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yara-authoring雅拉创作

Agent Skill

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

总安装

636

周安装

26

GitHub Stars

25

下载量

204
CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:yara-authoring(雅拉创作)
来源仓库:https://github.com/oimiragieo/agent-studio
仓库路径:skills/yara-authoring
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/oimiragieo/agent-studio --skill yara-authoring
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/oimiragieo/agent-studio --skill yara-authoring

简介

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。

  • 适合梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。
  • 使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,需人工复核关键判断。
  • 涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时应先确认最小权限和操作边界。
  • 安装前建议确认权限范围和维护状态,避免误操作生产系统。

SKILL.md

YARA Authoring Skill

Overview

This skill implements Trail of Bits' YARA authoring methodology for the agent-studio framework. YARA-X is the Rust-based successor to legacy YARA, offering improved performance, safety, and new features. This skill teaches you to think and act like an expert YARA author, producing detection rules that are precise, efficient, and maintainable.

Source repository: https://github.com/trailofbits/skills License: CC-BY-SA-4.0 Target: YARA-X (with legacy YARA compatibility guidance)

When to Use

  • When creating detection rules for malware samples
  • When building threat hunting rules for IOC identification
  • When converting legacy YARA rules to YARA-X format
  • When optimizing existing rules for performance and accuracy
  • When reviewing YARA rules for quality and false positive rates
  • When building rule sets for automated scanning pipelines

Iron Laws

  1. EVERY RULE MUST HAVE EFFICIENT ATOMS AND PASS LINTING — a rule without efficient atoms degrades scanner performance across the entire rule set; always run yr check and yr debug atoms before deployment.
  2. NEVER write rules without testing against both positive and negative samples — false positives on clean files are as harmful as missed detections; validate FP rate before deploying.
  3. ALWAYS include complete metadata (author, date, description, reference, hash) — rules without metadata are unauditable and unmaintainable in enterprise rule sets.
  4. NEVER use single-byte atoms or patterns starting with common bytes (0x00, 0xFF, 0x90) — these generate massive false positive rates and degrade the entire YARA scanning pipeline.
  5. ALWAYS use YARA-X toolchain (yr) by default — legacy yara/yarac tooling lacks memory safety, performance optimizations, and modern module support; use YARA-X unless backward compatibility is explicitly required.

YARA-X vs Legacy YARA

Key Differences

FeatureLegacy YARAYARA-X
LanguageCRust
SafetyManual memory managementMemory-safe
PerformanceGoodBetter (parallelism)
ModulesPE, ELF, math, etc.Same + new modules
SyntaxYARA syntaxCompatible + extensions
Toolchainyara, yaracyr CLI

YARA-X CLI Commands

# Scan a file
yr scan rule.yar target_file

# Check rule syntax
yr check rule.yar

# View rule atoms (for efficiency analysis)
yr debug atoms rule.yar

# Format a rule
yr fmt rule.yar

Rule Structure

Standard Template

import "pe"
import "math"

rule MalwareFamily_Variant : tag1 tag2 {
    meta:
        author      = "analyst-name"
        date        = "2026-02-21"
        description = "Detects MalwareFamily variant based on [specific indicators]"
        reference   = "https://example.com/analysis-report"
        hash        = "sha256-of-sample"
        tlp         = "WHITE"
        score       = 75

    strings:
        // Unique byte sequences from the malware
        $hex_pattern1 = { 48 8B 05 ?? ?? ?? ?? 48 89 45 F0 }
        $hex_pattern2 = { E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 85 C0 74 ?? }

        // String indicators
        $str_mutex   = "Global\\MalwareMutex_v2" ascii wide
        $str_c2      = "https://evil.example.com/gate.php" ascii
        $str_useragent = "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MalBot/1.0)" ascii

        // Encoded/obfuscated patterns
        $b64_config  = "aHR0cHM6Ly9ldmlsLmV4YW1wbGUuY29t" ascii  // base64

