Token导航 LogoToken导航TokenDH.com
研究检索敏感数据github未标认证来源可访问许可证需确认审计通过

jwtJWT 安全

Agent Skill

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

总安装

760

周安装

32

GitHub Stars

12

下载量

266
CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:jwt(JWT 安全)
来源仓库:https://github.com/claude-dev-suite/claude-dev-suite
仓库路径:skills/jwt
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/claude-dev-suite/claude-dev-suite --skill jwt
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/claude-dev-suite/claude-dev-suite --skill jwt

简介

jwt 用于辅助安全审计、权限检查和认证流程分析,适合梳理敏感配置和鉴权逻辑。

  • 它提供 JWT 令牌结构解析、签名验证和 Node.js 实现示例,支持 HS256 算法。
  • 使用时不能将工具输出直接作为最终结论,涉及密钥或用户数据时应确认最小权限和操作边界。
  • 安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写操作。
  • jwt 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

SKILL.md

JWT Core Knowledge

Deep Knowledge: Use mcp__documentation__fetch_docs with technology: jwt for comprehensive documentation.

Token Structure

header.payload.signature

Header: { "alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT" }
Payload: { "sub": "1234", "name": "John", "iat": 1516239022 }
Signature: HMACSHA256(base64(header) + "." + base64(payload), secret)

Node.js Implementation

import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';

const SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET!;

// Generate token
function generateToken(user: User): string {
  return jwt.sign(
    { sub: user.id, email: user.email },
    SECRET,
    { expiresIn: '1h' }
  );
}

// Verify token
function verifyToken(token: string): JwtPayload {
  return jwt.verify(token, SECRET) as JwtPayload;
}

// Refresh token pattern
function generateRefreshToken(user: User): string {
  return jwt.sign(
    { sub: user.id, type: 'refresh' },
    SECRET,
    { expiresIn: '7d' }
  );
}

Middleware

const authenticate = (req, res, next) => {
  const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
  if (!authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
    return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Missing token' });
  }

  const token = authHeader.split(' ')[1];
  try {
    req.user = verifyToken(token);
    next();
  } catch (err) {
    res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid token' });
  }
};

When NOT to Use This Skill

  • Session-based authentication - Use traditional server-side sessions with cookies
  • OAuth 2.0 flows - Use oauth2 skill for third-party authentication
  • NextAuth.js - Use nextauth skill for Next.js authentication
  • Simple internal APIs - API keys might be sufficient

Best Practices

DoDon't
Use HTTPSStore in localStorage (use httpOnly cookies)
Short expiry (15m-1h)Put sensitive data in payload
Validate all claimsUse weak secrets
Use refresh tokensIgnore expiration

Anti-Patterns

Anti-PatternWhy It's BadCorrect Approach
Storing JWT in localStorageVulnerable to XSS attacksUse httpOnly cookies
Long-lived access tokensSecurity risk if compromised15-minute expiry + refresh tokens
Weak secrets (< 32 bytes)Easy to brute forceUse 256-bit random secret
Ignoring algorithm verificationAlgorithm confusion attacksExplicitly specify allowed algorithms
Putting passwords in payloadToken is base64, not encryptedOnly non-sensitive claims
No token revocationCan't logout usersImplement blacklist or token versioning

Quick Troubleshooting

IssueCauseSolution
"Invalid signature"Wrong secret or algorithmVerify JWT_SECRET matches, check algorithm
"Token expired"exp claim in pastImplement refresh token flow
"Missing token"Authorization header not sentCheck Authorization: Bearer <token>
Token not recognizedMalformed tokenVerify header.payload.signature format
CORS errors with cookiesSameSite/Secure flagsSet sameSite:'strict', secure:true
Logout doesn't workTokens are statelessImplement revocation with Redis/DB

Standard Claims

ClaimPurpose
subSubject (user ID)
iatIssued at
expExpiration
issIssuer
audAudience

Production Readiness

Security Configuration

// Use asymmetric keys (RS256) for production
import * as jose from 'jose';

// Generate key pair (run once, store securely)
// openssl genrsa -out private.pem 2048
// openssl rsa -in private.pem -pubout -out public.pem

const privateKey = await jose.importPKCS8(
  process.env.JWT_PRIVATE_KEY!,
  'RS256'
);
const publicKey = await jose.importSPKI(
  process.env.JWT_PUBLIC_KEY!,
  'RS256'
);

