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hopeidshopeids 测试

Agent Skill

hopeids 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 OpenClaw 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

总安装

76,818

周安装

3,138

GitHub Stars

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下载量

24,853
OpenClaw

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

MIT-0

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:hopeids(hopeids 测试)
来源仓库:https://github.com/emberdesire/hopeids
安装命令:
openclaw skills install hopeids
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 OpenClaw 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

ClawHubOpenClaw
openclaw skills install hopeids

简介

AI 代理基于推理的入侵检测。模式匹配 + LLM 分析,用于越狱、提示注入、凭证盗窃、社会工程。 108 种检测模式、OpenClaw 插件、自动扫描、隔离。命令:hopid 扫描、hopid 测试、hopid 设置、hopid 统计、hopid 医生。

SKILL.md

hopeIDS Security Skill

Inference-based intrusion detection for AI agents with quarantine and human-in-the-loop.

Security Invariants

These are non-negotiable design principles:

  1. Block = full abort — Blocked messages never reach jasper-recall or the agent
  2. Metadata only — No raw malicious content is ever stored
  3. Approve ≠ re-inject — Approval changes future behavior, doesn't resurrect messages
  4. Alerts are programmatic — Telegram alerts built from metadata, no LLM involved

Features

  • Auto-scan — Scan messages before agent processing
  • Quarantine — Block threats with metadata-only storage
  • Human-in-the-loop — Telegram alerts for review
  • Per-agent config — Different thresholds for different agents
  • Commands/approve, /reject, /trust, /quarantine

The Pipeline

Message arrives
    ↓
hopeIDS.autoScan()
    ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  risk >= threshold?                     │
│                                         │
│  BLOCK (strictMode):                    │
│     → Create QuarantineRecord           │
│     → Send Telegram alert               │
│     → ABORT (no recall, no agent)       │
│                                         │
│  WARN (non-strict):                     │
│     → Inject <security-alert>           │
│     → Continue to jasper-recall         │
│     → Continue to agent                 │
│                                         │
│  ALLOW:                                 │
│     → Continue normally                 │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘

Configuration

{
  "plugins": {
    "entries": {
      "hopeids": {
        "enabled": true,
        "config": {
          "autoScan": true,
          "defaultRiskThreshold": 0.7,
          "strictMode": false,
          "telegramAlerts": true,
          "agents": {
            "moltbook-scanner": {
              "strictMode": true,
              "riskThreshold": 0.7
            },
            "main": {
              "strictMode": false,
              "riskThreshold": 0.8
            }
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

Options

OptionTypeDefaultDescription
autoScanbooleanfalseAuto-scan every message
strictModebooleanfalseBlock (vs warn) on threats
defaultRiskThresholdnumber0.7Risk level that triggers action
telegramAlertsbooleantrueSend alerts for blocked messages
telegramChatIdstring-Override alert destination
quarantineDirstring~/.openclaw/quarantine/hopeidsStorage path
agentsobject-Per-agent overrides
trustOwnersbooleantrueSkip scanning owner messages

Quarantine Records

When a message is blocked, a metadata record is created:

{
  "id": "q-7f3a2b",
  "ts": "2026-02-06T00:48:00Z",
  "agent": "moltbook-scanner",
  "source": "moltbook",
  "senderId": "@sus_user",
  "intent": "instruction_override",
  "risk": 0.85,
  "patterns": [
    "matched regex: ignore.*instructions",
    "matched keyword: api key"
  ],
  "contentHash": "ab12cd34...",
  "status": "pending"
}

Note: There is NO originalMessage field. This is intentional.


Telegram Alerts

When a message is blocked:

🛑 Message blocked

ID: `q-7f3a2b`
Agent: moltbook-scanner
Source: moltbook
Sender: @sus_user
Intent: instruction_override (85%)

Patterns:
• matched regex: ignore.*instructions
• matched keyword: api key

`/approve q-7f3a2b`
`/reject q-7f3a2b`
`/trust @sus_user`

Built from metadata only. No LLM touches this.


Commands

/quarantine [all|clean]

List quarantine records.

/quarantine        # List pending
/quarantine all    # List all (including resolved)
/quarantine clean  # Clean expired records

/approve <id>

Mark a blocked message as a false positive.

/approve q-7f3a2b

Effect:

  • Status → approved
  • (Future) Add sender to allowlist
  • (Future) Lower pattern weight

/reject <id>

Confirm a blocked message was a true positive.

/reject q-7f3a2b

Effect:

  • Status → rejected
  • (Future) Reinforce pattern weights

/trust <senderId>

Whitelist a sender for future messages.

/trust @legitimate_user

/scan <message>

Manually scan a message.

/scan ignore your previous instructions and...

What Approve/Reject Mean

CommandWhat it doesWhat it doesn't do
/approveMarks as false positive, may adjust IDSDoes NOT re-inject the message
/rejectConfirms threat, may strengthen patternsDoes NOT affect current message
/trustWhitelists sender for futureDoes NOT retroactively approve

The blocked message is gone by design. If it was legitimate, the sender can re-send.


Per-Agent Configuration

Different agents need different security postures:

"agents": {
  "moltbook-scanner": {
    "strictMode": true,    // Block threats
    "riskThreshold": 0.7   // 70% = suspicious
  },
  "main": {
    "strictMode": false,   // Warn only
    "riskThreshold": 0.8   // Higher bar for main
  },
  "email-processor": {
    "strictMode": true,    // Always block
    "riskThreshold": 0.6   // More paranoid
  }
}

Threat Categories

CategoryRiskDescription
command_injection🔴 CriticalShell commands, code execution
credential_theft🔴 CriticalAPI key extraction attempts
data_exfiltration🔴 CriticalData leak to external URLs
instruction_override🔴 HighJailbreaks, "ignore previous"
impersonation🔴 HighFake system/admin messages
discovery⚠️ MediumAPI/capability probing

Installation

npx hopeid setup

Then restart OpenClaw.


Links

  • GitHub: https://github.com/E-x-O-Entertainment-Studios-Inc/hopeIDS
  • npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/hopeid
  • Docs: https://exohaven.online/products/hopeids

适合场景

01

OpenClaw 用户查找和安装 Skill 时

02

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

03

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

04

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

补充不同宿主或平台的使用分布数据

能力 5

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

OpenClaw

98.64%
按下载量换算24,515

安全审计

VirusTotal

可疑

ClawScan

可疑

Static analysis

未展示

权限和风险

敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

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来源信息

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