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performing-purple-team-exercise进行紫色团队练习

Agent Skill

performing-purple-team-exercise 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

总安装

233

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CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:performing-purple-team-exercise(进行紫色团队练习)
来源仓库:https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills
仓库路径:skills/performing-purple-team-exercise
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill performing-purple-team-exercise
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill performing-purple-team-exercise

简介

用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息。

  • 适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中根据关键词或任务场景快速定位候选结果。
  • 可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。
  • 安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。
  • 当前暂无详细功能说明,需进一步查阅原始 SKILL.md 获取操作细节。

SKILL.md

Performing Purple Team Exercise

When to Use

Use this skill when:

  • SOC teams need to validate that detection rules actually fire for the threats they target
  • Red team assessments produced findings that need translation into detection improvements
  • New detection tools or SIEM migrations require validation of detection coverage
  • Analyst training requires hands-on experience with real attack techniques and SIEM responses
  • Quarterly or semi-annual detection validation cycles are scheduled

Do not use for unannounced red team engagements — purple team exercises require explicit coordination between offensive and defensive teams with real-time collaboration.

Prerequisites

  • Red team capability: internal team or contracted purple team operator
  • Attack simulation tools: Atomic Red Team, MITRE Caldera, or C2 framework (authorized)
  • SIEM access for real-time alert monitoring during exercise
  • ATT&CK-mapped detection rule inventory with expected alert names
  • Isolated test environment or approved production scope with change management approval
  • Communication channel (Slack/Teams) for real-time red-blue coordination

Workflow

Step 1: Define Exercise Scope and Objectives

Document exercise parameters:

purple_team_exercise:
  exercise_id: PT-2024-Q1
  date: 2024-03-20
  duration: 8 hours (09:00-17:00 UTC)
  scope:
    environment: Production (Finance VLAN, 10.0.5.0/24)
    systems_in_scope:
      - WORKSTATION-TEST01 (10.0.5.100) — Test endpoint
      - DC-TEST (10.0.5.200) — Test domain controller
      - FILESERVER-TEST (10.0.5.201) — Test file server
    systems_excluded:
      - All production domain controllers
      - Customer-facing systems
  objectives:
    - Validate 15 detection rules mapped to FIN7 TTPs
    - Test SOC analyst response to real attack indicators
    - Identify detection gaps for credential access and lateral movement
    - Measure detection latency for each technique
  threat_scenario: FIN7 campaign targeting financial data via spearphishing
  authorization: Approved by CISO, Change Request CR-2024-0567
  communication: #purple-team-2024q1 Slack channel

Step 2: Build ATT&CK-Mapped Test Plan

Create technique-by-technique test matrix:

#ATT&CK IDTechniqueTest ToolExpected DetectionBlue Team Metric
1T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentManual emailEmail gateway alertDetection Y/N, latency
2T1204.002User ExecutionMacro documentSysmon process creationDetection Y/N, latency
3T1059.001PowerShellAtomic RT #1-3PowerShell execution alertDetection Y/N, latency
4T1053.005Scheduled TaskAtomic RTScheduled task creation alertDetection Y/N, latency
5T1547.001Registry Run KeysAtomic RTRegistry modification alertDetection Y/N, latency
6T1003.001LSASS MemoryMimikatzCredential dumping alertDetection Y/N, latency
7T1550.002Pass-the-HashMimikatzNTLM anomaly detectionDetection Y/N, latency
8T1021.002SMB/PsExecPsExecPsExec service creation alertDetection Y/N, latency
9T1047WMIwmic /nodeWMI remote execution alertDetection Y/N, latency
10T1021.001RDPxfreerdpRDP lateral movement alertDetection Y/N, latency
11T1071.001Web C2Cobalt StrikeC2 beacon detectionDetection Y/N, latency
12T1041Exfiltration C2RcloneData exfiltration alertDetection Y/N, latency
13T1490Inhibit RecoveryvssadminShadow copy deletion alertDetection Y/N, latency
14T1486Data EncryptedTest encryptionMass encryption detectionDetection Y/N, latency
15T1070.001Clear LogswevtutilLog clearing detectionDetection Y/N, latency

Step 3: Execute Red Team Techniques

Run each technique with Atomic Red Team (or manual execution):

# Install Atomic Red Team
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/install-atomicredteam.ps1' -UseBasicParsing)
Install-AtomicRedTeam -getAtomics

