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security-audit安全审计

Agent Skill

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

总安装

1,430

周安装

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下载量

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CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:security-audit(安全审计)
来源仓库:https://github.com/mgd34msu/goodvibes-plugin
仓库路径:skills/security-audit
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/mgd34msu/goodvibes-plugin --skill security-audit
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/mgd34msu/goodvibes-plugin --skill security-audit

简介

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查和常见漏洞排查。

  • 适合梳理敏感配置、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。
  • 不能将工具输出直接当作最终结论,需人工复核关键操作。
  • 涉及密钥、令牌或生产系统时应先确认最小权限和操作边界。
  • security-audit 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

SKILL.md

Resources

scripts/
  validate-security-audit.sh
references/
  security-patterns.md

Security Audit

This skill guides you through performing comprehensive security audits on codebases to identify vulnerabilities, insecure patterns, and configuration issues. Use this when conducting security reviews, preparing for production deployments, or responding to security incidents.

When to Use This Skill

  • Conducting pre-deployment security reviews
  • Responding to security incidents or vulnerability reports
  • Performing periodic security audits on existing codebases
  • Validating security controls after major feature additions
  • Preparing for security compliance audits (SOC 2, ISO 27001)
  • Onboarding new team members to security standards

Audit Methodology

A systematic security audit follows these phases:

Phase 1: Reconnaissance

Objective: Understand the application architecture, tech stack, and attack surface.

Use precision_grep to map the codebase:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: auth_patterns
      pattern: "(session|token|auth|login|password|jwt)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: api_endpoints
      pattern: "(router\\.(get|post|put|delete)|export.*GET|export.*POST)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: database_queries
      pattern: "(prisma\\.|db\\.|query\\(|execute\\()"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: env_usage
      pattern: "process\\.env\\."
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: minimal

Identify critical components:

  • Authentication flows (login, registration, password reset)
  • Authorization middleware and guards
  • API endpoints (public vs authenticated)
  • Database access patterns
  • File upload/download handlers
  • Payment processing logic
  • Admin panels or privileged operations

Phase 2: Authentication Audit

Objective: Verify secure authentication implementation.

Check for Weak Session Management

Search for session configuration issues:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: session_config
      pattern: "(session|cookie).*secure.*false|httpOnly.*false|sameSite.*(none|lax)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: jwt_secrets
      pattern: "jwt\\.sign.*secret.*[\"'][^\"']{1,20}[\"']|new.*JwtStrategy"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: standard

Common vulnerabilities:

  • Session cookies without httpOnly flag (exposes to XSS)
  • Session cookies without secure flag (allows HTTP transmission)
  • Weak JWT secrets (under 32 bytes entropy)
  • Sessions without expiration (immortal sessions)
  • No session invalidation on logout

Secure session example:

import { cookies } from 'next/headers';

export async function createSession(userId: string) {
  const sessionToken = await generateSecureToken();
  const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000); // 7 days

  await db.session.create({
    data: {
      token: sessionToken,
      userId,
      expiresAt,
    },
  });

  cookies().set('session', sessionToken, {
    httpOnly: true,
    secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
    sameSite: 'strict',
    expires: expiresAt,
    path: '/',
  });
}

export async function invalidateSession(sessionToken: string) {
  await db.session.delete({ where: { token: sessionToken } });
  cookies().delete('session');
}

Check for Password Security Issues

Search for weak password handling:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: password_storage
      pattern: "password.*=.*(req\\.body|params|query)|password.*toString|password.*text"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: password_hashing
      pattern: "(bcrypt|argon2|scrypt|pbkdf2)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: verbose

Common vulnerabilities:

  • Passwords stored in plain text
  • Weak hashing algorithms (MD5, SHA1, SHA256 without salt)
  • No password complexity requirements
  • Password hints or recovery questions
  • Passwords logged or exposed in error messages

Secure password hashing:

import { hash, verify } from '@node-rs/argon2';

export async function hashPassword(password: string): Promise<string> {
  return await hash(password, {
    memoryCost: 19456, // 19 MB
    timeCost: 2,
    outputLen: 32,
    parallelism: 1,
  });
}

export async function verifyPassword(
  hash: string,
  password: string
): Promise<boolean> {
  try {
    return await verify(hash, password);
  } catch {
    return false;
  }
}

Check for MFA Implementation

Search for MFA patterns:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: mfa_usage
      pattern: "(totp|authenticator|2fa|mfa|otp)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: minimal

MFA best practices:

  • TOTP (Time-based One-Time Password) using authenticator apps
  • Backup codes for account recovery
  • SMS OTP as fallback (not primary)
  • WebAuthn/FIDO2 for hardware keys
  • Rate limiting on OTP verification

Phase 3: Authorization Audit

Objective: Ensure proper access controls and permission checks.