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and  // MZ header (PE file)
        filesize < 5MB and
        (
            2 of ($hex_*) or
            ($str_mutex and 1 of ($str_c2, $str_useragent)) or
            $b64_config
        )
}

Metadata Fields (Required)

FieldPurposeExample
authorWho wrote the rule"Trail of Bits"
dateWhen rule was created"2026-02-21"
descriptionWhat the rule detects"Detects XYZ malware loader"
referenceSource analysis/report"https://..."
hashSample hash for validation"sha256:abc123..."
tlpTraffic Light Protocol"WHITE", "GREEN", "AMBER", "RED"
scoreConfidence (0-100)75

String Pattern Best Practices

Hex Patterns

// GOOD: Specific bytes with targeted wildcards
$good = { 48 8B 05 ?? ?? ?? ?? 48 89 45 F0 }

// BAD: Too many wildcards (poor atoms)
$bad = { ?? ?? ?? ?? 48 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? }

// GOOD: Use jumps for variable-length gaps
$jump = { 48 8B 05 [4-8] 48 89 45 }

// GOOD: Use alternations for variant bytes
$alt = { 48 (8B | 89) 05 ?? ?? ?? ?? }

Text Strings

// Case-insensitive matching
$str1 = "CreateRemoteThread" ascii nocase

// Wide strings (UTF-16)
$str2 = "cmd.exe" ascii wide

// Full-word matching (avoid substring false positives)
$str3 = "evil" ascii fullword

Regular Expressions

// Use sparingly - regex is slower than literal strings
$re1 = /https?:\/\/[a-z0-9\-\.]+\.(xyz|top|club)\//

// Prefer hex patterns over regex for binary content
// WRONG: $re2 = /\x48\x8B\x05/
// RIGHT: $hex2 = { 48 8B 05 }

Atom Analysis

Atoms are the fixed byte sequences YARA uses to pre-filter which rules to evaluate. Efficient atoms = fast scanning.

How to Check Atoms

# View atoms for a rule
yr debug atoms rule.yar

# Good output: unique 4+ byte atoms
# Atom: 48 8B 05 (from $hex_pattern1)
# Atom: CreateRemoteThread (from $str1)

# Bad output: short or common atoms
# Atom: 00 00 (too common, will match everything)

Atom Quality Guidelines

Atom LengthQualityAction
1-2 bytesPoorRewrite pattern with more specific bytes
3 bytesAcceptableConsider extending if possible
4+ bytesGoodIdeal for efficient scanning
Common bytes (00, FF, 90)PoorAvoid patterns starting with common bytes

Condition Logic

Performance-Ordered Conditions

Place cheap checks first to enable short-circuit evaluation:

condition:
    // 1. File type check (instant)
    uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and

    // 2. File size check (instant)
    filesize < 10MB and

    // 3. Simple string matches (fast)
    $str_mutex and

    // 4. Complex conditions (slower)
    2 of ($hex_*) and

    // 5. Module calls (slowest)
    pe.imports("kernel32.dll", "VirtualAllocEx")

Common Condition Patterns

// At least N of a set
2 of ($indicator_*)

// All of a set
all of ($required_*)

// Any of a set
any of ($optional_*)

// String at specific offset
$mz at 0

// String in specific range
$header in (0..1024)

// Count-based
#suspicious_call > 5

Rule Categories

Category 1: Malware Family Detection

Targets specific malware families with high-confidence indicators.

rule APT_Backdoor_SilentMoon {
    meta:
        description = "Detects SilentMoon backdoor used by APT group"
        score = 90
    strings:
        $config_marker = { 53 4D 43 46 47 } // "SMCFG"
        $decrypt_routine = { 31 C0 8A 04 08 34 ?? 88 04 08 41 }
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        $config_marker and
        $decrypt_routine
}

