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pop-pay-pythonPOP PAY Python 搜索

Agent Skill

用于辅助 Python 项目开发、测试、依赖管理和常见框架工作流。它适合让 Agent 阅读 Python 代码、定位测试问题、整理运行命令、生成脚本或分析数据处理逻辑。使用时需要确认项目虚拟环境、依赖版本和测试入口;涉及执行脚本、读写文件、访问数据库或调用外部 API 时,应先明确运行目录和输入输出范围,避免误改生产数据。

总安装

4,056

周安装

169

GitHub Stars

1

下载量

1,352
OpenClaw

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

MIT-0

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:pop-pay-python(POP PAY Python 搜索)
来源仓库:https://github.com/tpemist/pop-pay-python
安装命令:
openclaw skills install pop-pay-python
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 OpenClaw 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

ClawHubOpenClaw
openclaw skills install pop-pay-python

简介

您的卡保留在您的 PC 上 — 无需 SaaS、无需登录、无需外部帐户。凭证直接注入,使它们远离人工智能的上下文窗口。

SKILL.md

name
pop-pay
version
0.6.23
description
Your card stays on your PC — no SaaS, no login, no external account. Credentials inject directly, keeping them out of the AI's context window.
homepage
https://github.com/TPEmist/Point-One-Percent
author
Point One Percent
license
MIT
requires
bins
env

What This Skill Does

Gives your OpenClaw agent the ability to pay at any online store using your own existing credit card — no account to create, no SaaS subscription, no external service to trust.

Your card number is stored in your local system keychain and is never placed in the agent's context window. When payment is approved, credentials are injected directly into the browser's payment form via CDP (Chrome DevTools Protocol — an open protocol maintained by Google) in a separate process — the agent never sees them. If your agent is compromised by a prompt injection attack, the attacker cannot steal your card.


Privacy & Data Flow

All payment logic runs on your machine. There are no Point One Percent servers involved in the payment path.

ComponentDefaultData stays
Card credentialsLocal system keychainYour machine only
Spend policy~/.config/pop-pay/.envYour machine only
Guardrail enginekeyword mode (zero API calls)Your machine only
Guardrail engine (optional)llm mode — uses your own API keyYour API provider
Webhook notificationsDisabled by default — only active if POP_WEBHOOK_URL is setYour chosen endpoint

Keyword guardrail (default): evaluates transactions locally with no external calls. LLM guardrail (opt-in): uses your own POP_LLM_API_KEY — no data is sent to Point One Percent.


Setup (One Time)

# Install from PyPI (https://pypi.org/project/pop-pay/)
pip install pop-pay
pop-pay setup          # securely stores your card in the system keychain
pop-pay setup --profile   # stores billing info (name, address, email)

Then add to your OpenClaw config:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "pop-pay": {
      "command": "pop-pay",
      "args": ["serve"]
    }
  }
}

Set your spend policy in ~/.config/pop-pay/.env:

POP_ALLOWED_CATEGORIES=["amazon","shopify","aws"]
POP_MAX_AMOUNT_PER_TX=100
POP_MAX_DAILY_BUDGET=300
POP_AUTO_INJECT=true          # set to false to review injections manually
POP_REQUIRE_HUMAN_APPROVAL=false  # set to true for manual confirmation on every payment

Tools

request_purchaser_info

When to call: You are on a contact/billing info page with fields for name, email, phone, or address — but no credit card fields are visible yet.

request_purchaser_info(
    target_vendor: str,   # e.g. "Amazon", "Shopify" — NOT a URL
    page_url: str,        # current browser page URL
    reasoning: str        # why you are filling this form
)
  • Injects name, email, phone, and address from the user's stored profile
  • Does NOT issue a card, does NOT charge anything, does NOT affect the budget
  • After this completes, navigate to the payment page and call request_virtual_card

request_virtual_card

When to call: You are on the checkout/payment page and credit card input fields are visible.

request_virtual_card(
    requested_amount: float,  # exact amount shown on screen
    target_vendor: str,       # e.g. "Amazon" — NOT a URL
    reasoning: str,           # explain why this purchase should happen
    page_url: str             # current checkout page URL
)
  • Evaluates the purchase against the user's spend policy (amount limits, allowlist)
  • Runs a guardrail check: evaluates whether this purchase should happen given the agent's current task context — not just whether it can (within budget)
  • Automatically scans the checkout page for prompt injection attacks before issuing the card
  • If approved, credentials are injected directly into the browser form via CDP — never passed to the agent
  • Returns: approved (with last 4 digits) or rejected (with reason)

After approval: Click the submit/pay button. The card has been filled automatically.


Usage Flow

Agent navigates to product page
  ↓
Agent clicks "Checkout" / "Proceed to payment"
  ↓
[If billing page appears first]
  → call request_purchaser_info(vendor, page_url, reasoning)
  → click Continue/Next
  ↓
[When payment/card fields are visible]
  → call request_virtual_card(amount, vendor, reasoning, page_url)
     (security scan runs automatically inside this call)
  ↓
[If approved]
  → click Submit / Place Order

Security Model

Propertypop-pay
Card number in agent contextNever
Stored locally (no external account)Yes — system keychain
Works with existing credit cardYes
Works with any merchantYes (any checkout form)
No SaaS / no login requiredYes
Guardrail (SHOULD vs CAN)Yes — keyword or LLM mode
Prompt injection scan on every paymentYes — automatic
Open source / auditableMIT

Prompt injection resistance: The card is injected by a separate local process (CDP injector) that activates only after guardrail approval. A malicious merchant cannot steal the card via hidden DOM instructions — the agent never had it.


Spend Policy Reference

Env varDefaultDescription
POP_ALLOWED_CATEGORIES[]JSON array of allowed vendor keywords
POP_MAX_AMOUNT_PER_TXrequiredMax per transaction (USD)
POP_MAX_DAILY_BUDGETrequiredMax total spend per day (USD)
POP_GUARDRAIL_ENGINEkeywordkeyword (local, zero API cost) or llm (semantic, needs API key)
POP_REQUIRE_HUMAN_APPROVALfalseAlways require human confirmation before payment
POP_AUTO_INJECTtrueEnable CDP auto-injection into checkout forms
POP_WEBHOOK_URL_(disabled)_Optional: POST notifications to Slack/Teams/PagerDuty

Example: Agent Buys Office Supplies on Amazon

# Agent has been asked: "Order a USB-C hub from Amazon, around $40"

# Step 1: Navigate to Amazon, find the product, add to cart, proceed to checkout

# Step 2: On billing info page
result = request_purchaser_info(
    target_vendor="Amazon",
    page_url="https://www.amazon.com/checkout/address",
    reasoning="Filling billing address for USB-C hub purchase as instructed by user"
)
# → Billing info injected. Click Continue.

# Step 3: On payment page — security scan runs automatically inside this call
result = request_virtual_card(
    requested_amount=43.99,
    target_vendor="Amazon",
    reasoning="Purchasing USB-C hub for home office setup as instructed by user",
    page_url="https://www.amazon.com/checkout/payment"
)
# → Approved. Card injected via CDP. Click "Place your order".

GitHub

github.com/TPEmist/Point-One-Percent

适合场景

01

OpenClaw 用户查找和安装 Skill 时

02

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

03

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

04

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

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能力 2

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能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

补充不同宿主或平台的使用分布数据

能力 5

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

OpenClaw

79.9%
按下载量换算1,080

安全审计

VirusTotal

可疑

ClawScan

可疑

Static analysis

通过

权限和风险

敏感数据

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安装前确认

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来源信息

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