Check for Missing Authorization Checks

Identify API endpoints:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: api_routes
      pattern: "export async function (GET|POST|PUT|DELETE|PATCH)"
      glob: "**/api/**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: auth_middleware
      pattern: "(requireAuth|withAuth|authorize|checkPermission)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: locations

Manual review checklist:

  • Do all authenticated endpoints verify user identity?
  • Do endpoints check resource ownership (user can only access their own data)?
  • Are admin routes protected by role checks?
  • Is authorization checked server-side (not just client-side)?

Common vulnerabilities:

  • Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR): /api/users/123 returns any user
  • Privilege escalation: Regular user can access admin functions
  • Missing authorization: Endpoints rely on client-side checks only

Secure authorization pattern:

import { auth } from '@/lib/auth';
import { db } from '@/lib/db';
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server';

export async function GET(
  req: Request,
  { params }: { params: { id: string } }
) {
  const session = await auth();

  if (!session) {
    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 });
  }

  const post = await db.post.findUnique({
    where: { id: params.id },
    select: { id: true, title: true, content: true, authorId: true },
  });

  if (!post) {
    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Not found' }, { status: 404 });
  }

  // Check ownership
  if (post.authorId !== session.user.id) {
    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Forbidden' }, { status: 403 });
  }

  return NextResponse.json(post);
}

Check for Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)

Search for role definitions:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: role_checks
      pattern: "(role.*===|role.*includes|hasRole|checkRole|permissions)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: matches

RBAC implementation:

type Role = 'user' | 'admin' | 'moderator';

type Permission =
  | 'posts:read'
  | 'posts:write'
  | 'posts:delete'
  | 'users:manage'
  | 'settings:admin';

const rolePermissions: Record<Role, Permission[]> = {
  user: ['posts:read', 'posts:write'],
  moderator: ['posts:read', 'posts:write', 'posts:delete'],
  admin: ['posts:read', 'posts:write', 'posts:delete', 'users:manage', 'settings:admin'],
};

export function hasPermission(role: Role, permission: Permission): boolean {
  return rolePermissions[role].includes(permission);
}

export function requirePermission(permission: Permission) {
  return async (req: Request) => {
    const session = await auth();

    if (!session || !hasPermission(session.user.role, permission)) {
      throw new Error('Insufficient permissions');
    }
  };
}

Phase 4: Input Validation Audit

Objective: Prevent injection attacks and malicious input.

Check for SQL Injection

Search for unsafe database queries:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: raw_sql
      pattern: "(\\$executeRaw|\\$queryRaw|db\\.query|connection\\.query).*\\$\\{|.*`.*\\$\\{"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: string_concatenation
      pattern: "(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE).*\\+.*req\\.(body|query|params)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: verbose

Common vulnerabilities:

  • String concatenation in SQL queries
  • Unsanitized user input in raw SQL
  • Dynamic table/column names from user input

Secure database queries:

// UNSAFE - SQL injection vulnerable
export async function getUserByEmail(email: string) {
  const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '${email}'`;
  return await db.$queryRawUnsafe(query);
}

// SAFE - Parameterized query
export async function getUserByEmail(email: string) {
  return await db.user.findUnique({
    where: { email },
  });
}

// SAFE - Raw query with parameters
export async function searchUsers(query: string) {
  return await db.$queryRaw`
    SELECT id, name, email
    FROM users
    WHERE name ILIKE ${'%' + query + '%'}
    LIMIT 20
  `;
}

Check for XSS (Cross-Site Scripting)

Search for unsafe rendering:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: dangerous_html
      pattern: "(dangerouslySetInnerHTML|innerHTML|outerHTML)"
      glob: "**/*.{tsx,jsx}"
    - id: unescaped_output
      pattern: "(v-html|\\[innerHTML\\])"
      glob: "**/*.{vue,html}"
  output:
    format: locations

Common vulnerabilities:

