incident-response（事件响应）

Incident Response Skill

Purpose

This skill establishes comprehensive procedures for detecting, analyzing, containing, eradicating, and recovering from security incidents affecting the CIA platform. It implements systematic incident management aligned with NIST SP 800-61r2, ISO 27035, and Hack23 ISMS Incident Response Plan with measurable response times and transparent communication.

When to Use This Skill

Apply this skill when:

• ✅ Detecting security alerts or suspicious activity
• ✅ Responding to security breaches or data exposure
• ✅ Managing vulnerability exploitation incidents
• ✅ Coordinating response to service disruptions
• ✅ Handling supply chain security incidents
• ✅ Meeting GDPR 72-hour breach notification requirements
• ✅ Conducting post-incident analysis and lessons learned
• ✅ Updating incident response playbooks

Do NOT use for:

• ❌ Routine maintenance or planned downtime
• ❌ Non-security operational issues
• ❌ Performance degradation without security implications

Decision Tree

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flowchart TD
    DETECT[🔍 Incident Detected] --> VALIDATE{✅ Confirmed<br/>Security Incident?}

    VALIDATE -->|YES| CLASSIFY{🏷️ Classify Severity}
    VALIDATE -->|NO| FALSE[📋 False Positive<br/>Document & Close]

    CLASSIFY -->|🔴 Critical<br/>€10K+ daily loss| S1[🔴 S1: Critical Response<br/>RTO: 30 min<br/>All Stakeholders]
    CLASSIFY -->|🟠 High<br/>€5-10K daily loss| S2[🟠 S2: High Response<br/>RTO: 1 hour<br/>Key Stakeholders]
    CLASSIFY -->|🟡 Medium<br/>€1-5K daily loss| S3[🟡 S3: Medium Response<br/>RTO: 4 hours<br/>Internal Only]
    CLASSIFY -->|🟢 Low<br/><€1K daily loss| S4[🟢 S4: Low Response<br/>RTO: 24 hours<br/>Documentation]

    S1 --> ACTIVATE[🚨 Activate Response Team<br/>CEO + Specialists]
    S2 --> ACTIVATE
    S3 --> ACTIVATE
    S4 --> ACTIVATE

    ACTIVATE --> CONTAIN[🛡️ Containment<br/>Isolate & Preserve]
    CONTAIN --> INVESTIGATE[🔬 Investigation<br/>Root Cause Analysis]
    INVESTIGATE --> REMEDIATE[🔧 Remediation<br/>Fix & Restore]
    REMEDIATE --> VALIDATE_FIX{✅ Validated?}

    VALIDATE_FIX -->|NO| REMEDIATE
    VALIDATE_FIX -->|YES| NOTIFY{📢 External<br/>Notification<br/>Required?}

    NOTIFY -->|YES - GDPR| GDPR[📢 GDPR Notification<br/>72-hour deadline]
    NOTIFY -->|YES - NIS2| NIS2[📢 NIS2 Notification<br/>24-hour initial]
    NOTIFY -->|YES - Customers| CUSTOMER[📢 Customer Notice<br/>Per SLA]
    NOTIFY -->|NO| DOCUMENT

    GDPR --> DOCUMENT[📝 Incident Report]
    NIS2 --> DOCUMENT
    CUSTOMER --> DOCUMENT

    DOCUMENT --> LESSONS[📈 Lessons Learned<br/>Process Improvement]
    LESSONS --> CLOSE[✅ Close Incident<br/>Archive Evidence]
    CLOSE --> MONITOR[🔄 Continuous Monitoring]

    style DETECT fill:#2196F3,color:#fff
    style S1 fill:#D32F2F,color:#fff
    style S2 fill:#FF9800,color:#fff
    style S3 fill:#FFC107,color:#000
    style S4 fill:#4CAF50,color:#fff
    style CONTAIN fill:#7B1FA2,color:#fff
    style INVESTIGATE fill:#1565C0,color:#fff
    style REMEDIATE fill:#FF9800,color:#fff
    style CLOSE fill:#4CAF50,color:#fff

Incident Severity Classification

Severity Matrix

Incident Classification Examples

🔴 S1: Critical Incidents

• Ransomware infection affecting production systems
• Active data breach with PII exposure
• Complete service outage affecting all users
• Successful credential theft with admin access
• Criminal liability (GDPR Article 83 violations)

