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研究检索敏感数据github未标认证来源可访问许可证需确认审计提醒

performing-thick-client-application-penetration-test执行胖客户端应用程序渗透测试

Agent Skill

用于辅助测试设计、自动化测试、用例整理和回归验证。它适合让 Agent 编写单元测试、端到端测试、测试计划或根据失败日志定位问题。使用时需要确认项目测试框架、运行命令和夹具数据,避免为了通过测试而改坏真实逻辑;涉及浏览器或外部服务时,应区分本地模拟、测试环境和生产环境。

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225

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安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:performing-thick-client-application-penetration-test(执行胖客户端应用程序渗透测试)
来源仓库:https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills
仓库路径:skills/performing-thick-client-application-penetration-test
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill performing-thick-client-application-penetration-test
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill performing-thick-client-application-penetration-test

简介

辅助胖客户端应用的安全测试设计与自动化验证。

  • 可生成测试用例、检查认证逻辑并识别本地存储风险点。
  • 通过 GitHub 仓库安装,需适配具体项目框架和运行环境。
  • 涉及浏览器或外部服务时,应区分模拟环境与真实生产边界。
  • performing-thick-client-application-penetration-test 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

SKILL.md

Performing Thick Client Application Penetration Test

Overview

Thick client (fat client) penetration testing assesses the security of desktop applications that run locally on user machines and communicate with backend servers. Unlike web applications, thick clients present a broader attack surface including local file storage, binary analysis, memory manipulation, DLL injection, process interception, and client-server communication. Common targets include banking applications, ERP clients (SAP GUI), trading platforms, healthcare systems, and legacy enterprise software.

When to Use

  • When conducting security assessments that involve performing thick client application penetration test
  • When following incident response procedures for related security events
  • When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
  • When validating security controls through hands-on testing

Prerequisites

  • Application installer and valid credentials
  • Windows/Linux test machine (isolated)
  • Tools: dnSpy, Procmon, Process Hacker, Wireshark, Burp Suite, Echo Mirage, Fiddler, IDA Pro/Ghidra
  • Administrative access to test machine
Legal Notice: This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.

Phase 1 — Information Gathering

Static Analysis

# Identify application technology
# Check file properties, signatures, framework (.NET, Java, C++, Electron)
file application.exe
# .NET -> dnSpy, JetBrains dotPeek
# Java -> JD-GUI, JADX
# C/C++ -> Ghidra, IDA Pro
# Electron -> extract asar archive

# Check for .NET framework
Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Program Files\TargetApp" -Recurse -Filter "*.dll" |
  ForEach-Object { [System.Reflection.AssemblyName]::GetAssemblyName($_.FullName).FullName }

# Strings analysis
strings application.exe | findstr -i "password\|secret\|api\|key\|token\|jdbc\|connection"

# Check for hardcoded credentials
strings application.exe | findstr -i "username\|user=\|pass=\|pwd=\|admin"

# Review configuration files
type "C:\Program Files\TargetApp\app.config"
type "C:\Program Files\TargetApp\settings.xml"
type "%APPDATA%\TargetApp\config.json"

# Check for certificate pinning
strings application.exe | findstr -i "cert\|pin\|ssl\|tls"

.NET Decompilation with dnSpy

# Open application in dnSpy
1. Launch dnSpy
2. File > Open > Select application.exe and DLLs
3. Search for:
   - "password", "secret", "connectionString"
   - Authentication methods
   - Encryption/decryption functions
   - API endpoints and keys
   - License validation logic

# Look for:
- Hardcoded credentials in source
- Insecure encryption (DES, MD5, base64 "encryption")
- SQL queries (potential injection)
- Disabled certificate validation
- Debug/verbose logging with sensitive data

Phase 2 — Dynamic Analysis

Process Monitoring

# Monitor file system activity with Procmon
# Filters:
#   Process Name = application.exe
#   Operation = CreateFile, WriteFile, ReadFile, RegSetValue

# Key observations:
# - Where does the app store data? (AppData, temp, registry)
# - Does it write credentials to disk?
# - Does it create temporary files with sensitive data?
# - What registry keys does it access?

