ln-654-resource-lifecycle-auditor（ln 654 资源生命周期审核员）

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Resource Lifecycle Auditor (L3 Worker)

Type: L3 Worker

Specialized worker auditing resource acquisition/release patterns, scope mismatches, and connection pool hygiene.

Purpose & Scope

• Audit resource lifecycle (Priority: HIGH)
• Check session/connection scope mismatch, streaming endpoint resource holding, cleanup patterns, pool config
• Write structured findings to file with severity, location, effort, recommendations
• Calculate compliance score (X/10) for Resource Lifecycle category

Inputs

MANDATORY READ: Load shared/references/audit_worker_core_contract.md. MANDATORY READ: Load shared/references/mcp_tool_preferences.md and shared/references/mcp_integration_patterns.md

Receives contextStore with: tech_stack, best_practices, db_config (database type, ORM settings, pool config, session factory), codebase_root, output_dir.

Domain-aware: Supports domain_mode + current_domain.

Use hex-graph first when reference chains or call paths materially improve lifecycle findings. Use hex-line first for local code/config reads when available. If MCP is unavailable, unsupported, or not indexed, continue with built-in Read/Grep/Glob/Bash and state the fallback in the report.

Workflow

MANDATORY READ: Load shared/references/two_layer_detection.md for detection methodology.

1. Parse context from contextStore

- Extract tech_stack, best_practices, db_config, output_dir - Determine scan_path

1. Detect DI framework

- FastAPI Depends(), Django middleware, Spring @Autowired/@PersistenceContext, Express middleware, Go wire/fx

1. Discover resource infrastructure

- Find session/connection factory patterns (sessionmaker, create_engine, DataSource, pool creation) - Find DI registration (Depends(), @Inject, providers, middleware mounting) - Find streaming endpoints (SSE, WebSocket, long-poll, streaming response) - Map: which endpoints receive which resources via DI

1. Scan codebase for violations (6 checks)

- Trace resource injection -> usage -> release across endpoint lifetime - Analyze streaming endpoints for held resources - Check error paths for cleanup

1. Collect findings with severity, location, effort, recommendation
2. Calculate score using penalty algorithm
3. Write Report: Build full markdown report in memory per shared/templates/audit_worker_report_template.md, write to {output_dir}/ln-654--global.md in single Write call
4. Return Summary: Return minimal summary to coordinator (see Output Format)

Audit Rules (Priority: HIGH)

1. Resource Scope Mismatch

What: Resource injected via DI lives for entire request/connection scope but is used for only a fraction of it.

Detection (Python/FastAPI):

• Step 1 - Find endpoints with DB session dependency:

- Grep: async def\s+\w+\(.*Depends\(get_db\)|Depends\(get_session\)|db:\s*AsyncSession|session:\s*AsyncSession

• Step 2 - Measure session usage span within endpoint body:

- Count lines between first and last session\.|db\.|await.*repo usage - Count total lines in endpoint function body

• Step 3 - Flag if usage_lines / total_lines < 0.2 (session used in <20% of function body)

- Especially: session used only at function start (auth check, initial load) but function continues with non-DB work

Detection (Node.js/Express):

• Middleware injects req.db or req.knex at request start
• Grep: app\.use.*pool|app\.use.*knex|app\.use.*prisma (middleware injection)
• Route handler uses req.db only in first 20% of function body

Detection (Java/Spring):

• @Transactional on method with long non-DB processing
• EntityManager injected but used only briefly
• Grep: @Autowired.*EntityManager|@PersistenceContext + method body analysis

Detection (Go):

• sql.DB or *gorm.DB passed to handler, used once, then long processing
• Grep: func.*Handler.*\*sql\.DB|func.*Handler.*\*gorm\.DB

Severity:

• CRITICAL: Session scope mismatch in streaming endpoint (SSE, WebSocket) - session held for minutes/hours
• HIGH: Session scope mismatch in endpoint with external API calls (session held during network latency)
• MEDIUM: Session scope mismatch in endpoint with >50 lines of non-DB processing

Recommendation: Extract DB operations into scoped function; acquire session only for the duration needed; use async with get_session() as session: block instead of endpoint-level DI injection.

