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info-disclosure信息披露

Agent Skill

info-disclosure 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

总安装

259

周安装

11

GitHub Stars

9

下载量

91
CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:info-disclosure(信息披露)
来源仓库:https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code
仓库路径:skills/info-disclosure
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill info-disclosure
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill info-disclosure

简介

info-disclosure 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。

  • 适用于信息披露管理、合规性检查和公开资料整理场景。
  • 通过 npx skills add 命令从指定 GitHub 仓库安装,需结合原始 README 核验具体用法。
  • 安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。
  • 适用宿主包括 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,接入前应确认版本、权限和运行环境要求。

SKILL.md

Information Disclosure Analysis

Analyze source code for information disclosure threats where sensitive data leaks to unauthorized parties. Maps to STRIDE I -- violations of the Confidentiality security property.

Supported Flags

Read ../../shared/schemas/flags.md for the full flag specification. This skill supports all cross-cutting flags including --scope, --depth, --severity, --format, --fix, --quiet, and --explain.

Framework Context

Read ../../shared/frameworks/stride.md, specifically the I - Information Disclosure section, for the threat model backing this analysis. Key concerns: data breaches, directory traversal, error message leaks, timing attacks, memory dumps, cleartext transmission.

Workflow

1. Determine Scope

Parse flags and resolve the target file list per the flags spec. Filter to files likely handling sensitive data:

  • API response builders and serializers
  • Error handlers and exception middleware
  • Logging configuration and log output
  • Database queries returning user data
  • Configuration files and environment loaders
  • Debug/diagnostic endpoints and health checks
  • File-serving routes and static asset configuration
  • Frontend templates and server-side rendering
  • GraphQL schema definitions and resolvers

2. Analyze for Information Disclosure Threats

For each in-scope file, apply the Analysis Checklist below. At --depth standard, examine each file for data exposure patterns. At --depth deep, trace data flows from database/store through processing to API response to confirm sensitive fields are filtered before transmission across trust boundaries.

3. Report Findings

Output findings per ../../shared/schemas/findings.md using the DISC ID prefix (e.g., DISC-001). Set references.stride to "I" on every finding.

Analysis Checklist

Work through these questions against the scoped code. Each "yes" may produce a finding.

  1. Verbose error messages -- Do error responses expose stack traces, database schemas, SQL queries, internal file paths, or library versions to the client? Search for unfiltered exception serialization in error handlers and catch blocks. Check if NODE_ENV=production or DEBUG=False actually suppresses detail.
  2. Excessive API response data -- Do API endpoints return full database objects instead of explicitly selected fields? Look for SELECT *, ORM .toJSON(), serialize(), or spreading entire model objects into responses without field allowlists. Compare the API response shape against the model definition to identify leaked internal fields (password_hash, internal_id, created_by).
  3. Sensitive data in logs -- Are passwords, tokens, credit card numbers, SSNs, or PII written to logs? Search for log calls near authentication, payment, or user profile handlers that dump request bodies or sensitive variables. Check if log redaction middleware is configured.
  4. Debug endpoints in production -- Are debug routes, profiling endpoints, or diagnostic pages accessible without feature flags or environment guards? Look for /debug, /health with excessive detail, phpinfo(), /actuator, /graphiql, /__debug__, /metrics, /_profiler, Swagger UI without auth.
  5. Directory traversal on reads -- Can user input control file read paths? Look for fs.readFile, open(), file_get_contents where the path incorporates req.params, request.args, or URL segments without path canonicalization and containment checks (realpath + prefix validation).
  6. Missing encryption for sensitive data -- Is PII, authentication data, or financial data stored or transmitted in cleartext? Check database schemas for unencrypted sensitive columns, API calls over HTTP instead of HTTPS, and missing field-level encryption on high-sensitivity data.
  7. Hardcoded secrets in source -- Are API keys, database passwords, encryption keys, or private certificates committed in source files? Search for high-entropy strings assigned to variables named key, secret, password, token, credential. Check .env files, config files, and test fixtures.
  8. HTTP headers leaking info -- Does the application set Server, X-Powered-By, X-AspNet-Version, or other headers that reveal technology stack details? Check response header configuration and whether helmet/equivalent suppression is applied.
  9. Timing side channels -- Are operations on secret data (password comparison, token validation, license checks) performed with early-exit logic that leaks information through response time differences? Look for short-circuit if statements on secret bytes.
  10. Client-side data exposure -- Is sensitive data embedded in HTML source, JavaScript bundles, or local storage? Look for server-side rendering that injects user data, API keys, internal URLs, or feature flag values into page templates or window.__CONFIG__ objects.
  11. Verbose health/status endpoints -- Do health check or status endpoints expose internal details like database connection strings, dependency versions, internal hostnames, queue sizes, or environment variable dumps? Check /health, /status, /info, /env endpoints.
  12. Source map exposure -- Are JavaScript source maps deployed to production, allowing attackers to read original source code? Check for .map files in build output and sourceMappingURL references in bundled JavaScript.