  • Rendering unsanitized user input with dangerouslySetInnerHTML
  • Using innerHTML to insert user-provided content
  • Disabling auto-escaping in template engines

Secure rendering:

import DOMPurify from 'isomorphic-dompurify';

// UNSAFE - XSS vulnerable
export function UnsafeComment({ content }: { content: string }) {
  return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: content }} />;
}

// SAFE - Auto-escaped by React
export function SafeComment({ content }: { content: string }) {
  return <div>{content}</div>;
}

// SAFE - Sanitized HTML if needed
export function SafeRichComment({ html }: { html: string }) {
  const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, {
    ALLOWED_TAGS: ['p', 'br', 'strong', 'em', 'a'],
    ALLOWED_ATTR: ['href'],
  });
  return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: sanitized }} />;
}

Check for Command Injection

Search for shell command execution:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: shell_exec
      pattern: "(exec|spawn|execSync|spawnSync|execFile).*req\\.(body|query|params)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: verbose

Common vulnerabilities:

  • User input passed directly to shell commands
  • Unsanitized file paths in file operations

Secure command execution:

import { spawn } from 'child_process';
import { z } from 'zod';

const allowedCommands = ['convert', 'resize', 'compress'] as const;
const commandSchema = z.enum(allowedCommands);

// UNSAFE - Command injection vulnerable
export async function processImage(filename: string) {
  exec(`convert ${filename} output.png`);
}

// SAFE - Validated input and array arguments
export async function processImage(command: string, filename: string) {
  const validCommand = commandSchema.parse(command);
  const sanitizedFilename = filename.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9._-]/g, '');

  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    const child = spawn('imagemagick', [validCommand, sanitizedFilename, 'output.png']);
    child.on('exit', (code) => {
      if (code === 0) resolve(undefined);
      else reject(new Error('Processing failed'));
    });
  });
}

Check for Path Traversal

Search for file operations:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: file_operations
      pattern: "(readFile|writeFile|unlink|stat|createReadStream).*req\\.(body|query|params)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: locations

Common vulnerabilities:

  • User-controlled file paths without validation
  • Missing path normalization (allowing ../ sequences)

Secure file handling:

import path from 'path';
import fs from 'fs/promises';

const UPLOADS_DIR = path.join(process.cwd(), 'uploads');

// UNSAFE - Path traversal vulnerable
export async function getFile(filename: string) {
  return await fs.readFile(`./uploads/${filename}`);
}

// SAFE - Path validation with defense against encoded traversals
export async function getFile(filename: string) {
  // Decode URL-encoded sequences (e.g., %2e%2e%2f -> ../)
  const decoded = decodeURIComponent(filename);
  const safePath = path.normalize(decoded).replace(/^(\.\.\/)+/, '');
  const fullPath = path.resolve(path.join(UPLOADS_DIR, safePath));

  // Ensure resolved path is within UPLOADS_DIR (prevents prefix collision)
  if (!fullPath.startsWith(UPLOADS_DIR + path.sep) && fullPath !== UPLOADS_DIR) {
    throw new Error('Invalid file path');
  }

  return await fs.readFile(fullPath);
}

Phase 5: Data Protection Audit

Objective: Ensure sensitive data is encrypted and properly handled.

Check for Encryption at Rest

Search for sensitive data storage:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: sensitive_fields
      pattern: "(ssn|credit.*card|bank.*account|passport|drivers.*license)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx,prisma}"
    - id: encryption_usage
      pattern: "(encrypt|decrypt|cipher|crypto)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: minimal

Encryption best practices:

  • Use AES-256-GCM for symmetric encryption
  • Store encryption keys in secure key management (AWS KMS, HashiCorp Vault)
  • Never commit encryption keys to version control
  • Rotate encryption keys periodically

Secure encryption implementation:

import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes } from 'crypto';

const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm';
const ENCRYPTION_KEY = process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY;
if (!ENCRYPTION_KEY) throw new Error('ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable is required');
const KEY = Buffer.from(ENCRYPTION_KEY, 'hex'); // 32 bytes

export function encrypt(plaintext: string): string {
  const iv = randomBytes(16);
  const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, KEY, iv);

  let encrypted = cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8', 'hex');
  encrypted += cipher.final('hex');

  const authTag = cipher.getAuthTag();

