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injectioninjection 搜索

Agent Skill

injection 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

总安装

247

周安装

10

GitHub Stars

9

下载量

78
CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:injection(injection 搜索)
来源仓库:https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code
仓库路径:skills/injection
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill injection
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill injection

简介

injection 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息。

  • 适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中根据关键词快速定位候选结果。
  • 通过 npx skills add 命令从指定仓库安装,需确认权限和维护状态。
  • 使用前建议核验是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写操作。
  • injection 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

SKILL.md

Injection Analysis (OWASP A03:2021)

Analyze source code for injection vulnerabilities where user-supplied data flows into interpreters without proper validation, sanitization, or parameterization. This is the most code-scannable OWASP category -- most injection patterns leave clear syntactic fingerprints in source code.

Supported Flags

Read ../../shared/schemas/flags.md for the full flag specification. This skill supports all cross-cutting flags. Key behaviors:

FlagInjection-Specific Behavior
--scopeDefault changed. Injection analysis focuses on files containing database queries, system calls, LDAP operations, and eval constructs.
--depth quickScanners + Grep patterns only, no data-flow tracing.
--depth standardFull code read of scoped files, local data-flow analysis within each file.
--depth deepTrace user input from HTTP entry points through call chains to sinks. Cross-file taint analysis.
--depth expertDeep + red team simulation: craft proof-of-concept payloads, DREAD scoring.
--severityFilter output. Injection findings are typically critical or high.
--fixGenerate parameterized replacements for each finding.

Framework Context

OWASP A03:2021 - Injection

User-supplied data is not validated, filtered, or sanitized by the application. Dynamic queries or commands are constructed using string concatenation or interpolation with hostile data. Common injection types:

  • SQL Injection (CWE-89): Unsanitized input in SQL queries
  • NoSQL Injection (CWE-943): Unsanitized input in MongoDB/NoSQL queries
  • OS Command Injection (CWE-78): User input passed to system shell commands
  • LDAP Injection (CWE-90): Unsanitized input in LDAP queries
  • Expression Language Injection (CWE-917): User input in EL/template engines
  • ORM Injection (CWE-89): Raw queries or unsafe ORM usage with user input

STRIDE Mapping: Tampering, Information Disclosure, Elevation of Privilege

Detection Patterns

Read references/detection-patterns.md for the full pattern catalog with language-specific examples, regex heuristics, and false positive guidance.

Pattern Summary:

  1. String concatenation in SQL queries
  2. Template string / f-string SQL construction
  3. Raw ORM queries with user input
  4. os.system / exec / subprocess with user input
  5. eval() / Function() with user input
  6. LDAP query string construction with user input

Workflow

Step 1: Determine Scope

  1. Parse --scope flag (default: changed).
  2. Resolve to a concrete file list.
  3. Filter to relevant file types: .py, .js, .ts, .jsx, .tsx, .java, .go, .rb, .php, .cs, .rs, .kt, .scala, .sql, .graphql.
  4. Prioritize files containing: database query patterns, HTTP handler functions, system call imports, LDAP library usage, eval/exec constructs.

Step 2: Check for Scanners

Detect available scanners in priority order:

ScannerDetectInjection Coverage
semgrepwhich semgrepSQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, EL, ORM -- broadest coverage
banditwhich banditPython: eval, exec, SQL, subprocess, pickle
gosecwhich gosecGo: SQL injection, command injection
brakemanwhich brakemanRails: SQL injection, command injection, mass assignment
spotbugsMaven/Gradle pluginJava: SQL injection, command injection, XXE, LDAP

Record which scanners are available and which are missing. If none are available, note: "No scanner available -- findings based on code pattern analysis only."

Step 3: Run Scanners

For each available scanner, run against the scoped files:

semgrep scan --config auto --json --quiet <target>
bandit -r <target> -f json -q
gosec -fmt json ./...

Normalize scanner output to the findings schema (see ../../shared/schemas/findings.md). Use the severity mapping from ../../shared/schemas/scanners.md.

