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data-disclosure数据披露

Agent Skill

用于辅助数据整理、表格处理、CSV/Excel 分析、指标计算和图表准备。它适合让 Agent 清洗字段、汇总数据、发现异常、生成统计口径或把分析结果转成可读说明。使用时需要确认数据来源、字段含义和时间范围,避免把样本数据当全量事实;涉及敏感数据、导出文件或批量写回时,应先确认权限和脱敏边界。

总安装

275

周安装

11

GitHub Stars

9

下载量

89
CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:data-disclosure(数据披露)
来源仓库:https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code
仓库路径:skills/data-disclosure
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill data-disclosure
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill data-disclosure

简介

用于检测代码中个人敏感数据的泄露风险点。

  • 聚焦 API 处理器、数据模型与日志中的直接/间接披露问题。
  • 支持 LINDDUN 威胁模型下的隐私影响评估。
  • 需配合权限标记与数据分类策略进行扫描。
  • 适用于上线前安全审计与合规检查流程。data-disclosure 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

SKILL.md

Disclosure of Information Analysis (LINDDUN D2)

Analyze source code for disclosure threats where personal data is accessible to unauthorized parties. Focuses specifically on personal and sensitive data rather than general system information. Covers direct disclosure (data breach vectors) and indirect disclosure (third-party sharing, over-collection).

Supported Flags

Read ../../shared/schemas/flags.md for full flag documentation. This skill supports all cross-cutting flags.

FlagDisclosure-Specific Behavior
--scopeDefault changed. Focuses on files handling personal data: API handlers, data models, logging, caching, third-party integrations, and error handling.
--depth quickGrep patterns only: scan for PII in logs, error messages, and third-party data sharing.
--depth standardFull code read, trace personal data flows within each file, check access controls on personal data stores.
--depth deepCross-file personal data flow tracing. Map all paths where PII exits the application boundary.
--depth expertDeep + breach simulation: model what personal data is exposed in each attack scenario.
--severityFilter output. PII in logs is typically high; over-fetching is medium.
--fixGenerate redaction, field-level access control, and data minimization replacements.

Framework Context

LINDDUN D2 -- Disclosure of Information

Disclosure of information in the LINDDUN context refers specifically to unauthorized access to personal data. Read ../../shared/frameworks/linddun.md for the full LINDDUN framework reference including the distinction between LINDDUN disclosure (personal data focus) and STRIDE information disclosure (general system information).

Privacy Property Violated: Confidentiality of Personal Data

STRIDE Mapping: Information Disclosure (LINDDUN narrows focus specifically to personal data rather than general system information)

Workflow

Step 1 -- Determine Scope

  1. Parse --scope flag (default: changed).
  2. Resolve to a concrete file list.
  3. Filter to relevant files: API handlers, data models, logging configuration, error handling, caching logic, third-party SDK integrations, data export endpoints, and serialization logic.
  4. Prioritize files containing: user data structures, PII fields, third-party API calls with user data, log statements, cache writes, and error responses.

Step 2 -- Analyze for Personal Data Disclosure

Read each scoped file and assess personal data exposure vectors:

  1. Check logging for PII: Scan log statements for personal data fields (name, email, phone, address, SSN, health data, financial data).
  2. Assess API response data: Determine whether endpoints return more personal fields than the consumer needs (over-fetching).
  3. Examine third-party data sharing: Identify where personal data flows to external services (analytics, advertising, logging, error tracking).
  4. Check error handling: Look for personal data in error messages, stack traces, and debug output.
  5. Evaluate cache and temporary storage: Determine whether personal data in caches, temp files, or browser storage is properly protected.

At --depth deep or --depth expert, trace all paths where personal data exits the application boundary and map the full disclosure surface.

Step 3 -- Report Findings

Output findings per ../../shared/schemas/findings.md. Each finding needs: DDSCL-NNN id, title, severity (based on data sensitivity and exposure scope), location with snippet, description of what personal data is disclosed and through which channel, impact (unauthorized data access), fix (redaction, minimization, or encryption), and CWE/LINDDUN references.