🟠 S2: High Incidents

• Exploitation of critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.0+)
• Partial data exposure (limited user data)
• Major service degradation (>50% users affected)
• Unauthorized access to sensitive systems
• Regulatory investigation triggered

🟡 S3: Medium Incidents

• Attempted exploitation (blocked by controls)
• Security misconfigurations discovered
• Malware detected and quarantined
• Moderate service impact (<50% users)
• Minor compliance violations

🟢 S4: Low Incidents

• Failed login attempts (below threshold)
• Security scan false positives
• Minor policy violations
• Suspicious activity with no impact
• Documentation issues

Incident Response Lifecycle

Phase 1: Preparation

Pre-Incident Readiness:

Incident_Response_Team:
  - CEO: James Pether Sörling (Incident Commander)
  - Security Lead: Primary responder
  - Development Lead: Technical remediation
  - External Consultant: On-call security expert
  - Legal Counsel: GDPR/regulatory compliance
  - Insurance Provider: Cyber insurance liaison

Tools_and_Resources:
  - AWS Detective: Log analysis and investigation
  - AWS Security Hub: Centralized security findings
  - AWS GuardDuty: Threat detection
  - GitHub Security: Repository security monitoring
  - CloudWatch Logs Insights: Query and analysis
  - Incident Response Playbooks: Scenario-specific procedures

Communication_Channels:
  - Primary: CEO email (james.sorling@hack23.com)
  - Secondary: GitHub Issues (private security issues)
  - Emergency: AWS Support (Enterprise plan)
  - External: External Stakeholder Registry contacts
  - Documentation: ISMS-PUBLIC repository updates

Evidence_Preservation:
  - AWS CloudTrail: 90-day retention
  - Application Logs: CloudWatch 30-day retention
  - Database Audit Logs: 90-day retention
  - Network Flow Logs: VPC Flow Logs 7-day retention
  - Backup Snapshots: Automated daily backups

Preparation Checklist:

• Incident Response Plan: Reviewed and updated quarterly
• Contact List: Current and tested (External Stakeholder Registry)
• Playbooks: Scenario-specific procedures documented
• Tools: AWS security services enabled and monitored
• Training: Annual tabletop exercises conducted
• Backups: Verified and tested monthly
• Insurance: Cyber insurance policy active and adequate
• Legal: Retainer with legal counsel for GDPR compliance

Phase 2: Detection and Analysis

Detection Sources:

flowchart LR
    subgraph "🔍 Automated Detection"
        GUARD[AWS GuardDuty<br/>Threat Detection]
        SECHUB[AWS Security Hub<br/>Findings Aggregation]
        CODEQL[CodeQL<br/>Code Scanning]
        DEPEND[Dependabot<br/>Vulnerability Alerts]
    end

    subgraph "👁️ Manual Detection"
        USER[User Report<br/>Security Concern]
        AUDIT[Security Audit<br/>Findings]
        RESEARCH[Security Researcher<br/>Disclosure]
        MONITOR[System Monitoring<br/>Anomalies]
    end

    subgraph "🎯 Incident Triage"
        VALIDATE[Validate Incident]
        CLASSIFY[Classify Severity]
        ASSIGN[Assign Response Team]
    end

    GUARD --> VALIDATE
    SECHUB --> VALIDATE
    CODEQL --> VALIDATE
    DEPEND --> VALIDATE
    USER --> VALIDATE
    AUDIT --> VALIDATE
    RESEARCH --> VALIDATE
    MONITOR --> VALIDATE

    VALIDATE --> CLASSIFY
    CLASSIFY --> ASSIGN

    style VALIDATE fill:#FF9800,color:#fff
    style CLASSIFY fill:#D32F2F,color:#fff
    style ASSIGN fill:#1565C0,color:#fff

Initial Assessment Checklist:

• Incident Confirmed: Validate security incident vs. false positive
• Scope Identified: Affected systems, data, and users documented
• Timeline Established: Initial detection and estimated start time
• Severity Classified: Using severity matrix (S1-S4)
• Evidence Preserved: Logs, snapshots, and artifacts collected
• Team Notified: Response team activated per severity level
• Stakeholders Informed: CEO notified within RTO
• Communication Plan: Notification requirements assessed

Analysis Activities:

# 1. Collect AWS CloudTrail logs
aws cloudtrail lookup-events \
  --lookup-attributes AttributeKey=EventName,AttributeValue=AssumeRole \
  --start-time 2024-01-15T00:00:00Z \
  --end-time 2024-01-16T00:00:00Z \
  --max-results 100 \
  > incident-cloudtrail-logs.json