Effort: M (refactor DI to scoped acquisition)

2. Streaming Endpoint Resource Holding

What: SSE, WebSocket, or long-poll endpoint holds DB session/connection for stream duration.

Detection (Python/FastAPI):

• Step 1 - Find streaming endpoints:

- Grep: StreamingResponse|EventSourceResponse|SSE|async def.*websocket|@app\.websocket - Grep: yield\s+.*event|yield\s+.*data:|async for.*yield (SSE generator pattern)

• Step 2 - Check if streaming function/generator has DB session in scope:

- Session from Depends() in endpoint signature -> held for entire stream - Session from context manager inside generator -> scoped (OK)

• Step 3 - Analyze session usage inside generator:

- If session used once at start (auth/permission check) then stream loops without DB -> scope mismatch

Detection (Node.js):

• Grep: res\.write\(|res\.flush\(|Server-Sent Events|new WebSocket|ws\.on\(
• Check if connection/pool client acquired before stream loop and not released

Detection (Java/Spring):

• Grep: SseEmitter|WebSocketHandler|StreamingResponseBody
• Check if @Transactional wraps streaming method

Detection (Go):

• Grep: Flusher|http\.Flusher|websocket\.Conn
• Check if *sql.DB or transaction held during flush loop

Severity:

• CRITICAL: DB session/connection held for entire SSE/WebSocket stream duration (pool exhaustion under load)
• HIGH: DB connection held during long-poll (>30s timeout)

Recommendation: Move auth/permission check BEFORE stream: acquire session, check auth, release session, THEN start streaming. Use separate scoped session for any mid-stream DB access.

Effort: M (restructure endpoint to release session before streaming)

3. Missing Resource Cleanup Patterns

What: Resource acquired without guaranteed cleanup (no try/finally, no context manager, no close()).

Detection (Python):

• Grep: session\s*=\s*Session\(\)|session\s*=\s*sessionmaker|engine\.connect\(\) NOT inside with or async with
• Grep: connection\s*=\s*pool\.acquire\(\)|conn\s*=\s*await.*connect\(\) NOT followed by try:.*finally:.*close\(\)
• Pattern: bare session = get_session() without context manager
• Safe patterns to exclude: async with session_factory() as session:, with engine.connect() as conn:

Detection (Node.js):

• Grep: pool\.connect\(\)|knex\.client\.acquireConnection|\.getConnection\(\) without corresponding .release() or .end() in same function
• Grep: createConnection\(\) without .destroy() in try/finally

Detection (Java):

• Grep: getConnection\(\)|dataSource\.getConnection\(\) without try-with-resources
• Pattern: Connection conn = ds.getConnection() without try (Connection conn =...) syntax

Detection (Go):

• Grep: sql\.Open\(|db\.Begin\(\) without defer.*Close\(\)|defer.*Rollback\(\)
• Pattern: tx, err:= db.Begin() without defer tx.Rollback()

Severity:

• HIGH: Session/connection acquired without cleanup guarantee (leak on exception)
• MEDIUM: File handle or cursor without cleanup in non-critical path

Exception: Session acquired and released before streaming/long-poll begins -> skip. NullPool / pool_size config documented as serverless design -> skip.

Recommendation: Ensure resources are cleaned up on all exit paths (context managers, try-finally, or framework-managed lifecycle).

Effort: S (wrap in context manager or add defer)

4. Connection Pool Configuration Gaps

What: Missing pool health monitoring, no pre-ping, no recycle, no overflow limits.