# Test 1: T1059.001 — PowerShell Execution
Write-Host "[$(Get-Date -Format 'HH:mm:ss')] Executing T1059.001 - PowerShell"
Invoke-AtomicTest T1059.001 -TestNumbers 1
# Notify blue team: "T1059.001 executed at $(Get-Date)"

# Test 2: T1053.005 — Scheduled Task Creation
Write-Host "[$(Get-Date -Format 'HH:mm:ss')] Executing T1053.005 - Scheduled Task"
Invoke-AtomicTest T1053.005 -TestNumbers 1

# Test 3: T1547.001 — Registry Run Key
Write-Host "[$(Get-Date -Format 'HH:mm:ss')] Executing T1547.001 - Registry Persistence"
Invoke-AtomicTest T1547.001 -TestNumbers 1,2

# Test 4: T1003.001 — Credential Dumping
Write-Host "[$(Get-Date -Format 'HH:mm:ss')] Executing T1003.001 - LSASS Access"
Invoke-AtomicTest T1003.001 -TestNumbers 1,2

# Test 5: T1490 — Shadow Copy Deletion
Write-Host "[$(Get-Date -Format 'HH:mm:ss')] Executing T1490 - Inhibit Recovery"
Invoke-AtomicTest T1490 -TestNumbers 1

# Cleanup after each test
Invoke-AtomicTest T1059.001 -TestNumbers 1 -Cleanup
Invoke-AtomicTest T1053.005 -TestNumbers 1 -Cleanup
Invoke-AtomicTest T1547.001 -TestNumbers 1,2 -Cleanup

Step 4: Monitor Blue Team Detection in Real-Time

Blue team monitors SIEM during execution:

--- Real-time purple team monitoring dashboard
index=notable earliest=-1h
| where Computer IN ("WORKSTATION-TEST01", "DC-TEST", "FILESERVER-TEST")
  OR src IN ("10.0.5.100", "10.0.5.200", "10.0.5.201")
| eval detection_latency = _time - orig_time
| eval latency_seconds = round(detection_latency, 0)
| sort _time
| table _time, rule_name, urgency, src, dest, user, latency_seconds

--- Check specific technique detection
index=sysmon Computer="WORKSTATION-TEST01" earliest=-15m
(EventCode=1 OR EventCode=3 OR EventCode=10 OR EventCode=11 OR EventCode=13)
| sort _time
| table _time, EventCode, Image, CommandLine, TargetFilename, TargetObject

Record results in real-time:

exercise_results = {
    "exercise_id": "PT-2024-Q1",
    "results": [
        {
            "technique": "T1059.001",
            "name": "PowerShell Execution",
            "execution_time": "09:15:00",
            "detected": True,
            "alert_name": "Suspicious PowerShell Encoded Command",
            "detection_time": "09:15:47",
            "latency_seconds": 47,
            "notes": "Detected via Sysmon EventCode 1 with encoded command pattern"
        },
        {
            "technique": "T1003.001",
            "name": "LSASS Memory Access",
            "execution_time": "10:30:00",
            "detected": False,
            "alert_name": None,
            "detection_time": None,
            "latency_seconds": None,
            "notes": "GAP: No detection rule for LSASS access. Sysmon EventCode 10 present but no correlation rule."
        }
    ]
}

Step 5: Collaborative Gap Remediation

For each gap, the blue team builds detection rules immediately:

--- Gap: T1003.001 — No LSASS access detection
--- Build rule during exercise
index=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe"
GrantedAccess IN ("0x1010", "0x1038", "0x1fffff", "0x40")
NOT SourceImage IN ("*\\svchost.exe", "*\\csrss.exe", "*\\MsMpEng.exe")
| stats count by Computer, SourceImage, SourceUser, GrantedAccess
| where count > 0

After building, re-test:

Red Team: "Re-executing T1003.001 at 11:45"
Blue Team: "Confirmed — alert 'LSASS Memory Access Detected' fired at 11:45:32 (32s latency)"
Result: GAP CLOSED

Step 6: Generate Exercise Report

def generate_purple_team_report(results):
    total = len(results["results"])
    detected = sum(1 for r in results["results"] if r["detected"])
    gaps = sum(1 for r in results["results"] if not r["detected"])
    avg_latency = sum(r["latency_seconds"] for r in results["results"]
                      if r["latency_seconds"]) / max(detected, 1)

    report = f"""
PURPLE TEAM EXERCISE REPORT — {results['exercise_id']}
{'=' * 60}

SUMMARY:
  Techniques Tested:     {total}
  Detected:              {detected} ({detected/total*100:.0f}%)
  Gaps Identified:       {gaps} ({gaps/total*100:.0f}%)
  Avg Detection Latency: {avg_latency:.0f} seconds