# 2. Query CloudWatch Logs
aws logs filter-log-events \
  --log-group-name /aws/lambda/cia-production \
  --start-time $(date -d '24 hours ago' +%s)000 \
  --filter-pattern "ERROR" \
  > incident-application-logs.txt

# 3. Check AWS GuardDuty findings
aws guardduty list-findings \
  --detector-id YOUR_DETECTOR_ID \
  --finding-criteria '{"Criterion":{"severity":{"Gte":7}}}' \
  --sort-criteria '{"AttributeName":"updatedAt","OrderBy":"DESC"}' \
  > incident-guardduty-findings.json

# 4. Review AWS Security Hub findings
aws securityhub get-findings \
  --filters '{"SeverityLabel":[{"Value":"CRITICAL","Comparison":"EQUALS"}]}' \
  --max-results 100 \
  > incident-securityhub-findings.json

# 5. Analyze access patterns
aws cloudtrail lookup-events \
  --lookup-attributes AttributeKey=Username,AttributeValue=SUSPECTED_USER \
  --start-time 2024-01-15T00:00:00Z \
  > incident-user-activity.json

# 6. Create evidence package
tar -czf incident-evidence-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S).tar.gz \
  incident-*.json incident-*.txt

Phase 3: Containment

Short-Term Containment:

Immediate_Actions:
  Network_Isolation:
    - Action: Isolate affected systems from network
    - Method: AWS Security Group rule changes
    - Command: |
        aws ec2 revoke-security-group-ingress \
          --group-id sg-AFFECTED \
          --protocol all \
          --cidr 0.0.0.0/0

  Access_Revocation:
    - Action: Disable compromised user accounts
    - Method: AWS IAM policy detachment
    - Command: |
        aws iam delete-login-profile \
          --user-name COMPROMISED_USER
        aws iam list-access-keys \
          --user-name COMPROMISED_USER | \
          jq -r '.AccessKeyMetadata[].AccessKeyId' | \
          xargs -I {} aws iam delete-access-key \
            --user-name COMPROMISED_USER \
            --access-key-id {}

  Session_Termination:
    - Action: Invalidate active sessions
    - Method: AWS IAM role trust policy update
    - Command: |
        aws iam update-assume-role-policy \
          --role-name AFFECTED_ROLE \
          --policy-document file://deny-all-policy.json

  Snapshot_Creation:
    - Action: Preserve current state for forensics
    - Method: EBS snapshot, RDS snapshot, S3 versioning
    - Command: |
        aws ec2 create-snapshot \
          --volume-id vol-AFFECTED \
          --description "Incident forensic snapshot $(date)"
        aws rds create-db-snapshot \
          --db-snapshot-identifier incident-snapshot-$(date +%Y%m%d) \
          --db-instance-identifier cia-production

Long-Term Containment:

Sustained_Protection:
  System_Patching:
    - Action: Apply security patches to affected systems
    - Priority: Critical vulnerabilities first
    - Validation: Test in staging before production

  Password_Rotation:
    - Action: Force password reset for all affected users
    - Method: AWS Cognito password reset enforcement
    - Scope: All users if credential exposure suspected

  Certificate_Revocation:
    - Action: Revoke and reissue compromised certificates
    - Method: AWS Certificate Manager
    - Timeline: Immediate for compromised, planned for rotation

  WAF_Rules:
    - Action: Deploy AWS WAF rules to block attack patterns
    - Patterns: IP blocking, SQL injection, XSS prevention
    - Review: Daily review during incident response

  Enhanced_Monitoring:
    - Action: Increase logging verbosity and alerting
    - Tools: CloudWatch alarms, GuardDuty sensitivity
    - Duration: Maintain until incident closed + 30 days

Phase 4: Eradication

Root Cause Elimination:

Malware_Removal:
  - Identify all infected systems (AWS Systems Manager inventory)
  - Terminate compromised EC2 instances
  - Deploy clean AMI from known-good backup
  - Scan file systems with AWS Inspector
  - Verify integrity with AWS CloudWatch Logs Insights

Vulnerability_Patching:
  - Apply security patches addressing root cause
  - Update dependencies (Dependabot PRs)
  - Fix configuration weaknesses (AWS Config remediation)
  - Implement compensating controls if patch unavailable

