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golang-securityGo 安全

Agent Skill

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

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安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

MIT-0

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:golang-security(Go 安全)
来源仓库:https://github.com/samber/golang-security
安装命令:
openclaw skills install golang-security
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 OpenClaw 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

ClawHubOpenClaw
openclaw skills install golang-security

简介

提供 Golang 安全最佳实践和漏洞预防指南。

  • 适合辅助安全审计、权限检查和常见漏洞排查。golang-security 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。
  • 通过 clawhub 安装,适用于 OpenClaw 中的安全分析任务。
  • 使用时不能直接采信工具结论,需确认最小权限和操作边界。
  • 建议结合项目实际情况验证敏感配置和依赖风险。

SKILL.md

name
golang-security
description
Security best practices and vulnerability prevention for Golang. Covers injection (SQL, command, XSS), cryptography, filesystem safety, network security, cookies, secrets management, memory safety, and logging. Apply when writing, reviewing, or auditing Go code for security, or when working on any risky code involving crypto, I/O, secrets management, user input handling, or authentication. Includes configuration of security tools.
user-invocable
true
license
MIT
compatibility
Designed for Claude Code or similar AI coding agents, and for projects using Golang.
metadata
author
samber
version
1.1.4
openclaw
emoji
🔒
homepage
https://github.com/samber/cc-skills-golang
requires
bins
install
package
golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
bins
[govulncheck]
allowed-tools
Read Edit Write Glob Grep Bash(go:*) Bash(golangci-lint:*) Bash(git:*) Agent WebFetch Bash(govulncheck:*) WebSearch AskUserQuestion

Persona: You are a senior Go security engineer. You apply security thinking both when auditing existing code and when writing new code — threats are easier to prevent than to fix.

Thinking mode: Use ultrathink for security audits and vulnerability analysis. Security bugs hide in subtle interactions — deep reasoning catches what surface-level review misses.

Modes:

  • Review mode — reviewing a PR for security issues. Start from the changed files, then trace call sites and data flows into adjacent code — a vulnerability may live outside the diff but be triggered by it. Sequential.
  • Audit mode — full codebase security scan. Launch up to 5 parallel sub-agents (via the Agent tool), each covering an independent vulnerability domain: (1) injection patterns, (2) cryptography and secrets, (3) web security and headers, (4) authentication and authorization, (5) concurrency safety and dependency vulnerabilities. Aggregate findings, score with DREAD, and report by severity.
  • Coding mode — use when writing new code or fixing a reported vulnerability. Follow the skill's sequential guidance. Optionally launch a background agent to grep for common vulnerability patterns in newly written code while the main agent continues implementing the feature.

Go Security

Overview

Security in Go follows the principle of defense in depth: protect at multiple layers, validate all inputs, use secure defaults, and leverage the standard library's security-aware design. Go's type system and concurrency model provide some inherent protections, but vigilance is still required.

Security Thinking Model

Before writing or reviewing code, ask three questions:

  1. What are the trust boundaries? — Where does untrusted data enter the system? (HTTP requests, file uploads, environment variables, database rows written by other services)
  2. What can an attacker control? — Which inputs flow into sensitive operations? (SQL queries, shell commands, HTML output, file paths, cryptographic operations)
  3. What is the blast radius? — If this defense fails, what's the worst outcome? (Data leak, RCE, privilege escalation, denial of service)

Severity Levels

LevelDREADMeaning
Critical8-10RCE, full data breach, credential theft — fix immediately
High6-7.9Auth bypass, significant data exposure, broken crypto — fix in current sprint
Medium4-5.9Limited exposure, session issues, defense weakening — fix in next sprint
Low1-3.9Minor info disclosure, best-practice deviations — fix opportunistically

Levels align with DREAD scoring.

Research Before Reporting

Before flagging a security issue, trace the full data flow through the codebase — don't assess a code snippet in isolation.

  1. Trace the data origin — follow the variable back to where it enters the system. Is it user input, a hardcoded constant, or an internal-only value?
  2. Check for upstream validation — look for input validation, sanitization, type parsing, or allow-listing earlier in the call chain.
  3. Examine the trust boundary — if the data never crosses a trust boundary (e.g., internal service-to-service with mTLS), the risk profile is different.
  4. Read the surrounding code, not just the diff — middleware, interceptors, or wrapper functions may already provide a layer of defense.

Severity adjustment, not dismissal: upstream protection does not eliminate a finding — defense in depth means every layer should protect itself. But it changes severity: a SQL concatenation reachable only through a strict input parser is medium, not critical. Always report the finding with adjusted severity and note which upstream defenses exist and what would happen if they were removed or bypassed.

When downgrading or skipping a finding: add a brief inline comment (e.g., // security: SQL concat safe here — input is validated by parseUserID() which returns int) so the decision is documented, reviewable, and won't be re-flagged by future audits.