DETAILED RESULTS:
"""
    for r in results["results"]:
        status = "DETECTED" if r["detected"] else "GAP"
        latency = f"{r['latency_seconds']}s" if r["latency_seconds"] else "N/A"
        report += f"  [{status}] {r['technique']} — {r['name']} (Latency: {latency})\n"
        if not r["detected"]:
            report += f"          Action: {r['notes']}\n"

    return report

Key Concepts

TermDefinition
Purple TeamCollaborative exercise where red (offensive) and blue (defensive) teams work together to validate and improve detection
Adversary EmulationStructured simulation of specific threat actor TTPs for testing defensive capabilities
Detection ValidationProcess of confirming that detection rules fire correctly when the targeted technique is executed
Detection LatencyTime between technique execution and SIEM alert generation — measured during purple team exercises
Gap RemediationImmediate creation or tuning of detection rules for techniques that were not detected during testing
Atomic Red TeamOpen-source library of small, focused tests for individual ATT&CK techniques

Tools & Systems

  • Atomic Red Team: Open-source attack test library from Red Canary for technique-by-technique validation
  • MITRE Caldera: Automated adversary emulation platform supporting ATT&CK-mapped attack chains
  • Vectr: Purple team management platform for tracking exercise results and detection coverage improvements
  • Prelude Operator: Adversary emulation tool supporting automated multi-step attack scenarios
  • AttackIQ: Breach and Attack Simulation (BAS) platform for continuous detection validation

Common Scenarios

  • Quarterly Validation: Test top 20 detection rules against ATT&CK techniques to ensure continued effectiveness
  • New Tool Validation: After deploying new EDR, validate detection coverage against baseline techniques
  • Analyst Training: Junior analysts observe real attacks in real-time with expert guidance on SIEM investigation
  • Post-Incident Validation: After a real incident, emulate the attack chain to verify detection improvements
  • Compliance Evidence: Document detection validation results for SOC 2, ISO 27001, or PCI DSS audits

Output Format

PURPLE TEAM EXERCISE REPORT — PT-2024-Q1
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Date:         2024-03-20 (09:00-17:00 UTC)
Scenario:     FIN7 Financial Sector Campaign
Scope:        Finance VLAN (10.0.5.0/24)

RESULTS:
  Techniques Tested:     15
  Detected:              11 (73%)
  Gaps Identified:       4 (27%)
  Gaps Remediated Same Day: 3
  Avg Detection Latency: 38 seconds

DETAILED RESULTS:
  [PASS]  T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment      — 12s latency
  [PASS]  T1204.002 User Execution (Macro)         — 8s latency
  [PASS]  T1059.001 PowerShell Execution            — 47s latency
  [PASS]  T1053.005 Scheduled Task                  — 23s latency
  [PASS]  T1547.001 Registry Run Keys               — 31s latency
  [FAIL]  T1003.001 LSASS Memory Access             — REMEDIATED during exercise
  [FAIL]  T1550.002 Pass-the-Hash                   — REMEDIATED during exercise
  [PASS]  T1021.002 PsExec                          — 15s latency
  [PASS]  T1047 WMI Remote Execution                — 42s latency
  [PASS]  T1021.001 RDP Lateral Movement            — 28s latency
  [FAIL]  T1071.001 Web C2 Beaconing                — REMEDIATED during exercise
  [PASS]  T1041 Exfiltration over C2                — 67s latency
  [PASS]  T1490 Shadow Copy Deletion                — 5s latency
  [FAIL]  T1486 Data Encryption for Impact          — OPEN — requires endpoint telemetry
  [PASS]  T1070.001 Event Log Clearing              — 11s latency

POST-EXERCISE COVERAGE: 93% (14/15) — up from 73% at start
REMAINING GAP: T1486 requires EDR file monitoring enhancement

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能力 1

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能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

36.2%
按下载量换算30

Claude

30.8%
按下载量换算25

Cursor

16.61%
按下载量换算14

Gemini CLI

8.91%
按下载量换算7

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

未通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

可疑

权限和风险

敏感数据

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安装前确认

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