Account_Cleanup:
  - Remove unauthorized user accounts (AWS IAM)
  - Delete rogue resources (EC2, Lambda, S3)
  - Audit and correct permission escalations
  - Review and revoke suspicious API keys

Configuration_Hardening:
  - Enable AWS GuardDuty if disabled
  - Enforce MFA for all IAM users
  - Implement least privilege IAM policies
  - Enable encryption at rest (S3, EBS, RDS)
  - Enable VPC Flow Logs for network monitoring

Eradication Checklist:

• Root Cause Identified: Technical analysis complete
• Vulnerability Fixed: Patch applied or workaround implemented
• Malware Removed: All infected systems cleaned or replaced
• Accounts Secured: Unauthorized access revoked
• Configuration Hardened: Security controls strengthened
• Validation Testing: Security scans confirm clean state
• Documentation Updated: Changes recorded in change log

Phase 5: Recovery

System Restoration:

Restore_Services:
  Phase_1_Critical:
    - Restore database from pre-incident backup
    - Deploy application from verified clean build
    - Restore S3 data from backup or versioning
    - Verify data integrity (checksums, record counts)

  Phase_2_Validation:
    - Run security scans (CodeQL, OWASP Dependency Check)
    - Execute integration tests (Maven verify)
    - Perform manual security testing
    - Validate monitoring and alerting

  Phase_3_Gradual_Rollout:
    - Enable read-only mode initially
    - Monitor for anomalies (30-minute observation)
    - Enable write operations selectively
    - Full restoration with enhanced monitoring

Monitoring_Enhancement:
  - CloudWatch alarm thresholds lowered
  - GuardDuty findings reviewed daily
  - Security Hub compliance checks enabled
  - Anomaly detection baseline recalculated

Recovery Verification:

# 1. Verify application functionality
curl -s https://www.hack23.com/cia/ | grep -q "Citizen Intelligence Agency"
echo "Application accessible: $?"

# 2. Check database connectivity
psql -h DATABASE_HOST -U cia_user -d cia_db -c "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM politician;"

# 3. Verify API endpoints
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" https://api.hack23.com/health
# Expected: 200

# 4. Test authentication
# Perform test login with known credentials
# Verify MFA enforcement

# 5. Scan for vulnerabilities
mvn dependency-check:check
# Expected: No critical vulnerabilities

# 6. Monitor logs for errors
aws logs tail /aws/lambda/cia-production --follow --filter-pattern "ERROR"

Phase 6: Post-Incident Activities

Lessons Learned Analysis:

# Incident Post-Mortem Template

## Incident Summary
- **Incident ID:** INC-2024-001
- **Date Detected:** 2024-01-15 09:30 UTC
- **Date Resolved:** 2024-01-16 14:00 UTC
- **Severity:** S2 (High)
- **Duration:** 28.5 hours

## Incident Details
- **Type:** Unauthorized access attempt
- **Attack Vector:** Exposed API endpoint with weak authentication
- **Affected Systems:** Production API server (EC2 instance i-0123456789abcdef)
- **Data Impact:** No data exfiltration confirmed
- **Business Impact:** €8K estimated revenue loss (service degradation)

## Timeline
- **2024-01-15 09:30 UTC:** GuardDuty alert - suspicious API calls
- **2024-01-15 09:45 UTC:** Incident validated, CEO notified
- **2024-01-15 10:00 UTC:** Response team activated (S2 severity)
- **2024-01-15 10:30 UTC:** Affected endpoint isolated (security group update)
- **2024-01-15 11:00 UTC:** Root cause identified (missing authentication)
- **2024-01-15 12:00 UTC:** Fix deployed to staging, testing complete
- **2024-01-15 14:00 UTC:** Fix deployed to production
- **2024-01-15 15:00 UTC:** Monitoring confirms normal operation
- **2024-01-16 14:00 UTC:** Incident closed after 24-hour observation

## Root Cause Analysis
**What Happened:**
New API endpoint deployed without authentication middleware. Exposed endpoint allowed unauthenticated access to internal admin functions.