  // Return: iv:authTag:ciphertext
  return `${iv.toString('hex')}:${authTag.toString('hex')}:${encrypted}`;
}

export function decrypt(ciphertext: string): string {
  const [ivHex, authTagHex, encrypted] = ciphertext.split(':');

  const iv = Buffer.from(ivHex, 'hex');
  const authTag = Buffer.from(authTagHex, 'hex');

  const decipher = createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, KEY, iv);
  decipher.setAuthTag(authTag);

  let decrypted = decipher.update(encrypted, 'hex', 'utf8');
  decrypted += decipher.final('utf8');

  return decrypted;
}

Check for PII Handling

Search for personally identifiable information:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: pii_fields
      pattern: "(email|phone|address|name|dob|birth.*date)"
      glob: "**/*.prisma"
    - id: logging_pii
      pattern: "(console\\.log|logger\\.(info|debug|warn)).*\\.(email|phone|ssn)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: locations

PII protection checklist:

  • Minimize PII collection (only collect what's necessary)
  • Redact PII in logs and error messages
  • Implement data retention policies (auto-delete old data)
  • Provide user data export (GDPR/CCPA compliance)
  • Provide user data deletion (right to be forgotten)

Check for Secrets Management

Search for hardcoded secrets:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: hardcoded_secrets
      pattern: "(api.*key.*=.*[\"'][a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}|secret.*=.*[\"'][a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}|password.*=.*[\"'][^\"']{8,})"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: committed_env
      pattern: ".*"
      glob: ".env"
  output:
    format: verbose

Common vulnerabilities:

  • API keys hardcoded in source code
  • .env files committed to version control
  • Secrets exposed in client-side code
  • Default credentials not changed

Secure secrets management:

import { z } from 'zod';

const envSchema = z.object({
  DATABASE_URL: z.string().url(),
  NEXTAUTH_SECRET: z.string().min(32),
  STRIPE_SECRET_KEY: z.string().startsWith('sk_'),
  OPENAI_API_KEY: z.string().startsWith('sk-'),
});

export const env = envSchema.parse({
  DATABASE_URL: process.env.DATABASE_URL,
  NEXTAUTH_SECRET: process.env.NEXTAUTH_SECRET,
  STRIPE_SECRET_KEY: process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY,
  OPENAI_API_KEY: process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY,
});

// Ensure .env is in .gitignore
// Use .env.example (without values) to document required variables
// Use secrets management in production (Vercel Env Vars, AWS Secrets Manager)

Phase 6: Dependency Audit

Objective: Identify and remediate vulnerable dependencies.

Run Automated Vulnerability Scanners

Use npm audit:

precision_exec:
  commands:
    - cmd: "npm audit --json"
      timeout_ms: 30000
  verbosity: standard

Check for outdated packages:

precision_exec:
  commands:
    - cmd: "npm outdated --json"
      timeout_ms: 10000
  verbosity: minimal

Prioritize fixes:

  • Critical/High: Fix immediately before deployment
  • Moderate: Fix within 30 days
  • Low: Fix during regular maintenance

Check for Supply Chain Attacks

Verify lockfile integrity:

precision_exec:
  commands:
    - cmd: "npm audit signatures"
      timeout_ms: 30000
  verbosity: standard

Checklist:

  • Commit lockfiles (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml)
  • Review dependency changes in PRs
  • Use npm ci in CI/CD (not npm install)
  • Pin dependency versions in critical projects
  • Use tools like Socket.dev for dependency analysis

Phase 7: API Security Audit

Objective: Secure API endpoints against common attacks.

Check for Rate Limiting

Search for rate limiting implementation:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: rate_limit_usage
      pattern: "(rateLimit|rate.*limiter|Ratelimit|upstash.*ratelimit)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: minimal

Implement rate limiting:

import { Ratelimit } from '@upstash/ratelimit';
import { Redis } from '@upstash/redis';
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server';

const ratelimit = new Ratelimit({
  redis: Redis.fromEnv(),
  limiter: Ratelimit.slidingWindow(10, '10 s'), // 10 requests per 10 seconds
  analytics: true,
});

export async function POST(req: Request) {
  const ip = req.headers.get('x-forwarded-for') ?? 'unknown';
  const { success, limit, reset, remaining } = await ratelimit.limit(ip);

  if (!success) {
    return NextResponse.json(
      { error: 'Too many requests' },
      {
        status: 429,
        headers: {
          'X-RateLimit-Limit': limit.toString(),
          'X-RateLimit-Remaining': remaining.toString(),
          'X-RateLimit-Reset': new Date(reset).toISOString(),
        },
      }
    );
  }