Analysis Checklist

  1. Do log statements include personal data (names, emails, phone numbers, addresses)?
  2. Are API responses returning full user objects instead of only needed fields?
  3. Is personal data sent to third-party analytics or error tracking services?
  4. Do error messages or stack traces contain personal data values?
  5. Is PII passed through URL query parameters (visible in logs and referrer headers)?
  6. Are personal data fields encrypted at rest, or stored in plaintext?
  7. Do caching layers store personal data without appropriate TTLs or access controls?
  8. Do debug modes expose additional personal data that production would not?

What to Look For

  1. PII in log statements: Personal data written to logs, console, or debug output.

- Grep: log\.\w+\(.*email|logger\.\w+\(.*password|console\.log\(.*ssn|print\(.*credit.card

  1. Over-fetched API responses: Returning complete user objects with unnecessary fields.

- Grep: res\.json\(user\)|response\.send\(userData\)|SELECT \*.*FROM.*user|\.toJSON\(\)

  1. Third-party data sharing: PII sent to analytics, error tracking, or advertising SDKs.

- Grep: Sentry\.captureException.*user|analytics\.track.*email|gtag.*user_id|bugsnag.*user

  1. PII in error responses: Personal data leaked through error handling.

- Grep: res\.status\(.*\.json\(.*user|catch.*res\.send\(.*err|error.*message.*email

  1. Personal data in URLs: PII in query parameters or path segments.

- Grep: \?email=|&phone=|/users/\$\{email\}|encodeURIComponent\(.*email\)|queryString.*ssn

  1. Plaintext PII storage: Personal data stored without encryption.

- Grep: password.*varchar|ssn.*text|credit_card.*string|healthData.*column|plaintext.*pii

  1. Cache with personal data: PII stored in cache layers without protection.

- Grep: cache\.set\(.*user|redis\.set\(.*email|localStorage\.setItem\(.*token|sessionStorage.*user

  1. Missing field-level access control: No column or field restriction on personal data.

- Grep: SELECT \*|findAll\(\)|\.find\(\{\}\)|\.aggregate\(\[|include:.*all

Regulatory Mapping

RegulationProvisionRelevance
GDPR Art. 5(1)(f)Integrity and confidentialityPersonal data must be protected against unauthorized disclosure
GDPR Art. 32Security of processingAppropriate technical measures to protect personal data
GDPR Art. 33-34Breach notificationDisclosure of personal data triggers 72-hour notification
CCPA 1798.100Right to knowConsumers must know what personal data is collected and shared
CCPA 1798.150Private right of actionData breaches exposing personal data create liability
HIPAA 164.312Technical safeguardsProtected health information requires access controls and encryption

Output Format

Use finding ID prefix DDSCL (e.g., DDSCL-001, DDSCL-002).

All findings follow the schema in ../../shared/schemas/findings.md with:

  • references.cwe: CWE-200, CWE-311, or CWE-532 as appropriate
  • references.owasp: A01:2021 (Broken Access Control) or A02:2021 (Cryptographic Failures)
  • metadata.tool: "data-disclosure"
  • metadata.framework: "linddun"
  • metadata.category: "D2"

Summary table after all findings:

| Disclosure Pattern           | Critical | High | Medium | Low |
|------------------------------|----------|------|--------|-----|
| PII in logs                  |          |      |        |     |
| Over-fetched API responses   |          |      |        |     |
| Third-party data sharing     |          |      |        |     |
| PII in error messages        |          |      |        |     |
| Personal data in URLs        |          |      |        |     |
| Plaintext PII storage        |          |      |        |     |
| Cache / temp storage leaks   |          |      |        |     |

Followed by: top 3 priorities, personal data flow map, and overall assessment.

适合场景

01

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

03

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

35.06%
按下载量换算31

Claude

29.46%
按下载量换算26

Cursor

18.05%
按下载量换算16

Gemini CLI

9.66%
按下载量换算9

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

未通过

权限和风险

操作浏览器

该 Skill 可能涉及浏览器控制能力,使用时可能读取或操作网页内容,需要在受控环境中确认权限边界。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在 warning/failed 结果,不能写成本站确认安全。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

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