]. Through [RESPONSE ACTIONS], normal operations
were restored within [TIMEFRAME]. [DATA IMPACT STATEMENT].

### Business Impact
- Service Availability: [Degraded/Offline for X minutes]
- Data Impact: [None/Potential exposure of X records]
- Financial Impact: [Estimated cost]
- Reputation Impact: [Public/Internal]

Module B: Timeline (Chronological Analysis)

## Incident Timeline

| Time (UTC) | Event | Source | Action Taken |
|------------|-------|--------|--------------|
| 14:32 | Traffic spike detected | Cloudflare Alert | On-call notified |
| 14:35 | 5x baseline traffic confirmed | Grafana | Incident declared |
| 14:38 | Geo-blocking activated | Cloudflare | EU/US traffic filtered |
| 14:42 | Attack vector identified: UDP amplification | DPI Analysis | Null-route for UDP/427 |
| 14:55 | Traffic normalized | Monitoring | Mitigation confirmed |
| 15:17 | All systems stable | Status page | Incident closed |

### Dwell Time Analysis
- Time to Detection (TTD): 0 minutes (automated)
- Time to Containment (TTC): 10 minutes
- Time to Eradication (TTE): 23 minutes
- Time to Recovery (TTR): 45 minutes

Module C: Technical Analysis & IoCs

## Technical Analysis

### Attack Vectors (MITRE ATT&CK)
- T1498: Network Denial of Service
- T1498.001: Direct Network Flood
- T1498.002: Reflection Amplification

### Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

#### Network Artifacts
| Type | Value | Context |
|------|-------|---------|
| IP Range | 192.0.2.0/24 | Source (spoofed) |
| ASN | AS12345 | Amplification source |
| Port | UDP/427 | SLP Amplification |
| Signature | \x00\x00\x00\x00SLP | Payload pattern |

#### System Artifacts
| Type | Value | Hash (SHA256) |
|------|-------|---------------|
| Modified File | /var/www/shell.php | a1b2c3... |
| New User | backdoor_admin | N/A |
| Cron Job | /tmp/.hidden/beacon | d4e5f6... |

### Root Cause Analysis (5-Whys)
1. Why did the attack succeed? → Amplification ports were exposed
2. Why were ports exposed? → Firewall rules not updated after migration
3. Why weren't rules updated? → No automated validation in deployment
4. Why no automation? → Security review not in CI/CD pipeline
5. Why not in pipeline? → Technical debt, prioritized features

**Root Cause**: Missing security validation in deployment pipeline

4. DDoS Post-Mortem Analysis

Metrics Table

MetricValueThresholdStatus
Peak Bandwidth45 Gbps10 GbpsExceeded
Peak Packets/sec12M PPS5M PPSExceeded
Peak Requests/sec850K RPS100K RPSExceeded
Unique Source IPs145,000N/AAmplification
Attack Duration45 minN/A-
Geographic Spread89 countriesN/AGlobal botnet

Attack Vector Classification

Vector% of TrafficTypeMitigation
UDP Flood60%VolumetricNull-route
SYN Flood25%ProtocolSYN cookies
HTTP Flood15%ApplicationRate limiting

Multi-Vector Detection

Was this a smoke-screen attack?
├── Volumetric attack started: 14:32
├── Application-layer probing detected: 14:38
├── Login brute-force attempts: 14:40-14:45
└── Conclusion: Coordinated multi-vector attack

5. CVE Correlation for DDoS

Map attack signatures to known vulnerabilities for threat intelligence.

Amplification Vector CVE Table

Attack TypePortAmplification FactorCVEDescription
NTP MonlistUDP/123556xCVE-2013-5211NTP mode 7 monlist
MemcachedUDP/1121151,000xCVE-2018-1000115UDP reflection
CLDAPUDP/38970xCVE-2020-9490LDAP reflection
SLPUDP/4272,200xCVE-2023-29552Service Location Protocol
DNSUDP/5354xVariousOpen resolver abuse
SSDPUDP/190030xVariousUPnP reflection
ChargenUDP/19358xCVE-1999-0103Character generator

Analysis Example

## CVE Correlation Analysis

Traffic analysis shows 40% of UDP flood originated from port 427.
Deep Packet Inspection confirmed payloads typical for CVE-2023-29552.