  // Process request
  return NextResponse.json({ success: true });
}

Check for CORS Configuration

Search for CORS setup:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: cors_config
      pattern: "(Access-Control-Allow-Origin|cors\\(|corsOptions)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: matches

Common vulnerabilities:

  • Wildcard CORS (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) with credentials
  • Overly permissive origin whitelist
  • Missing preflight request handling

Secure CORS configuration:

import { NextResponse } from 'next/server';

const ALLOWED_ORIGINS = [
  'https://example.com',
  'https://app.example.com',
];

export async function GET(req: Request) {
  const origin = req.headers.get('origin');

  const headers: Record<string, string> = {
    'Content-Type': 'application/json',
  };

  if (origin && ALLOWED_ORIGINS.includes(origin)) {
    headers['Access-Control-Allow-Origin'] = origin;
    headers['Access-Control-Allow-Credentials'] = 'true';
  }

  return NextResponse.json({ data: 'response' }, { headers });
}

Webhook Signature Verification

Best practice: Use crypto.timingSafeEqual() for comparing webhook signatures to prevent timing attacks:

import crypto from 'crypto';

export function verifyWebhookSignature(payload: string, signature: string, secret: string): boolean {
  const expectedSignature = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(payload).digest('hex');
  const signatureBuffer = Buffer.from(signature);
  const expectedBuffer = Buffer.from(expectedSignature);

  // Prevent timing attacks - constant-time comparison
  if (signatureBuffer.length !== expectedBuffer.length) return false;
  return crypto.timingSafeEqual(signatureBuffer, expectedBuffer);
}

CORS Preflight Handling

export async function OPTIONS(req: Request) {
  const origin = req.headers.get('origin');

  const headers: Record<string, string> = {
    'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS',
    'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'Content-Type, Authorization',
    'Access-Control-Max-Age': '86400', // 24 hours
  };

  if (origin && ALLOWED_ORIGINS.includes(origin)) {
    headers['Access-Control-Allow-Origin'] = origin;
    headers['Access-Control-Allow-Credentials'] = 'true';
  }

  return new NextResponse(null, { status: 204, headers });
}

Check for CSRF Protection

Search for CSRF implementation:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: csrf_tokens
      pattern: "(csrf|csrfToken|xsrf)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: minimal

CSRF protection strategies:

  • Use SameSite cookies (sameSite: 'strict' or 'lax')
  • Implement CSRF tokens for state-changing operations
  • Require custom headers for API requests (e.g., X-Requested-With)
  • Verify Origin and Referer headers

Check for Content Security Policy (CSP)

Search for CSP headers:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: csp_headers
      pattern: "Content-Security-Policy"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx,json}"
  output:
    format: locations

Implement CSP:

// next.config.js
const ContentSecurityPolicy = `
  default-src 'self';
  // WARNING: 'unsafe-eval' and 'unsafe-inline' significantly weaken CSP. Use nonces or hashes instead.
  script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.vercel-insights.com;
  style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
  img-src 'self' data: https:;
  font-src 'self' data:;
  connect-src 'self' https://api.example.com;
  frame-ancestors 'none';
  base-uri 'self';
  form-action 'self';
`;

module.exports = {
  async headers() {
    return [
      {
        source: '/(.*)',
        headers: [
          {
            key: 'Content-Security-Policy',
            value: ContentSecurityPolicy.replace(/\n/g, ''),
          },
          {
            key: 'X-Frame-Options',
            value: 'DENY',
          },
          {
            key: 'X-Content-Type-Options',
            value: 'nosniff',
          },
          {
            key: 'Referrer-Policy',
            value: 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin',
          },
          {
            key: 'Permissions-Policy',
            value: 'camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()',
          },
        ],
      },
    ];
  },
};

Phase 8: Infrastructure Security Audit

Objective: Harden deployment infrastructure.