Detection (Python/SQLAlchemy):

• Grep for create_engine\(|create_async_engine\(:

- Missing pool_pre_ping=True -> stale connections not detected - Missing pool_recycle -> connections kept beyond DB server timeout (default: MySQL 8h, PG unlimited) - Missing pool_size -> uses default 5 (may be too small for production) - Missing max_overflow -> unbounded overflow under load - pool_size=0 or NullPool in web service -> no pooling (anti-pattern)

• Grep for pool event listeners:

- Missing @event.listens_for(engine, "invalidate") -> no visibility into connection invalidation - Missing @event.listens_for(engine, "checkout") -> no connection checkout monitoring - Missing @event.listens_for(engine, "checkin") -> no connection return monitoring

Detection (Node.js):

• Grep for createPool\(|new Pool\(:

- Missing min/max configuration - Missing idleTimeoutMillis or reapIntervalMillis - Missing connection validation (validateConnection, testOnBorrow)

Detection (Java/Spring):

• Grep: DataSource|HikariConfig|HikariDataSource:

- Missing leakDetectionThreshold - Missing maximumPoolSize (defaults to 10) - Missing connectionTestQuery or connectionInitSql

Detection (Go):

• Grep: sql\.Open\(:

- Missing db.SetMaxOpenConns() - Missing db.SetMaxIdleConns() - Missing db.SetConnMaxLifetime()

Severity:

• HIGH: No pool_pre_ping AND no pool_recycle (stale connections served silently)
• HIGH: No max_overflow limit in web service (unbounded connection creation under load)
• MEDIUM: Missing pool event listeners (no visibility into pool health)
• MEDIUM: Missing leak detection threshold (Java/HikariCP)
• LOW: Pool size at default value (may be adequate for small services)

Context-dependent exceptions:

• NullPool is valid for serverless/Lambda
• pool_size=5 may be fine for low-traffic services

Recommendation: Configure pool_pre_ping=True, pool_recycle < DB server timeout, appropriate pool_size for expected concurrency, add pool event listeners for monitoring.

Effort: S (add config parameters), M (add event listeners/monitoring)

5. Unclosed Resources in Error Paths

What: Exception/error handling paths that skip resource cleanup.

Detection (Python):

• Find except blocks containing raise or return without prior session.close(), conn.close(), or cursor.close()
• Pattern: except Exception: logger.error(...); raise (re-raise without cleanup)
• Find generator functions with DB session where GeneratorExit is not handled:

- Grep: async def.*yield.*session|def.*yield.*session without try:.*finally:.*close\(\)

Detection (Node.js):

• Grep: catch\s*\( blocks that throw or return without releasing connection
• Pattern: pool.connect().then(client => {...}) without .finally(() => client.release())
• Promise chains without .finally() for cleanup

Detection (Java):

• Grep: catch\s*\( blocks without finally {conn.close()} when connection opened in try
• Not using try-with-resources for AutoCloseable resources

Detection (Go):

• Grep: if err!= nil \{.*return before defer statement for resource cleanup
• Pattern: error check between Open() and defer Close() that returns without closing

Severity:

• CRITICAL: Session/connection leak in high-frequency endpoint error path (pool exhaustion)
• HIGH: Resource leak in error path of API handler
• MEDIUM: Resource leak in error path of background task

Recommendation: Use context managers/try-with-resources/defer BEFORE any code that can fail; for generators, add try/finally around yield.

Effort: S (restructure acquisition to before-error-path)

6. Resource Factory vs Injection Anti-pattern

What: Using framework DI to inject short-lived resources into long-lived contexts instead of using factory pattern.