**Conclusion**: Botnet leveraging unpatched VMware ESXi instances as
SLP reflectors. Recommend:
1. Verify our infrastructure is not acting as reflector
2. Block UDP/427 at edge
3. Report to upstream provider

6. Impact Assessment Matrix

Operational Impact

CategoryLevelDescription
AvailabilityCriticalComplete outage for 15 minutes
PerformanceHigh50% degradation for 30 minutes
CollateralMediumAPI gateway affected

Financial Impact

CategoryEstimated Cost
Lost Revenue$15,000
Scrubbing Overage$2,500
Incident Response$5,000 (8 person-hours)
Total$22,500

Reputation Impact

ChannelSeverityAction Required
Social MediaMediumPrepared statement
B2B PartnersLowDirect notification
PressNoneNo external coverage

7. Blameless Post-Mortem

Principles

  1. Focus on systems, not individuals: "Why did the process allow X?" not "Who did X?"
  2. Assume good intentions: Everyone acted with the best information available
  3. Learn, don't punish: Goal is improvement, not blame
  4. Share openly: Publish internally for organizational learning

Post-Mortem Template

## Post-Mortem: [Incident Title]

### What Happened
[Factual description of the incident]

### What Went Well
- Detection was automated (0 min TTD)
- On-call responded within SLA
- Communication was clear

### What Went Wrong
- Firewall rules were outdated
- No alerting for UDP traffic spikes
- Runbook was incomplete

### Action Items
| ID | Action | Owner | Due Date | Status |
|----|--------|-------|----------|--------|
| 1 | Add security validation to CI/CD | @devops | 2026-02-01 | Open |
| 2 | Update runbook with DDoS procedures | @security | 2026-01-28 | Open |
| 3 | Implement UDP traffic alerting | @sre | 2026-02-05 | Open |

### Lessons Learned
- Automated security gates prevent configuration drift
- Regular runbook reviews are essential
- Multi-vector attacks require layered defense

8. Report Distribution

Classification Levels

LevelAudienceContent
ExecutiveC-Level, BoardSummary, business impact, remediation status
TechnicalSecurity Team, SOCFull IoCs, TTPs, forensic details
LegalLegal, ComplianceData impact, regulatory implications
PublicCustomers, PressSanitized summary, no technical details

Retention Requirements

Document TypeRetentionStorage
Full Incident Report7 yearsEncrypted archive
IoC Data2 yearsThreat Intelligence Platform
Logs & Evidence1 yearImmutable storage

9. Checklists

Pre-Incident Preparation

  • Incident response runbooks documented
  • On-call rotation established
  • Communication templates prepared
  • Evidence collection tools ready
  • Stakeholder contact list updated

During Incident

  • Incident declared and logged
  • Timeline documentation started
  • Evidence preserved (logs, packets)
  • Stakeholders notified
  • Status page updated

Post-Incident

  • Full incident report completed
  • Post-mortem meeting scheduled
  • Action items assigned and tracked
  • Lessons learned documented
  • Controls validated/improved

References


Credits & Attribution

This skill draws from the "Handbuch für Advanced Security Incident Reporting" methodology, incorporating elements of NIST SP 800-61, SANS frameworks, and industry best practices.

Developed by webconsulting.at for the Claude skill collection.

Source: https://github.com/dirnbauer/webconsulting-skills

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执行命令

安装流程涉及命令执行,可能通过 npx skills add https://github.com/dirnbauer/webconsulting-skills --skill security-incident-reporting;npx skills add dirnbauer/webconsulting-skills --skill "security-incident-reporting" 联网下载 Skill 或依赖。用户安装前应确认命令来源、仓库内容和执行环境。

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