Threat Modeling (STRIDE)

Apply STRIDE to every trust boundary crossing and data flow in your system: Spoofing (authentication), Tampering (integrity), Repudiation (audit logging), Information Disclosure (encryption), Denial of Service (rate limiting), Elevation of Privilege (authorization). Score each threat using DREAD (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, Discoverability) to prioritize remediation — Critical (8-10) demands immediate action.

For the full methodology with Go examples, DFD trust boundaries, DREAD scoring, and OWASP Top 10 mapping, see Threat Modeling Guide.

Quick Reference

SeverityVulnerabilityDefenseStandard Library Solution
CriticalSQL InjectionParameterized queries separate data from codedatabase/sql with ? placeholders
CriticalCommand InjectionPass args separately, never via shell concatenationexec.Command with separate args
HighXSSAuto-escaping renders user data as text, not HTML/JShtml/template, text/template
HighPath TraversalScope file access to a root, prevent ../ escapesos.Root (Go 1.24+), filepath.Clean
MediumTiming AttacksConstant-time comparison avoids byte-by-byte leakscrypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare
HighCrypto IssuesUse vetted algorithms; never roll your owncrypto/aes, crypto/rand
MediumHTTP SecurityTLS + security headers prevent downgrade attacksnet/http, configure TLSConfig
LowMissing HeadersHSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options prevent browser attacksSecurity headers middleware
MediumRate LimitingRate limits prevent brute-force and resource exhaustiongolang.org/x/time/rate, server timeouts
HighRace ConditionsProtect shared state to prevent data corruptionsync.Mutex, channels, avoid shared state

Detailed Categories

For complete examples, code snippets, and CWE mappings, see:

Code Review Checklist

For the full security review checklist organized by domain (input handling, database, crypto, web, auth, errors, dependencies, concurrency), see Security Review Checklist — a comprehensive checklist for code review with coverage of all major vulnerability categories.

Tooling & Verification

Static Analysis & Linting

Security-relevant linters: bodyclose, sqlclosecheck, nilerr, errcheck, govet, staticcheck. See the samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-lint skill for configuration and usage.

For deeper security-specific analysis:

# Go security checker (SAST)
go install github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/gosec@latest
gosec ./...

# Vulnerability scanner — see golang-dependency-management for full govulncheck usage
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
govulncheck ./...

Security Testing

# Race detector
go test -race ./...

# Fuzz testing
go test -fuzz=Fuzz

Common Mistakes

SeverityMistakeFix
Highmath/rand for tokensOutput is predictable — attacker can reproduce the sequence. Use crypto/rand
CriticalSQL string concatenationAttacker can modify query logic. Parameterized queries keep data and code separate
Criticalexec.Command("bash -c")Shell interprets metacharacters (;, `, ``). Pass args separately to avoid shell parsing
HighTrusting unsanitized inputValidate at trust boundaries — internal code trusts the boundary, so catching bad input there protects everything
CriticalHardcoded secretsSecrets in source code end up in version history, CI logs, and backups. Use env vars or secret managers
MediumComparing secrets with ==== short-circuits on first differing byte, leaking timing info. Use crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare
MediumReturning detailed errorsStack traces and DB errors help attackers map your system. Return generic messages, log details server-side
HighIgnoring -race findingsRaces cause data corruption and can bypass authorization checks under concurrency. Fix all races
HighMD5/SHA1 for passwordsBoth have known collision attacks and are fast to brute-force. Use Argon2id or bcrypt (intentionally slow, memory-hard)
HighAES without GCMECB/CBC modes lack authentication — attacker can modify ciphertext undetected. GCM provides encrypt+authenticate
MediumBinding to 0.0.0.0Exposes service to all network interfaces. Bind to specific interface to limit attack surface

Security Anti-Patterns

SeverityAnti-PatternWhy It FailsFix
HighSecurity through obscurityHidden URLs are discoverable via fuzzing, logs, or sourceAuthentication + authorization on all endpoints
HighTrusting client headersX-Forwarded-For, X-Is-Admin are trivially forgedServer-side identity verification
HighClient-side authorizationJavaScript checks are bypassed by any HTTP clientServer-side permission checks on every handler
HighShared secrets across envsStaging breach compromises productionPer-environment secrets via secret manager
CriticalIgnoring crypto errors_, _ = encrypt(data) silently proceeds unencryptedAlways check errors — fail closed, never open
CriticalRolling your own cryptoCustom encryption hasn't been analyzed by cryptographersUse crypto/aes GCM, golang.org/x/crypto/argon2

See Security Architecture for detailed anti-patterns with Go code examples.

Cross-References

See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-database, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-safety, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-observability, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration skills.

  • → See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration skill for automated AI-driven code review in CI using these guidelines

Additional Resources

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能力概览

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能力 2

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能力 5

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安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

OpenClaw

87.93%
按下载量换算2,153

安全审计

VirusTotal

通过

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通过

Static analysis

可疑

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敏感数据

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