# Monitor with Process Hacker
# Check: loaded DLLs, network connections, handles, tokens

# Monitor network traffic
# Wireshark filter: ip.addr == <server_ip>
# Check for: unencrypted credentials, API keys, tokens

Traffic Interception

# Intercept HTTP/HTTPS traffic with Burp Suite
# Configure system proxy: 127.0.0.1:8080
# Install Burp CA certificate in Windows certificate store

# For non-HTTP protocols, use Echo Mirage
# Inject into process and intercept TCP/UDP traffic

# For HTTPS with certificate pinning:
# Method 1: Patch certificate validation in dnSpy
# Method 2: Use Frida to hook SSL validation
frida -l bypass_ssl_pinning.js -f application.exe

# Fiddler for .NET applications
# Enable HTTPS decryption
# Monitor API calls, request/response bodies

Phase 3 — Vulnerability Testing

Authentication Bypass

# Test local authentication bypass
1. Open dnSpy, find authentication method
2. Set breakpoint on credential validation
3. Modify return value to bypass (Debug > Set Next Statement)
4. Or: Patch binary to always return true

# Test for credential storage
# Check: registry, config files, SQLite databases, Windows Credential Manager
reg query "HKCU\Software\TargetApp" /s
type "%APPDATA%\TargetApp\user.db"
# SQLite: sqlite3 user.db ".dump"

DLL Hijacking

# Identify DLL search order vulnerability
# Use Procmon to find DLLs loaded from writable paths
# Filter: Result = NAME NOT FOUND, Path ends with .dll

# Create malicious DLL
# msfvenom -p windows/exec CMD=calc.exe -f dll -o hijacked.dll
# Place in application directory or writable PATH directory

# DLL sideloading
# If app loads DLL without full path:
# 1. Create DLL with same exports
# 2. Place in app directory
# 3. DLL loads before legitimate version

Memory Analysis

# Dump process memory
# Use Process Hacker > Process > Properties > Memory
# Search for plaintext credentials, tokens, session IDs

# Strings from memory dump
strings process_dump.dmp | findstr -i "password\|token\|session\|bearer"

# Modify memory values (license bypass, privilege escalation)
# Use Cheat Engine or x64dbg to:
# 1. Find memory address of authorization variable
# 2. Modify value (e.g., isAdmin = 0 -> isAdmin = 1)

Input Validation

# SQL Injection in local database
# Test input fields with: ' OR 1=1--
# If app uses local SQLite/SQL Server Express

# Command injection
# Test fields that interact with OS:
# File paths: ..\..\..\..\windows\system32\cmd.exe
# Print/export: | calc.exe

# Buffer overflow
# Send oversized input to text fields
# Monitor with x64dbg for crashes
# Check for SEH-based or stack-based overflows

Phase 4 — API Security Testing

# Capture API calls from thick client
# In Burp Suite, analyze:

# IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference)
# Change user IDs in requests to access other users' data
# GET /api/users/1001 -> GET /api/users/1002

# Authorization bypass
# Remove or modify JWT tokens
# Test role escalation: change role claim from "user" to "admin"

# Mass assignment
# Add additional parameters to API requests
# POST /api/profile {"name": "test", "isAdmin": true}

# Rate limiting
# Test for brute-force protection on login API
# Test for account lockout bypass

Findings Template

FindingSeverityCVSSRemediation
Hardcoded database credentials in binaryCritical9.1Use secure credential storage (DPAPI, vault)
DLL hijacking via writable app directoryHigh7.8Use full DLL paths, validate DLL signatures
Plaintext credentials in memoryHigh7.5Zero memory after use, use SecureString
No certificate pinningMedium6.5Implement certificate pinning
Local SQLite DB with cleartext passwordsCritical9.0Use bcrypt/Argon2 hashing
Disabled SSL validation in codeHigh8.1Enable proper certificate validation

References

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02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

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需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

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能力 2

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能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

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按下载量换算27

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按下载量换算21

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按下载量换算14

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按下载量换算7

安全审计

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可疑

Snyk

可疑

权限和风险

敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在 warning/failed 结果,不能写成本站确认安全。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

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