**Why It Happened:**
- Code review process did not catch missing @PreAuthorize annotation
- Integration tests did not include security test cases
- Deployment pipeline lacked security gate (CodeQL did not run)

**Contributing Factors:**
- Tight deadline pressure led to shortened review
- Developer unfamiliar with Spring Security patterns
- Security requirements not explicitly documented in user story

## What Went Well
- ✅ Detection within 15 minutes (GuardDuty alert)
- ✅ Incident validation within 15 minutes
- ✅ Containment within 1 hour (met RTO)
- ✅ Clear communication with CEO throughout
- ✅ No data loss or exfiltration
- ✅ Root cause identified quickly

## What Went Wrong
- ❌ Vulnerability introduced during deployment
- ❌ Code review did not catch security issue
- ❌ Security tests inadequate
- ❌ Deployment pipeline lacked security gate

## Action Items
1. **Immediate (Week 1):**
   - [ ] Add CodeQL to required CI/CD checks (blocker) - Owner: DevOps Lead
   - [ ] Create security test template for API endpoints - Owner: Security Lead
   - [ ] Update code review checklist with security items - Owner: Dev Lead

2. **Short-Term (Month 1):**
   - [ ] Conduct security training for development team - Owner: CEO
   - [ ] Implement Spring Security audit (all @RequestMapping) - Owner: Dev Team
   - [ ] Add AWS WAF rules for API protection - Owner: Security Lead

3. **Long-Term (Quarter 1):**
   - [ ] Establish security champion program - Owner: CEO
   - [ ] Implement automated security testing framework - Owner: QA Lead
   - [ ] Document secure coding standards - Owner: Security Lead

## Metrics
- **MTTD (Mean Time to Detect):** 15 minutes (target: <30 min) ✅
- **MTTR (Mean Time to Respond):** 15 minutes (target: <1 hour) ✅
- **MTTC (Mean Time to Contain):** 1 hour (target: <1 hour) ✅
- **MTTR (Mean Time to Resolve):** 28.5 hours (target: <24 hours) ⚠️
- **Total Downtime:** 2 hours (partial degradation)

## Compliance Notifications
- **GDPR Notification:** Not required (no personal data breach)
- **NIS2 Notification:** Not required (not material incident)
- **Customer Notification:** Sent via email (transparency commitment)
- **Insurance Notification:** Submitted claim for revenue loss

## Approval
- **Incident Commander:** James Pether Sörling, CEO
- **Date:** 2024-01-16
- **Status:** Closed
- **Archive Location:** ISMS-PUBLIC/incidents/INC-2024-001.md

Incident Response Playbooks

Playbook 1: Ransomware Incident

Ransomware_Response:
  Detection:
    - Indicators: Mass file encryption, ransom notes, unusual process activity
    - Sources: AWS GuardDuty, CloudWatch anomaly detection, user reports

  Immediate_Actions:
    - Isolate affected systems (network segmentation)
    - Disable user accounts (prevent lateral movement)
    - Preserve evidence (EBS snapshots, memory dumps)
    - Notify CEO and cyber insurance provider

  Containment:
    - Terminate infected EC2 instances
    - Disable compromised IAM credentials
    - Block malicious IP addresses (Security Groups, WAF)
    - Scan all systems for indicators of compromise

  Eradication:
    - Identify ransomware variant (file extensions, ransom note)
    - Remove malware from all systems
    - Patch exploited vulnerabilities
    - Reset all credentials (passwords, API keys, certificates)

  Recovery:
    - Restore from backups (verified clean)
    - Rebuild systems from clean AMIs
    - Validate data integrity
    - Gradual service restoration with monitoring

  Notification:
    - GDPR notification if PII accessed (72-hour deadline)
    - Customer notification per SLA
    - Law enforcement (if required by jurisdiction)
    - Cyber insurance claim submission

  References:
    - NIST SP 800-61r2 Section 3.4
    - CISA Ransomware Guide
    - AWS Incident Response Whitepaper

Playbook 2: Data Breach Incident

Data_Breach_Response:
  Detection:
    - Indicators: Unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, S3 bucket exposure
    - Sources: AWS CloudTrail, GuardDuty, Security Hub, public disclosure

  Immediate_Actions:
    - Assess scope of breach (what data, how many records)
    - Classify data per Data Classification Policy
    - Preserve evidence (CloudTrail logs, network logs)
    - Activate legal counsel for GDPR compliance

  Containment:
    - Block unauthorized access (S3 bucket policies, IAM)
    - Revoke compromised credentials
    - Enable S3 versioning to prevent further deletion
    - Monitor for continued unauthorized access

  Investigation:
    - Identify access method (stolen credentials, misconfiguration)
    - Determine timeline (when breach started, when detected)
    - Assess data sensitivity (PII, financial, health data)
    - Calculate affected individuals (GDPR Article 33)

