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review-security审查安全

Agent Skill

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

总安装

240

周安装

10

GitHub Stars

公开资料未说明

下载量

80
CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:review-security(审查安全)
来源仓库:https://github.com/nielsmadan/agentic-coding
仓库路径:skills/review-security
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/nielsmadan/agentic-coding --skill review-security
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/nielsmadan/agentic-coding --skill review-security

简介

review-security 用于辅助安全审计和权限检查,适合梳理敏感配置和分析鉴权逻辑。

  • 适用于漏洞排查、依赖风险检查和认证流程审查等安全场景。
  • 使用时不能将工具输出直接当作最终结论,需先确认最小权限和操作边界。
  • 涉及密钥、令牌或生产系统时应先确认脱敏方式和操作限制。
  • 可通过 npx skills add 命令从指定 GitHub 仓库安装使用。

SKILL.md

Review Security

Security audit for common vulnerabilities and unsafe patterns.

Usage

/review-security              # Review context-related code
/review-security --staged     # Review staged changes
/review-security --all        # Full codebase audit (parallel agents)

Scope

FlagScopeMethod
(none)Context-related codeFiles from the current conversation context: any files the user has discussed, opened, or that you have read/edited in this session. If no conversation context exists, ask the user to specify files or use --staged/--all.
--stagedStaged changesgit diff --cached --name-only
--allFull codebaseGlob source files, parallel agents

Do NOT skip checks:

  • "This code is internal only" -- Internal code gets compromised too
  • "This is just a prototype" -- Prototypes become production code
  • "I already checked for the obvious issues" -- The non-obvious ones are the dangerous ones

Gotchas

  • Dependency audit commands (pip-audit, safety check, bundle audit, govulncheck) must be installed separately. If missing, they silently produce no output rather than erroring.
  • --staged reviews the full file content, not just the diff. Pre-existing vulnerabilities in the file are flagged even if the staged change is unrelated.

Workflow

  1. Determine scope based on flags (see Scope table above)
  2. Review each file against the Security Checklist below, prioritizing categories in this order:

1. Injection (OWASP 2021 A03) — highest exploitation likelihood 2. Sensitive Data Exposure (OWASP 2021 A02) — hardcoded secrets are easy wins 3. Broken Authentication (OWASP 2021 A07) — auth bugs have outsized impact 4. Security Misconfiguration (OWASP 2021 A05) — config issues are common in PRs 5. Dependency Vulnerabilities — run audit commands last (they take time)

  1. Parallelize if scope has >5 files: spawn one sub-agent per checklist category, each scanning all files. Merge results and deduplicate.
  2. Check dependencies using the ecosystem-specific commands in the Dependency Vulnerabilities section
  3. Classify severity for each finding:

- Critical: Exploitable vulnerability with direct user/data impact (e.g., SQL injection on a public endpoint, hardcoded production secret) - High: Vulnerability requiring specific conditions to exploit but with serious impact (e.g., XSS in admin panel, missing rate limiting on login) - Medium: Security weakness that increases attack surface (e.g., overly permissive CORS, debug mode flag) - Suggestion: Defense-in-depth improvement (e.g., adding CSP headers, tightening cookie flags)

  1. Report findings grouped by severity using the Output Format below

Security Checklist

References below use OWASP Top 10 2021 category numbers (A01–A10).

For code examples, grep patterns, false-positive rules, and dependency audit commands, see references/security-checklist.md.

Injection (OWASP A03)

  • No string concatenation in SQL queries (use parameterized queries)
  • No unsanitized user input passed to shell commands
  • No direct HTML insertion from user content (use textContent or a sanitizer)

Broken Authentication (OWASP A07)

  • Passwords hashed with bcrypt/argon2 (not MD5/SHA1)
  • Rate limiting on login endpoints
  • Session tokens are secure (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite)
  • No credentials in URLs or logs
  • Account lockout after failed attempts

Sensitive Data Exposure (OWASP A02)

  • No hardcoded secrets, API keys, or passwords in source code (use environment variables)
  • No sensitive fields (passwords, tokens) written to logs
  • Grep source files for secret patterns — see references/security-checklist.md for patterns and false-positive filtering rules

Security Misconfiguration (OWASP A05)

  • Debug mode disabled in production
  • No default/test credentials
  • Error messages don't expose internals
  • CORS properly configured (not * for sensitive APIs)
  • Security headers set (CSP, X-Frame-Options, etc.)

Dependency Vulnerabilities

Run ecosystem-specific audit commands — see references/security-checklist.md for commands by ecosystem.

Report any Critical or High severity vulnerabilities.

Output Format

## Security Review: {scope}

### Critical (fix immediately)
- {file}:{line} - {vulnerability type}: {description}
  **Fix:** {remediation}

### High Priority
- {file}:{line} - {issue}
  **Fix:** {remediation}

### Medium Priority
- {file} - {issue}

### Dependency Vulnerabilities
| Package | Severity | CVE | Fix Version |
|---------|----------|-----|-------------|
| {pkg} | Critical | CVE-XXXX-XXXX | {version} |

### Suggestions
- {improvement}

Examples

Staged changes introduce SQL injection:

/review-security --staged

Reviews staged files and catches a login handler using string concatenation to build a SQL query with user input. Reports it as Critical with a fix showing parameterized queries.

Pre-release audit finds hardcoded secret:

/review-security --all

Parallel agents scan the full codebase by security category. Finds a hardcoded API key in a config file and a JWT secret committed as a string literal, along with an overly permissive CORS policy allowing all origins.

Troubleshooting

False positive on an intentional security pattern

Solution: If the flagged code is deliberate (e.g., a test fixture with hardcoded credentials, or a localhost-only CORS wildcard), add a comment like // SECURITY: intentional - <reason> so future audits can skip it with context.

Obfuscated or generated code blocks the audit

Solution: Exclude generated files (e.g., *.min.js, dist/, generated/) from the scope and audit only the source inputs. For vendored code, check the upstream project's security advisories rather than scanning the minified output.

Notes

  • Focus on exploitable vulnerabilities, not theoretical risks
  • Always provide remediation guidance
  • For --all, use parallel agents per category for speed
  • Check both source code and configuration files
  • Dependency checks require package manager files (package.json, requirements.txt, etc.)

适合场景

01

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

03

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

39.1%
按下载量换算31

Claude

26.75%
按下载量换算21

Cursor

18.21%
按下载量换算15

Gemini CLI

8.48%
按下载量换算7

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

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