Check Docker Security

Search for Dockerfile:

precision_read:
  files:
    - path: "Dockerfile"
      extract: content
  verbosity: minimal

Docker security checklist:

  • Use minimal base images (alpine, distroless)
  • Run as non-root user
  • Multi-stage builds to reduce attack surface
  • No secrets in image layers (use build args)
  • Pin base image versions (avoid latest tag)
  • Scan images for vulnerabilities (docker scan, Trivy)

Secure Dockerfile:

FROM node:20-alpine AS base

FROM base AS deps
RUN apk add --no-cache libc6-compat
WORKDIR /app
COPY package*.json ./
RUN npm ci --only=production

FROM base AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=deps /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY . .
RUN npm run build

FROM base AS runner
WORKDIR /app

ENV NODE_ENV=production

# Create non-root user
RUN addgroup --system --gid 1001 nodejs && \
    adduser --system --uid 1001 nextjs

COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/standalone ./
COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/static ./.next/static
COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/public ./public

USER nextjs

EXPOSE 3000
ENV PORT=3000
ENV HOSTNAME="0.0.0.0"

HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
  CMD node -e "require('http').get('http://localhost:3000/api/health', (r) => process.exit(r.statusCode === 200 ? 0 : 1))"

CMD ["node", "server.js"]

Check Environment Variable Security

Search for env file usage:

precision_glob:
  patterns:
    - ".env*"
    - "*.env"
  verbosity: count_only

Verify.gitignore:

precision_read:
  files:
    - path: ".gitignore"
      extract: content
  verbosity: minimal

Environment security checklist:

  • .env files in .gitignore
  • Use .env.example (without values) to document variables
  • Use secrets management in production (not .env files)
  • Separate environments (development, staging, production)
  • Rotate secrets regularly

Check TLS Configuration

Verify HTTPS enforcement:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: https_redirect
      pattern: "(https|ssl|tls|hsts|Strict-Transport-Security)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx,json}"
  output:
    format: minimal

TLS best practices:

  • Enforce HTTPS (redirect HTTP to HTTPS)
  • Enable HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security)
  • Use TLS 1.2+ (disable TLS 1.0, 1.1)
  • Use strong cipher suites
  • Implement certificate pinning for mobile apps

Audit Reporting

Structure your audit findings in this format:

Executive Summary

## Security Audit Report

**Application:** [Name]
**Audit Date:** [Date]
**Auditor:** [Name/Team]
**Scope:** [Components audited]

### Summary
- Total findings: X
- Critical: Y
- High: Z
- Medium: A
- Low: B

### Risk Assessment
[Overall risk level: Critical/High/Medium/Low]

Detailed Findings

For each vulnerability:

### [SEVERITY] Finding #X: [Title]

**Category:** [Authentication/Authorization/Input Validation/etc.]
**Severity:** [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
**CWE:** [CWE-XXX if applicable]

**Description:**
[Clear description of the vulnerability]

**Location:**
- File: `path/to/file.ts`
- Lines: 42-58

**Impact:**
[What can an attacker do? What data is at risk?]

**Proof of Concept:**

// Example exploit code or reproduction steps


**Remediation:**

// Secure code example


**References:**

- [OWASP Link]
- [CWE Link]

Severity Classification

SeverityCriteria
CriticalRemote code execution, authentication bypass, sensitive data exposure
HighPrivilege escalation, SQL injection, XSS in critical flows
MediumInformation disclosure, CSRF, weak authentication
LowMinor information leaks, missing security headers

Precision Tool Workflows

Full Security Scan Workflow

Run a comprehensive security scan using precision_grep:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    # Authentication issues
    - id: weak_auth
      pattern: "(password.*plain|password.*clear|md5|sha1)\\("
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"

    # SQL injection
    - id: sql_injection
      pattern: "(\\$queryRaw|\\$executeRaw).*\\$\\{|query.*\\+.*params"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"

    # XSS
    - id: xss
      pattern: "(dangerouslySetInnerHTML|innerHTML|v-html)"
      glob: "**/*.{tsx,jsx,vue}"

    # Command injection
    - id: command_injection
      pattern: "(exec|spawn).*\\(.*req\\.(body|query)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"

    # Path traversal
    - id: path_traversal
      pattern: "(readFile|writeFile).*req\\.(body|query|params)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"

    # Hardcoded secrets
    - id: hardcoded_secrets
      pattern: "(api.*key.*=.*[\"'][a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}|sk_live)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"