Detection (Python/FastAPI):

• Step 1 - Find DI-injected sessions in endpoint signatures:

- Grep: Depends\(get_db\)|Depends\(get_session\)|Depends\(get_async_session\)

• Step 2 - Classify endpoint lifetime:

- Short-lived: regular REST endpoint (request/response) -> DI injection OK - Long-lived: SSE (StreamingResponse, EventSourceResponse), WebSocket (@app.websocket), background task (BackgroundTasks.add_task)

• Step 3 - Flag DI injection in long-lived endpoints:

- Long-lived endpoint should use factory pattern: async with session_factory() as session: at point of need - NOT session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session) at endpoint level

Detection (Node.js/Express):

• Middleware-injected pool connection (req.db) used in WebSocket handler or SSE route
• Should use: const conn = await pool.connect(); try {...} finally {conn.release()} at point of need

Detection (Java/Spring):

• @Autowired EntityManager in @Controller with SSE endpoint (SseEmitter)
• Should use: programmatic EntityManager creation from EntityManagerFactory

Detection (Go):

• *sql.DB injected at handler construction time but *sql.Conn should be acquired per-operation

Severity:

• CRITICAL: DI-injected session in SSE/WebSocket endpoint (session outlives intended scope by orders of magnitude)
• HIGH: DI-injected session passed to background task (task outlives request)

Recommendation: Use factory pattern for long-lived contexts; inject the factory (sessionmaker, pool), not the session/connection itself.

Effort: M (change DI from session to session factory, add scoped acquisition)

Scoring Algorithm

MANDATORY READ: Load shared/references/audit_worker_core_contract.md and shared/references/audit_scoring.md.

Output Format

MANDATORY READ: Load shared/references/audit_worker_core_contract.md and shared/templates/audit_worker_report_template.md.

Write JSON summary per shared/references/audit_summary_contract.md. In managed mode the caller passes both runId and summaryArtifactPath; in standalone mode the worker generates its own run-scoped artifact path per shared contract.

Write report to {output_dir}/ln-654--global.md with category: "Resource Lifecycle" and checks: resource_scope_mismatch, streaming_resource_holding, missing_cleanup, pool_configuration, error_path_leak, factory_vs_injection.

Return summary per shared/references/audit_summary_contract.md.

When summaryArtifactPath is absent, write the standalone runtime summary under .hex-skills/runtime-artifacts/runs/{run_id}/evaluation-worker/{worker}--{identifier}.json and optionally echo the same summary in structured output.

Report written: .hex-skills/runtime-artifacts/runs/{run_id}/audit-report/ln-654--global.md
Score: X.X/10 | Issues: N (C:N H:N M:N L:N)

Critical Rules

MANDATORY READ: Load shared/references/audit_worker_core_contract.md.

• Do not auto-fix: Report only
• DI-aware: Understand framework dependency injection lifetime scopes (request, singleton, transient)
• Framework detection first: Identify DI framework before checking injection patterns
• Streaming detection first: Find all streaming/long-lived endpoints before scope analysis
• Exclude tests: Do not flag test fixtures, test session setup, mock sessions
• Exclude CLI/scripts: DI scope mismatch is not relevant for single-run scripts
• Effort realism: S = <1h, M = 1-4h, L = >4h
• Pool config is context-dependent: NullPool is valid for serverless/Lambda; pool_size=5 may be fine for low-traffic services
• Safe pattern awareness: Do not flag resources inside async with, with, try-with-resources, defer (already managed)

Definition of Done

MANDATORY READ: Load shared/references/audit_worker_core_contract.md.

• contextStore parsed successfully (including output_dir, db_config)
• scan_path determined
• DI framework detected (FastAPI Depends, Django middleware, Spring @Autowired, Express middleware, Go wire)
• Streaming endpoints inventoried
• All 6 checks completed:

- resource scope mismatch, streaming resource holding, missing cleanup, pool configuration, error path leak, factory vs injection

• Findings collected with severity, location, effort, recommendation
• Score calculated using penalty algorithm
• Report written to {output_dir}/ln-654--global.md (atomic single Write call)
• Summary written per contract

Reference Files

• Audit output schema: shared/references/audit_output_schema.md

Version: 1.0.0 Last Updated: 2026-03-03