// Sign token
async function generateToken(user: User): Promise<string> {
  return new jose.SignJWT({
    sub: user.id,
    email: user.email,
  })
    .setProtectedHeader({ alg: 'RS256', typ: 'JWT' })
    .setIssuedAt()
    .setIssuer(process.env.JWT_ISSUER!)
    .setAudience(process.env.JWT_AUDIENCE!)
    .setExpirationTime('15m')  // Short-lived access token
    .sign(privateKey);
}

// Verify token
async function verifyToken(token: string): Promise<jose.JWTPayload> {
  const { payload } = await jose.jwtVerify(token, publicKey, {
    issuer: process.env.JWT_ISSUER!,
    audience: process.env.JWT_AUDIENCE!,
  });
  return payload;
}

Secure Token Storage

// Server-side: HttpOnly cookie for access token
res.cookie('access_token', token, {
  httpOnly: true,     // Prevents XSS access
  secure: true,       // HTTPS only
  sameSite: 'strict', // CSRF protection
  maxAge: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
  path: '/',
});

// Refresh token in separate cookie
res.cookie('refresh_token', refreshToken, {
  httpOnly: true,
  secure: true,
  sameSite: 'strict',
  maxAge: 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 7 days
  path: '/api/auth/refresh', // Only sent to refresh endpoint
});

Token Rotation & Revocation

// Refresh token rotation
async function refreshTokens(refreshToken: string) {
  // Verify refresh token
  const payload = await verifyRefreshToken(refreshToken);

  // Check if refresh token is in blacklist (revoked)
  if (await isTokenRevoked(refreshToken)) {
    throw new Error('Token revoked');
  }

  // Revoke old refresh token
  await revokeToken(refreshToken);

  // Generate new tokens
  const user = await db.users.findUnique({ where: { id: payload.sub } });
  return {
    accessToken: await generateToken(user),
    refreshToken: await generateRefreshToken(user),
  };
}

// Token revocation with Redis
async function revokeToken(token: string): Promise<void> {
  const payload = await jose.decodeJwt(token);
  const ttl = payload.exp! - Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
  if (ttl > 0) {
    await redis.set(`revoked:${token}`, '1', 'EX', ttl);
  }
}

// Logout: revoke all user tokens
async function logoutAll(userId: string): Promise<void> {
  // Increment user's token version, invalidating all existing tokens
  await db.users.update({
    where: { id: userId },
    data: { tokenVersion: { increment: 1 } },
  });
}

Algorithm Security

// NEVER allow 'none' algorithm
// ALWAYS specify allowed algorithms explicitly
const { payload } = await jose.jwtVerify(token, publicKey, {
  algorithms: ['RS256'], // Only allow RS256
  issuer: process.env.JWT_ISSUER!,
  audience: process.env.JWT_AUDIENCE!,
});

// Validate token type to prevent token confusion
if (payload.type !== 'access') {
  throw new Error('Invalid token type');
}

Monitoring Metrics

MetricAlert Threshold
Token verification failures> 100/min
Refresh token reuse attempts> 10/min
Expired token requests> 500/min
Invalid signature errors> 50/min

Claims Validation

async function validateTokenClaims(payload: jose.JWTPayload): Promise<void> {
  // Check required claims
  if (!payload.sub || !payload.iat || !payload.exp) {
    throw new Error('Missing required claims');
  }

  // Check user still exists and is active
  const user = await db.users.findUnique({ where: { id: payload.sub } });
  if (!user || !user.isActive) {
    throw new Error('User not found or inactive');
  }

  // Check token version (for logout-all functionality)
  if (payload.tokenVersion !== user.tokenVersion) {
    throw new Error('Token invalidated');
  }
}

Checklist

  • Use RS256 (asymmetric) in production
  • Short access token expiry (15 minutes)
  • Refresh tokens with rotation
  • HttpOnly cookies (not localStorage)
  • Secure + SameSite cookie flags
  • Token revocation mechanism
  • Validate issuer and audience
  • Specify allowed algorithms explicitly
  • Include token version for logout-all
  • Monitor verification failures
  • Rate limit token endpoints

Reference Documentation

适合场景

01

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

03

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

36.63%
按下载量换算97

Claude

28.93%
按下载量换算77

Cursor

20.63%
按下载量换算55

Gemini CLI

9.54%
按下载量换算25

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

继续浏览同类 Skills