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anemone-browser海葵浏览器

Agent Skill

anemone-browser 用于处理浏览器自动化、网页检查和页面信息提取,适合在 OpenClaw 中需要让 Agent 打开页面、读取网页或验证前端流程时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

总安装

12,888

周安装

537

GitHub Stars

公开资料未说明

下载量

4,296
OpenClaw

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

MIT-0

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:anemone-browser(海葵浏览器)
来源仓库:https://github.com/easonc13/anemone-browser
安装命令:
openclaw skills install anemone-browser
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 OpenClaw 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

ClawHubOpenClaw
openclaw skills install anemone-browser

简介

为 OpenClaw 代理提供带反检测机制的 Chrome 浏览器实例。

  • 可用于网页抓取、界面状态检查及人机交互模拟。
  • 支持多标签页独立运行与远程桌面接管操作。anemone-browser 属于运维类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。
  • 安装命令:openclaw skills install anemone-browser。
  • 使用时需遵守目标网站服务条款避免触发封禁。

SKILL.md

name
anemone-browser
description
>
Triggers
set up browser", "browser blocked", "CAPTCHA", "VNC",

Anemone Browser — Managed Browser for OpenClaw Agents

Headful Chrome with anti-detection, VNC takeover, and multi-session isolation. Works on Mac, Linux, Docker — anywhere OpenClaw runs.

Setup

macOS

bash scripts/setup-mac.sh

Detects Chrome, configures OpenClaw browser profile. After setup:

openclaw browser start
# Agent's browser tool works automatically
Note: macOS setup does NOT include VNC/noVNC. The user is expected to access the Mac via their own remote desktop solution (e.g. macOS Screen Sharing, Tailscale, or physical access). VNC takeover with noVNC links is only available on Linux.

Linux / Docker

# Install deps (once)
bash scripts/setup.sh

# Start browser + VNC environment
bash scripts/start.sh [password] [novnc_port] [cdp_port] [resolution]

start.sh outputs the noVNC URL, password, and CDP port. Safe to re-run.

OpenClaw Config

Setup scripts configure this automatically. Manual reference:

macOS:

{
  "browser": {
    "enabled": true,
    "defaultProfile": "openclaw",
    "headless": false,
    "executablePath": "/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Chrome"
  }
}

Linux:

{
  "browser": {
    "enabled": true,
    "headless": false,
    "noSandbox": true,
    "executablePath": "/usr/bin/google-chrome-stable"
  }
}

Multi-Session Window Isolation

Multiple sessions share one Chrome (same cookies/logins) but each gets its own window.

Rules (MUST follow):

  1. On session start — open your own tab, save the targetId:
   browser action=open targetUrl="https://example.com" profile=openclaw
   # Returns targetId — THIS IS YOURS, save it
  1. ALL subsequent calls — always include your targetId:
   browser action=snapshot profile=openclaw targetId="<your-targetId>"
   browser action=navigate profile=openclaw targetId="<your-targetId>" targetUrl="..."
   browser action=act profile=openclaw targetId="<your-targetId>" ...
  1. On session end — close your tab:
   browser action=close targetId="<your-targetId>"
  1. NEVER operate without targetId — you'll land on another session's tab.
  1. NEVER pick another session's tab from browser action=tabs.

Opening a new window (not tab) via CDP:

import json, asyncio, websockets, urllib.request

async def open_new_window(cdp_port, url):
    version = json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(f"http://127.0.0.1:{cdp_port}/json/version").read())
    async with websockets.connect(version["webSocketDebuggerUrl"]) as ws:
        await ws.send(json.dumps({
            "id": 1, "method": "Target.createTarget",
            "params": {"url": url, "newWindow": True}
        }))
        resp = json.loads(await ws.recv())
        return resp["result"]["targetId"]

Architecture:

Chrome (one instance, one profile, shared cookies)
├── Window targetId=AAA → Session A
├── Window targetId=BBB → Session B
└── Window targetId=CCC → Session C

VNC Takeover (CRITICAL)

When hitting a CAPTCHA, login wall, or any blocker, send the user a noVNC link:

https://<IP>:<NOVNC_PORT>/vnc.html?password=<PASSWORD>&autoconnect=true&resize=scale

Constructing the link:

Linux/Docker (from start.sh output):

https://57.129.90.145:10150/vnc.html?password=e0GGP4xeMUL5ga&autoconnect=true&resize=scale
  • IP: server's public or Tailscale IP
  • Port + password: from start.sh output

macOS: VNC takeover is NOT available. The user must access the Mac directly (physical access, macOS Screen Sharing, or their own remote desktop solution).

Takeover flow:

  1. Agent detects blocker (CAPTCHA, login, 2FA)
  2. Agent sends noVNC link to user
  3. User opens link → sees Chrome → solves the problem
  4. User confirms done → agent continues

Anti-Detection

  • Headful Chrome — no HeadlessChrome in UA
  • --disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled — no navigator.webdriver=true
  • UA override via CDP if needed:
  {"method": "Network.setUserAgentOverride", "params": {
    "userAgent": "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36"
  }}

Security

  • SSL/TLS on noVNC (self-signed cert)
  • Random 14-char password (Linux) or system auth (macOS)
  • CDP: localhost only, never exposed to network
  • Chrome Policy: file://, javascript:, data:text/html blocked; extensions blocked; DevTools disabled

Important: No Kiosk Mode

Do NOT use Chrome's --kiosk flag. It hides the tab bar and address bar, making multi-window unusable via VNC. Use --start-maximized instead.

适合场景

01

OpenClaw 用户查找和安装 Skill 时

02

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

03

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

04

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

补充不同宿主或平台的使用分布数据

能力 5

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

OpenClaw

80.04%
按下载量换算3,439

安全审计

VirusTotal

可疑

ClawScan

通过

Static analysis

未展示

权限和风险

操作浏览器

该 Skill 可能涉及浏览器控制能力,使用时可能读取或操作网页内容,需要在受控环境中确认权限边界。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在 warning/failed 结果,不能写成本站确认安全。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

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