Category 2: Technique Detection

Targets specific attack techniques regardless of malware family.

rule TECHNIQUE_ProcessHollowing {
    meta:
        description = "Detects process hollowing technique indicators"
        score = 60
    strings:
        $api1 = "NtUnmapViewOfSection" ascii
        $api2 = "WriteProcessMemory" ascii
        $api3 = "SetThreadContext" ascii
        $api4 = "ResumeThread" ascii
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        3 of ($api*)
}

Category 3: Packer/Obfuscator Detection

Identifies packed or obfuscated executables.

rule PACKER_UPX {
    meta:
        description = "Detects UPX packed executables"
        score = 30
    strings:
        $upx0 = "UPX0" ascii
        $upx1 = "UPX1" ascii
        $upx2 = "UPX!" ascii
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        2 of ($upx*)
}

Common Pitfalls

  1. Over-broad rules: Too many wildcards = too many false positives. Be specific.
  2. Under-tested rules: Always test against known-clean files to measure FP rate.
  3. Missing metadata: Rules without metadata are unmaintainable. Always include all required fields.
  4. Ignoring atoms: A rule with poor atoms slows down the entire scanning pipeline.
  5. Hardcoded offsets: Use in (range) instead of exact offsets when possible -- variants shift bytes.
  6. Legacy syntax: Use YARA-X features and yr toolchain, not legacy yara/yarac.

Linting Checklist

Before deploying any rule:

  • Rule compiles without errors: yr check rule.yar
  • Rule has efficient atoms: yr debug atoms rule.yar
  • All required metadata fields present
  • Tested against target sample (true positive confirmed)
  • Tested against clean file corpus (false positive rate acceptable)
  • Condition logic is performance-ordered (cheap checks first)
  • No overly broad wildcard patterns
  • Rule follows naming convention: CATEGORY_FamilyName_Variant

Integration with Agent-Studio

Recommended Workflow

  1. Analyze malware sample with binary-analysis-patterns or memory-forensics
  2. Extract indicators and patterns
  3. Use yara-authoring to create detection rules
  4. Lint and atom-analyze rules
  5. Test rules against known samples and clean corpus
  6. Use variant-analysis to find similar samples for rule tuning

Complementary Skills

SkillRelationship
binary-analysis-patternsExtract indicators from malware for rule authoring
memory-forensicsExtract memory artifacts for memory-scanning rules
variant-analysisFind malware variants to tune rule coverage
static-analysisAutomated analysis to complement YARA detection
protocol-reverse-engineeringExtract network signatures for YARA rules

Anti-Patterns

Anti-PatternWhy It FailsCorrect Approach
Over-broad wildcards (????????)Poor atoms cause rule to run against every file byte; massive performance degradationUse at least 4 consecutive fixed bytes; scope wildcards to specific positions
Skipping atom analysisInvisible performance sink; rule may have 1-byte atoms causing false positivesAlways run yr debug atoms rule.yar before deployment
Missing metadata fieldsRules become unauditable; cannot trace origin, sample, or analystAlways include: author, date, description, reference, hash, tlp, score
Conditions before file type checksExpensive string matching runs on non-matching file typesPlace uint16(0) == 0x5A4D (or equivalent) first in every condition
Using nocase on short stringsShort case-insensitive patterns match everywhere in arbitrary dataReserve nocase for strings >= 8 bytes; use exact case for shorter patterns

Memory Protocol

Before starting: Check for existing YARA rules in the project for naming conventions and pattern reuse.

During authoring: Write rules incrementally, testing each against the target sample. Document atom analysis results.

After completion: Record effective patterns, atom quality metrics, and false positive rates to .claude/context/memory/learnings.md for improving future rule authoring.

适合场景

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02

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03

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安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

34.35%
按下载量换算70

Claude

29.52%
按下载量换算60

Cursor

18.62%
按下载量换算38

Gemini CLI

9.89%
按下载量换算20

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

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