    # Insecure cookies
    - id: insecure_cookies
      pattern: "(httpOnly.*false|secure.*false|sameSite.*none)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"

  output:
    format: locations

Batch Security Audit

Use discover + batch for efficient auditing:

discover:
  queries:
    - id: auth_files
      type: glob
      patterns: ["**/auth/**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}", "**/api/auth/**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"]
    - id: api_routes
      type: glob
      patterns: ["**/api/**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"]
    - id: db_files
      type: grep
      pattern: "(prisma|db|database)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  verbosity: files_only

Then batch read and analyze:

precision_read:
  files: [/* Use discovered files */]
  extract: symbols
  symbol_filter: ["function", "class"]
  verbosity: standard

Automated Security Testing

Integrate security checks into CI/CD:

# .github/workflows/security.yml
name: Security Scan

on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
  pull_request:
    branches: [main]

jobs:
  security:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Run npm audit
        run: npm audit --audit-level=high

      - name: Run Snyk security scan
        uses: snyk/actions/node@master
        env:
          SNYK_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SNYK_TOKEN }}

      - name: Run Trivy vulnerability scanner
        uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master
        with:
          scan-type: 'fs'
          scan-ref: '.'
          severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'

      - name: Run OWASP ZAP scan
        uses: zaproxy/action-baseline@v0.7.0
        with:
          target: 'http://localhost:3000'

Common Security Mistakes

1. Trusting Client-Side Validation

Problem: Relying on client-side checks for security.

Solution: Always validate on the server.

// UNSAFE - Client-side only
export function ClientForm() {
  const [email, setEmail] = useState('');

  const isValid = email.includes('@');

  return (
    <form onSubmit={() => fetch('/api/subscribe', {
      method: 'POST',
      body: JSON.stringify({ email }),
    })}>
      <input value={email} onChange={(e) => setEmail(e.target.value)} />
      <button disabled={!isValid}>Subscribe</button>
    </form>
  );
}

// SAFE - Server-side validation
export async function POST(req: Request) {
  const body = await req.json();

  const schema = z.object({
    email: z.string().email(),
  });

  const result = schema.safeParse(body);

  if (!result.success) {
    return NextResponse.json(
      { error: result.error.flatten() },
      { status: 400 }
    );
  }

  // Process valid email
  await subscribeUser(result.data.email);
  return NextResponse.json({ success: true });
}

2. Exposing Sensitive Data in API Responses

Problem: Returning more data than needed.

Solution: Use explicit select to limit fields.

// UNSAFE - Returns password hash
export async function GET(req: Request) {
  const user = await db.user.findUnique({ where: { id: userId } });
  return NextResponse.json(user);
}

// SAFE - Excludes sensitive fields
export async function GET(req: Request) {
  const user = await db.user.findUnique({
    where: { id: userId },
    select: {
      id: true,
      name: true,
      email: true,
      avatar: true,
      // passwordHash excluded
    },
  });
  return NextResponse.json(user);
}

3. Logging Sensitive Data

Problem: Writing PII or secrets to logs.

Solution: Redact sensitive data before logging.

// UNSAFE - Logs password
export async function login(email: string, password: string) {
  console.log('Login attempt:', { email, password });
  // ...
}

// SAFE - Redacts password
export async function login(email: string, password: string) {
  console.log('Login attempt:', { email, password: '[REDACTED]' });
  // ...
}

Post-Audit Actions

After completing the audit:

  1. Prioritize findings by severity and exploitability
  2. Create tickets for each finding (link to audit report)
  3. Fix critical/high issues immediately
  4. Run validation script to verify remediations
  5. Schedule follow-up audit after fixes
  6. Update security documentation with lessons learned
  7. Train team on common vulnerabilities found

Validation

Run the validation script after audit remediation:

./scripts/validate-security-audit.sh /path/to/project

The script checks for:

  • Common vulnerability patterns
  • Secure authentication implementation
  • Input validation coverage
  • Secrets management
  • Security headers configuration
  • Dependency vulnerabilities

Further Reading

适合场景

01

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

03

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

36.1%
按下载量换算169

Claude

30.87%
按下载量换算144

Cursor

17.62%
按下载量换算82

Gemini CLI

8.15%
按下载量换算38

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

未通过

权限和风险

需要联网

该 Skill 可能需要联网访问来源站点、仓库或外部 API;具体网络访问范围需要结合源码和 README 复核。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在 warning/failed 结果,不能写成本站确认安全。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

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