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correlating-threat-campaigns关联威胁活动

Agent Skill

correlating-threat-campaigns 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

总安装

329

周安装

14

GitHub Stars

5,885

下载量

115
CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:correlating-threat-campaigns(关联威胁活动)
来源仓库:https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills
仓库路径:skills/correlating-threat-campaigns
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill correlating-threat-campaigns
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill correlating-threat-campaigns

简介

correlating-threat-campaigns 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。

  • 它在多个孤立事件共享 IOC 或 TTP 时启用,识别跨周/月的高级持续性威胁活动。
  • 依赖 MISP 或 SIEM 历史数据,避免基于弱信号强行关联导致误判。
  • 安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。
  • 适用宿主包括 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,接入前应确认版本、权限和运行环境要求。

SKILL.md

Correlating Threat Campaigns

When to Use

Use this skill when:

  • Multiple unrelated-appearing incidents share IOCs (same C2 IP, same malware hash, similar TTPs)
  • An ISAC partner shares indicators from an incident that match your own historical events
  • Building a campaign report linking adversary activity over weeks or months to a single operation

Do not use this skill to force correlation based on weak signals — false campaign attribution misleads defenders and wastes resources on incorrect threat models.

Prerequisites

  • TIP or SIEM with historical indicator and event data (90+ days recommended)
  • MISP correlation engine enabled with event sharing configured
  • Graph analysis tool (Maltego, Neo4j, or OpenCTI) for relationship visualization
  • Reference to MITRE ATT&CK intrusion set and campaign objects for structuring output

Workflow

Step 1: Collect and Normalize Events

Gather all candidate events for correlation from:

  • Internal SIEM (raw events, alert history)
  • TIP (historical indicators and events)
  • ISAC sharing (partner-submitted events in MISP or TAXII)
  • Commercial intelligence (Recorded Future, Mandiant, CrowdStrike reports)

Normalize all events to STIX 2.1 schema with consistent timestamp (UTC), indicator types, and confidence scores. Ensure all indicators have source attribution and collection date.

Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points

Apply systematic pivot analysis across four dimensions:

Infrastructure pivots:

  • Same IP address or /24 subnet across events
  • Same domain registrant email or WHOIS organization
  • Same ASN or hosting provider with same account fingerprint
  • Same SSL certificate fingerprint or serial number across C2 domains

Capability pivots:

  • Same malware hash or YARA signature match
  • Same C2 communication protocol (Cobalt Strike beacon config, Sliver implant parameters)
  • Same exploit code or weaponized document template
  • Same obfuscation method or packer fingerprint

Temporal pivots:

  • Events occurring within same time window (operational hours suggesting same timezone)
  • Sequential events with logical kill chain progression
  • Malware compilation timestamps clustering in same date range

Victimology pivots:

  • Same target sector (healthcare, energy, financial)
  • Same target geography
  • Same targeted technology (specific ERP vendor, VPN appliance brand)

Step 3: Calculate Correlation Confidence

Apply weighted scoring for campaign attribution:

def calculate_campaign_confidence(events: list) -> float:
    scores = []

    # Infrastructure overlap (highest weight — most discriminating)
    infra_overlap = count_shared_infra(events) / len(events)
    scores.append(infra_overlap * 40)

    # Capability overlap (high weight — TTPs are durable)
    capability_overlap = count_shared_ttps(events) / len(events)
    scores.append(capability_overlap * 35)

    # Temporal proximity (moderate weight)
    temporal_score = assess_temporal_clustering(events)
    scores.append(temporal_score * 15)

    # Victimology alignment (lower weight — many actors target same sector)
    victim_score = assess_victim_pattern(events)
    scores.append(victim_score * 10)

    total = sum(scores)
    if total >= 70: return "HIGH"
    elif total >= 45: return "MEDIUM"
    else: return "LOW"

Step 4: Build Campaign Graph

In OpenCTI or Maltego, construct campaign graph:

  • Campaign object (STIX) as central node
  • Intrusion Set → uses → Malware objects
  • Intrusion Set → uses → Infrastructure objects
  • Intrusion Set → targets → Identity objects (victim organizations/sectors)
  • Campaign → attributed-to → Threat Actor (if attribution achieved)
  • Indicators → indicates → Malware (linking technical observables to capabilities)

Label each relationship with evidence reference and confidence.

Step 5: Produce Campaign Intelligence Report

Structure the campaign report:

  1. Campaign name: Assign descriptive codename based on targeting theme or tooling
  2. Timeline: First/last observed dates with activity phases
  3. Attribution: Suspected threat actor with confidence level
  4. Target profile: Industry verticals, geographies, organization sizes
  5. TTPs summary: ATT&CK Navigator heatmap for campaign-specific techniques
  6. Shared indicators: IOCs that span multiple incidents (highest confidence for blocking)
  7. Detection guidance: Sigma/YARA rules specific to this campaign

Key Concepts

TermDefinition
CampaignSTIX object representing a grouping of adversarial behaviors with common objectives over a defined time period
Intrusion SetSTIX object grouping related intrusion activity by common objectives, even when actor identity is uncertain
PivotUsing a single data point (IOC, infrastructure, TTP) to discover related events or adversary artifacts
ClusteringMachine learning or manual grouping of incidents based on feature similarity to identify campaign boundaries
False CorrelationIncorrect linking of unrelated incidents due to shared infrastructure (CDNs, shared hosting) or common tools

Tools & Systems

  • MISP Correlation Engine: Automatic correlation of events sharing attribute values across the MISP instance and federated instances
  • OpenCTI Graph: Interactive relationship graph for visualizing campaign linkages with STIX object types
  • Maltego: Link analysis for infrastructure and capability pivoting across multiple data sources
  • Neo4j: Graph database with Cypher queries for large-scale campaign correlation (millions of events)

Common Pitfalls

  • CDN/Shared hosting false positives: Cloudflare, AWS CloudFront, and bulletproof hosters serve multiple threat actors. Shared IP alone does not establish campaign linkage.
  • Common malware conflation: Multiple threat actors use Cobalt Strike. Shared capability does not indicate same actor without additional corroboration.
  • Premature attribution: Forcing campaign-to-actor attribution before evidence threshold is reached produces incorrect intelligence that persists in reports.
  • Missing temporal analysis: Events from different years may share infrastructure that was recycled by a different actor, not the same campaign.

适合场景

01

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

03

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

36.67%
按下载量换算42

Claude

28.38%
按下载量换算33

Cursor

16.98%
按下载量换算20

Gemini CLI

9.51%
按下载量换算11

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

可疑

权限和风险

只读

该 Skill 主要提供规则、说明或参考内容,本身偏只读;真正读写文件、联网或执行命令仍取决于宿主 Agent 的任务。

安装前确认

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来源信息

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