Extension Analyze (Security & Compliance Auditor)
Audit an existing Chrome extension. Do NOT just explain — execute the workflow.
Workflow (Execute This)
Step 1: Locate extension root and detect framework
Ask user for path if not provided. Detect framework:
ls wxt.config.ts plasmo.config.ts vite.config.ts manifest.json 2>/dev/null- Plasmo: manifest auto-generated; check
package.jsonandplasmo.config.tsinstead - WXT: check
wxt.config.tsmanifest section - Vanilla/CRXJS: check
manifest.jsondirectly
Step 2: Scan manifest.json (or equivalent config)
# Check MV version, permissions, host_permissions, CSP, web_accessible_resources
cat <ext>/manifest.json | jq '{manifest_version, permissions, host_permissions, content_security_policy, web_accessible_resources}'Step 3: Quick grep scans
# XSS vectors
grep -rn "innerHTML\|outerHTML\|document\.write\|insertAdjacentHTML" <ext>/src --include="*.ts" --include="*.js"
# Unsafe patterns
grep -rn "eval(\|new Function(\|setTimeout.*string\|setInterval.*string" <ext>/src
# Hardcoded secrets
grep -rn "api_key\|apiKey\|secret\|password\|token" <ext>/src --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" | grep -v "\.test\." | grep -v "node_modules"
# HTTP (non-HTTPS) calls
grep -rn "http://" <ext>/src --include="*.ts" --include="*.js"
# Message handler sender validation
grep -rn "onMessage\|addListener" <ext>/src | grep -v "node_modules"
# Remote code loading
grep -rn "importScripts\|fetch.*\.js\|eval\|chrome\.scripting\.executeScript" <ext>/srcStep 4: Check CSP configuration
- MV3 default CSP:
script-src 'self'; object-src 'self' - Flag any
unsafe-inline,unsafe-eval, orhttp:sources - Verify no remote script sources
Step 5: Dependency audit
cd <ext> && npm audit --json | jq '.vulnerabilities | to_entries[] | {pkg: .key, severity: .value.severity}'Step 6: Generate report
Output findings grouped by severity. See Output Format below.
Severity Levels
| Level | Criteria |
|---|---|
| Critical | RCE, data exfiltration, remote code loading, eval with untrusted input |
| High | XSS, missing sender validation, API keys in source, HTTP API calls |
| Medium | Overly broad permissions, unsafe-inline CSP, sync storage secrets |
| Low | Missing error handling, no TypeScript, console.log in production |
Top 10 Issues Found in Most Extensions
innerHTMLwith page-sourced data (XSS) — HighonMessagewithout sender origin check — High<all_urls>host permission when not needed — Mediumunsafe-inlineorunsafe-evalin CSP — Medium/Critical- API keys hardcoded in source — Critical
eval()ornew Function()usage — Criticalchrome.storage.syncstoring sensitive data — Medium- HTTP endpoints instead of HTTPS — High
- Remote script loading (MV3 violation) — Critical
- Missing
web_accessible_resourcesrestrictions — Medium
Output Format
## Extension Audit Report: <name> v<version>
Date: <date> | MV: <2|3>
### Summary
Critical: X | High: X | Medium: X | Low: X
### Findings
#### [CRITICAL] API Key Exposed in Source
File: src/background.ts:42
Pattern: `const API_KEY = "sk-..."`
Fix: Move to environment variable or user-provided settings
Reference: references/common-vulnerabilities.md#4
...
### Passed Checks
- CSP: No unsafe-inline/eval ✓
- HTTPS: All API calls use HTTPS ✓References
references/security-checklist.md— Full security audit checklistreferences/best-practices-checklist.md— Performance, UX, accessibility, CWSreferences/common-vulnerabilities.md— Vulnerability patterns with grep/fixreferences/cws-compliance-checklist.md— Chrome Web Store policy compliance- Chrome Permissions List
- Chrome Extensions Docs
Related Skills
extension-manifest— Generate/validate manifest.jsonextension-create— Scaffold new extensionextension-publish— Store submission checklist