  Notification:
    - GDPR notification to supervisory authority (72 hours)
    - Individual notification if high risk (GDPR Article 34)
    - NIS2 notification if material incident (24 hours)
    - Public disclosure if required by regulations

  Remediation:
    - Fix root cause (configuration, vulnerability, process)
    - Implement compensating controls
    - Enhance monitoring and alerting
    - Update incident response procedures

  Documentation:
    - Incident report with timeline
    - Evidence preservation for legal proceedings
    - Regulatory notification documentation
    - Lessons learned and action items

Playbook 3: DDoS Attack

DDoS_Response:
  Detection:
    - Indicators: Service degradation, high network traffic, AWS Shield alerts
    - Sources: CloudWatch metrics, AWS Shield, user reports

  Immediate_Actions:
    - Activate AWS Shield Advanced if not enabled
    - Enable AWS WAF rate limiting
    - Engage AWS DDoS Response Team (DRT)
    - Notify CEO and stakeholders

  Mitigation:
    - CloudFront distribution to absorb traffic
    - AWS Shield Advanced DDoS mitigation
    - WAF rules to block malicious patterns
    - Scale resources (Auto Scaling, RDS read replicas)

  Analysis:
    - Identify attack type (volumetric, protocol, application)
    - Determine attack source (IP addresses, geographic origin)
    - Assess business impact (users affected, revenue loss)
    - Estimate attack duration and intensity

  Communication:
    - Status page updates (transparency)
    - Customer notifications (service status)
    - Media response (if public attention)
    - Post-incident transparency report

  Recovery:
    - Gradual traffic restoration as attack subsides
    - Monitor for residual attack activity
    - Validate service functionality
    - Review capacity planning

  Post_Incident:
    - Analyze attack patterns for future prevention
    - Update WAF rules based on attack signatures
    - Review architecture for DDoS resilience
    - Consider AWS Shield Advanced if cost-justified

GDPR Breach Notification Requirements

72-Hour Notification Rule

GDPR_Compliance:
  Article_33_Requirements:
    - Notification to supervisory authority within 72 hours
    - Description of nature of breach
    - Name and contact details of DPO (if applicable)
    - Description of likely consequences
    - Measures taken or proposed to address breach

  Article_34_Requirements:
    - Direct notification to individuals if high risk
    - Clear and plain language description
    - Measures to mitigate adverse effects
    - Communication without undue delay

  Supervisory_Authority:
    - Sweden: Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten (IMY)
    - Contact: imy@imy.se
    - Phone: +46 (0)8 657 61 00
    - Online: https://www.imy.se/

  Breach_Assessment:
    High_Risk_Indicators:
      - Special categories of data (GDPR Article 9)
      - Large number of individuals affected (>1000)
      - Children or vulnerable individuals affected
      - Sensitive personal data (financial, health, criminal)
      - Data exfiltration or ransomware

    Low_Risk_Indicators:
      - Data already public or encrypted
      - Small number of individuals affected
      - Immediate containment successful
      - No realistic risk of harm to individuals

GDPR Notification Template:

# Data Breach Notification to Supervisory Authority

**To:** Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten (IMY)
**From:** Hack23 AB (Data Controller)
**Date:** [Within 72 hours of breach awareness]
**Reference:** GDPR Article 33

## 1. Description of the Personal Data Breach

**Nature of Breach:**
[Describe what happened: unauthorized access, data loss, ransomware, etc.]

**Date/Time of Breach:**
- Breach Occurred: [Estimated start time]
- Breach Detected: [Detection timestamp]
- IMY Notified: [Current timestamp]

**Categories of Personal Data:**
- [X] Names and contact details
- [ ] Financial information
- [ ] Health data
- [ ] Special categories (Article 9)
- [X] Login credentials

**Data Subjects Affected:**
- Number: Approximately [X] individuals
- Categories: [Users, customers, employees, etc.]

## 2. Contact Point

**Data Protection Officer (if applicable):**
- Name: [DPO Name] or CEO: James Pether Sörling
- Email: james.sorling@hack23.com
- Phone: [Contact number]