Step 4: Claude Analysis

Read each scoped file and analyze for injection patterns not caught by scanners:

  1. Identify sinks: Database query functions, system calls, LDAP operations, eval/exec, template engines.
  2. Trace sources: HTTP request parameters, form data, URL path segments, headers, cookies, file uploads, environment variables from user input.
  3. Check sanitization: Is there parameterization, input validation, allowlisting, or escaping between source and sink?
  4. Assess context: Is the code reachable from an external entry point? Is there framework-level protection (e.g., Django ORM, prepared statements)?
  5. Deduplicate: Merge Claude findings with scanner findings. If both found the same issue, keep the scanner finding and add Claude's context.

At --depth deep or --depth expert, trace data flow across files:

  • Follow function calls from HTTP handlers to database/system call sites.
  • Check middleware and interceptors for global sanitization.
  • Map the full taint path: source -> transforms -> sink.

Step 5: Report

Output findings using the format from ../../shared/schemas/findings.md.

Each finding must include:

  • id: INJ-001, INJ-002, etc.
  • title: Concise description of the injection type and location.
  • severity: Based on exploitability, authentication requirements, and impact.
  • location: File, line, function, and vulnerable code snippet.
  • description: What is vulnerable and why.
  • impact: What an attacker can achieve.
  • fix: Parameterized/safe replacement code.
  • references: CWE, OWASP A03:2021, STRIDE mapping.

What to Look For

These are the primary injection patterns to detect. Each has detailed examples and regex heuristics in references/detection-patterns.md.

  1. String concatenation in SQL: "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " + userId
  2. Template literals in SQL: ` SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${userId} `
  3. F-strings / format strings in SQL: f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = {user_id}"
  4. Raw ORM queries: Model.objects.raw(user_input), sequelize.query(userInput)
  5. OS command construction: os.system("ping " + host), exec("ls " + dir)
  6. subprocess with shell=True: subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True) where cmd includes user input
  7. eval/exec with user input: eval(request.body), new Function(userCode)()
  8. LDAP filter construction: "(uid=" + username + ")" without escaping
  9. NoSQL operator injection: db.users.find({username: req.body.username}) where body can contain $gt, $ne
  10. Stored procedures with concatenation: Dynamic SQL inside stored procedures

Scanner Integration

Primary: semgrep (broadest injection coverage across languages) Language-specific: bandit (Python), gosec (Go), brakeman (Rails), spotbugs (Java) Fallback: Grep regex patterns from references/detection-patterns.md

When scanners are available, run them first and use Claude analysis to:

  • Validate scanner findings (reduce false positives).
  • Find injection patterns scanners miss (complex data flows, indirect concatenation).
  • Provide fix suggestions with parameterized replacements.

When no scanners are available, Claude performs full pattern-based analysis using the Grep heuristics from references/detection-patterns.md and contextual code reading. Report these findings with confidence: medium.

Output Format

Use finding ID prefix INJ (e.g., INJ-001, INJ-002).

All findings follow the schema in ../../shared/schemas/findings.md with:

  • references.owasp: "A03:2021"
  • references.stride: "T" (Tampering), "I" (Info Disclosure), or "E" (Elevation of Privilege)
  • metadata.tool: "injection"
  • metadata.framework: "owasp"
  • metadata.category: "A03"

CWE Mapping by Injection Type:

Injection TypeCWETypical Severity
SQL InjectionCWE-89critical
OS Command InjectionCWE-78critical
NoSQL InjectionCWE-943high
LDAP InjectionCWE-90high
Expression Language InjectionCWE-917high
ORM Injection (raw queries)CWE-89high
eval/exec InjectionCWE-95critical

Summary Table

After all findings, output a summary:

| Injection Type | Critical | High | Medium | Low |
|---------------|----------|------|--------|-----|
| SQL            |          |      |        |     |
| OS Command     |          |      |        |     |
| NoSQL          |          |      |        |     |
| eval/exec      |          |      |        |     |
| LDAP           |          |      |        |     |
| ORM            |          |      |        |     |

Followed by: top 3 priorities, scanner coverage notes, and overall assessment.

适合场景

01

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

03

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

37.55%
按下载量换算29

Claude

32.63%
按下载量换算25

Cursor

17.48%
按下载量换算14

Gemini CLI

9.76%
按下载量换算8

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

未通过

权限和风险

敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在 warning/failed 结果,不能写成本站确认安全。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

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