Pragmatism Notes

  • Debug mode in development is expected. Only flag DEBUG=True or equivalent when it appears in production configuration or when there is no environment gating.
  • SELECT * is not always a disclosure risk. It depends on whether the full result is serialized to the API response. If application code filters fields before responding, the query itself is not the issue.
  • Source maps in production are a trade-off: they improve error reporting but expose source code. Rate this low unless the source contains hardcoded secrets or sensitive business logic.
  • Technology stack headers (X-Powered-By) are low severity on their own but contribute to reconnaissance. They matter more in combination with known vulnerabilities in the disclosed versions.

What to Look For

Concrete code patterns and grep heuristics to surface information disclosure risks:

  • Stack traces in responses: traceback.format_exc(), e.stack, err.message sent in HTTP responses, DEBUG = True in production config, app.use(errorHandler) without production mode filtering. Grep: (stack|traceback|stackTrace)\b near response serialization.
  • Full object serialization: res.json(user), return JsonResponse(model.__dict__), JSON.stringify(record) without field selection -- compare against the model definition to see if password_hash, ssn, internal_notes fields leak.
  • Secrets in logs: logger.debug(f"token={token}"), console.log(req.headers.authorization), log.info("password: " + pwd). Grep: log\w*\.\w+\(.*\b(password|token|secret|key|authorization|ssn|credit.?card)\b.
  • Path traversal reads: open(os.path.join(base, request.args['file'])) without os.path.realpath containment, fs.readFile(req.params.name) without validation. Grep: (readFile|open|fopen)\s*\(.*req\.(params|query|body).
  • Debug routes: /debug/, /admin/phpinfo, /_profiler, /graphiql, /swagger, /actuator without auth guards. Grep: (debug|profiler|phpinfo|actuator|graphiql) in route definitions.
  • Missing field filtering: SELECT * FROM users returned directly via API, .find({}) in MongoDB without projection, Sequelize findAll without attributes restriction. Grep: SELECT \*|\.find\(\s*\{\s*\}\s*\)|findAll\(\s*\).
  • Technology headers: X-Powered-By, Server: Apache/2.4.51, X-AspNet-Version -- check for helmet, removeHeader, or equivalent suppression. Grep: X-Powered-By|x-powered-by|server.*header.
  • Source maps in production: .map files in build/dist directories, sourceMappingURL= in production JS bundles. Grep: sourceMappingURL|\.js\.map.

Output Format

Each finding must conform to ../../shared/schemas/findings.md.

id:          DISC-<NNN>
severity:    critical | high | medium | low
confidence:  high | medium | low
location:    file, line, function, snippet
description: What data is exposed and through which channel
impact:      What sensitive information an attacker can obtain
fix:         Concrete remediation with diff when possible
references:
  stride: "I"
  cwe:    CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Info), CWE-209 (Error Messages), or relevant CWE
metadata:
  tool:      info-disclosure
  framework: stride
  category:  I

Severity Guidelines for Information Disclosure

SeverityCriteria
criticalHardcoded production secrets in source, directory traversal exposing arbitrary files, PII/credentials in API responses
highStack traces with internal paths/queries in production errors, sensitive data in logs, debug endpoints without auth
mediumExcessive API fields exposing non-critical internal data, technology stack headers, timing side channels
lowVerbose health check responses, minor information in HTTP headers, source maps in production, client-side comments

Common CWE References

CWEDescription
CWE-200Exposure of Sensitive Information to Unauthorized Actor
CWE-209Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Info
CWE-532Insertion of Sensitive Info into Log File
CWE-22Path Traversal
CWE-215Insertion of Sensitive Info Into Debugging Code
CWE-312Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information
CWE-319Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
CWE-548Exposure of Information Through Directory Listing

适合场景

01

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

03

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

37.56%
按下载量换算34

Claude

31.26%
按下载量换算28

Cursor

16.52%
按下载量换算15

Gemini CLI

9.68%
按下载量换算9

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

未通过

权限和风险

敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在 warning/failed 结果,不能写成本站确认安全。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

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