## 3. Likely Consequences

**Assessment of Impact:**
[Describe potential harm to individuals: identity theft, financial loss, discrimination, etc.]

**Risk Level:** [High / Medium / Low]

**Justification:**
[Explain risk assessment considering data sensitivity, number affected, safeguards in place]

## 4. Measures Taken

**Containment:**
- [List immediate actions taken to stop breach]

**Mitigation:**
- [Actions to reduce harm to individuals]

**Prevention:**
- [Measures to prevent recurrence]

## 5. Additional Information

**Evidence Preservation:**
- Logs archived: [Yes/No]
- Forensic investigation: [In progress / Complete]

**Individual Notification:**
- Required: [Yes/No]
- Completed: [Yes/No / In progress]
- Method: [Email / Letter / Website notice]

**Supporting Documentation:**
[Attached incident report, forensic analysis, etc.]

---

**Declaration:**
This notification is made in compliance with GDPR Article 33. Hack23 AB commits to cooperating fully with the supervisory authority and providing updates as investigation progresses.

**Signature:** James Pether Sörling, CEO
**Date:** [Submission date]

External Stakeholder Registry

Key Contacts for Incident Response:

Regulatory_Authorities:
  Swedish_DPA:
    Name: Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten (IMY)
    Email: imy@imy.se
    Phone: +46 (0)8 657 61 00
    Website: https://www.imy.se/
    Purpose: GDPR breach notification

  Swedish_Cert:
    Name: CERT-SE (Swedish Computer Security Incident Response Team)
    Email: cert@cert.se
    Phone: +46 (0)8 632 88 00
    Website: https://www.cert.se/
    Purpose: Critical infrastructure incidents

Legal_and_Insurance:
  Legal_Counsel:
    Contact: [Law firm details]
    Purpose: GDPR compliance, regulatory response

  Cyber_Insurance:
    Provider: [Insurance company]
    Policy: [Policy number]
    Emergency: [24/7 hotline]
    Purpose: Incident notification, claim submission

Technical_Support:
  AWS_Support:
    Type: Enterprise Support
    Contact: AWS Console support center
    Purpose: Infrastructure incidents, DDoS mitigation

  External_Security_Consultant:
    Contact: [Consultant details]
    Purpose: Forensic analysis, incident response support

Communication:
  Customers:
    Method: Email notification via mailing list
    Timeline: Within 24 hours of confirmed breach

  Media:
    Spokesperson: CEO James Pether Sörling
    Policy: Transparency and factual communication

Compliance Mapping

ISO 27001:2022

• A.5.24 - Information Security Incident Management Planning and Preparation
• A.5.25 - Assessment and Decision on Information Security Events
• A.5.26 - Response to Information Security Incidents
• A.5.27 - Learning from Information Security Incidents

NIST CSF 2.0

• DE.AE - Anomalies and Events (Detection Process)
• RS.AN - Analysis (Response Planning)
• RS.MI - Mitigation (Response Activities)
• RS.IM - Improvements (Post-Incident Activity)

CIS Controls v8

• Control 17 - Incident Response Management
• Control 17.1 - Designate Personnel to Manage Incident Handling
• Control 17.2 - Establish and Maintain Contact Information for Reporting Security Incidents
• Control 17.3 - Establish and Maintain an Enterprise Process for Reporting Incidents
• Control 17.4 - Establish and Maintain an Incident Response Process
• Control 17.5 - Assign Key Roles and Responsibilities

NIST SP 800-61r2

• Section 2.3 - Incident Response Team Structure
• Section 3.1 - Preparation
• Section 3.2 - Detection and Analysis
• Section 3.3 - Containment, Eradication, and Recovery
• Section 3.4 - Post-Incident Activity

References

• Hack23 ISMS: Incident Response Plan
• NIST SP 800-61r2: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide
• ISO 27035: Information Security Incident Management
• GDPR Articles 33-34: Personal Data Breach Notification
• AWS Incident Response: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/whitepapers/latest/aws-security-incident-response-guide/
• CISA Incident Response: https://www.cisa.gov/incident-response

Examples from CIA Platform

Incident Example: API Endpoint Exposure

Incident Summary:

• Type: Unauthorized access (security misconfiguration)
• Severity: S2 (High)
• Detection: AWS GuardDuty alert
• Duration: 28.5 hours (detection to closure)
• Impact: No data breach, service degradation

Key Learnings:

• GuardDuty detected within 15 minutes (excellent MTTD)
• Code review process improved (security checklist)
• CodeQL added as required CI/CD gate
• Security training scheduled for development team

Document Maintenance:

• Review Frequency: Quarterly
• Last Updated: 2024-01-15
• Next Review: 2024-04-15
• Owner: Security Team / CIA Project Maintainers