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analyzing-malware-behavior-with-cuckoo-sandbox使用 Cuckoo 沙箱分析恶意软件行为

Agent Skill

analyzing-malware-behavior-with-cuckoo-sandbox 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

总安装

979

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下载量

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CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:analyzing-malware-behavior-with-cuckoo-sandbox(使用 Cuckoo 沙箱分析恶意软件行为)
来源仓库:https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills
仓库路径:skills/analyzing-malware-behavior-with-cuckoo-sandbox
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill analyzing-malware-behavior-with-cuckoo-sandbox
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill analyzing-malware-behavior-with-cuckoo-sandbox

简介

在 Cuckoo Sandbox 中执行恶意样本,监控文件、注册表和网络行为。

  • 生成详细报告用于 YARA 规则编写和感染链还原。
  • 适合批量分析与自动化分类,需配置独立沙箱环境。
  • 避免分析已知勒索软件变种,防止数据损坏。
  • analyzing-malware-behavior-with-cuckoo-sandbox 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

SKILL.md

Analyzing Malware Behavior with Cuckoo Sandbox

When to Use

  • A suspicious sample passed static analysis triage and requires behavioral observation in a controlled environment
  • You need to capture network traffic, file drops, registry modifications, and API calls from a malware execution
  • Determining the full infection chain including second-stage payload downloads and persistence mechanisms
  • Generating behavioral signatures and YARA rules based on observed runtime activity
  • Automated analysis of bulk malware samples requiring consistent reporting

Do not use when the sample is a known ransomware variant that may spread via network shares in a misconfigured sandbox; verify network isolation first.

Prerequisites

  • Cuckoo Sandbox 3.x installed on a dedicated analysis server (Ubuntu 22.04 recommended)
  • Guest VMs configured with Windows 10/11 snapshots (Cuckoo agent installed, snapshots taken at clean state)
  • VirtualBox, KVM, or VMware configured as the Cuckoo virtualization backend
  • Isolated network with InetSim or FakeNet-NG for simulating internet services
  • Suricata or Snort integrated for network-level signature matching during analysis
  • Sufficient disk space for PCAP captures and memory dumps (minimum 500 GB recommended)

Workflow

Step 1: Submit Sample to Cuckoo

Submit the malware sample for automated analysis:

# Submit via command line
cuckoo submit /path/to/suspect.exe

# Submit with specific analysis timeout (300 seconds)
cuckoo submit --timeout 300 /path/to/suspect.exe

# Submit with specific VM and analysis package
cuckoo submit --machine win10_x64 --package exe --timeout 300 /path/to/suspect.exe

# Submit via REST API
curl -F "file=@suspect.exe" -F "timeout=300" -F "machine=win10_x64" \
  http://localhost:8090/tasks/create/file

# Submit URL for analysis
curl -F "url=http://malicious-site.com/payload" -F "timeout=300" \
  http://localhost:8090/tasks/create/url

# Check task status
curl http://localhost:8090/tasks/view/1 | jq '.task.status'

Step 2: Monitor Execution in Real-Time

Track the analysis progress and observe live behavior:

# Watch Cuckoo analysis log
tail -f /opt/cuckoo/log/cuckoo.log

# Monitor analysis task status
cuckoo status

# Access Cuckoo web interface for live screenshots and process tree
# Navigate to http://localhost:8080/analysis/<task_id>/

Key behavioral events to watch during execution:

  • Process creation chain (parent-child relationships)
  • Network connection attempts to external IPs
  • File drops in temporary directories or system folders
  • Registry modifications to Run keys or service entries
  • API calls related to encryption (CryptEncrypt), injection (WriteProcessMemory), or evasion

Step 3: Analyze Process Activity

Review the process tree and API call trace from the Cuckoo report:

# Parse Cuckoo JSON report programmatically
import json

with open("/opt/cuckoo/storage/analyses/1/reports/report.json") as f:
    report = json.load(f)

# Process tree analysis
for process in report["behavior"]["processes"]:
    pid = process["pid"]
    ppid = process["ppid"]
    name = process["process_name"]
    print(f"PID: {pid} PPID: {ppid} Name: {name}")

    # Extract suspicious API calls
    for call in process["calls"]:
        api = call["api"]
        if api in ["CreateRemoteThread", "VirtualAllocEx", "WriteProcessMemory",
                    "NtCreateThreadEx", "RegSetValueExA", "URLDownloadToFileA"]:
            args = {arg["name"]: arg["value"] for arg in call["arguments"]}
            print(f"  [!] {api}({args})")

Step 4: Review Network Activity

Examine network connections, DNS queries, and HTTP requests:

# Network analysis from Cuckoo report
network = report["network"]

# DNS resolutions
print("DNS Queries:")
for dns in network.get("dns", []):
    print(f"  {dns['request']} -> {dns.get('answers', [])}")

# HTTP requests
print("\nHTTP Requests:")
for http in network.get("http", []):
    print(f"  {http['method']} {http['uri']} (Host: {http['host']})")
    if http.get("body"):
        print(f"    Body: {http['body'][:200]}")

# TCP connections
print("\nTCP Connections:")
for tcp in network.get("tcp", []):
    print(f"  {tcp['src']}:{tcp['sport']} -> {tcp['dst']}:{tcp['dport']}")

# Extract PCAP for deeper Wireshark analysis
# PCAP location: /opt/cuckoo/storage/analyses/1/dump.pcap

Step 5: Examine File System and Registry Changes

Document persistence mechanisms and dropped files:

# File operations
print("Files Created/Modified:")
for f in report["behavior"].get("summary", {}).get("files", []):
    print(f"  {f}")

# Dropped files with hashes
print("\nDropped Files:")
for dropped in report.get("dropped", []):
    print(f"  Path: {dropped['filepath']}")
    print(f"  SHA-256: {dropped['sha256']}")
    print(f"  Size: {dropped['size']} bytes")
    print(f"  Type: {dropped['type']}")

# Registry modifications
print("\nRegistry Keys Modified:")
for key in report["behavior"].get("summary", {}).get("keys", []):
    print(f"  {key}")

Step 6: Review Signatures and Scoring

Check Cuckoo's behavioral signatures and threat scoring:

# Behavioral signatures triggered
print("Triggered Signatures:")
for sig in report.get("signatures", []):
    severity = sig["severity"]
    name = sig["name"]
    description = sig["description"]
    marker = "[!]" if severity >= 3 else "[*]"
    print(f"  {marker} [{severity}/5] {name}: {description}")
    for mark in sig.get("marks", []):
        if mark.get("call"):
            print(f"      API: {mark['call']['api']}")
        if mark.get("ioc"):
            print(f"      IOC: {mark['ioc']}")

# Overall score
score = report.get("info", {}).get("score", 0)
print(f"\nOverall Threat Score: {score}/10")

Step 7: Extract Memory Dump Artifacts

Analyze the full memory dump captured during execution:

# Memory dump is saved at:
# /opt/cuckoo/storage/analyses/1/memory.dmp

# Use Volatility to analyze the memory dump
vol3 -f /opt/cuckoo/storage/analyses/1/memory.dmp windows.pslist
vol3 -f /opt/cuckoo/storage/analyses/1/memory.dmp windows.malfind
vol3 -f /opt/cuckoo/storage/analyses/1/memory.dmp windows.netscan

Key Concepts

TermDefinition
Dynamic AnalysisExecuting malware in a controlled environment to observe runtime behavior including system calls, network activity, and file operations
Sandbox EvasionTechniques malware uses to detect virtual/sandbox environments and alter behavior to avoid analysis (sleep timers, VM checks, user interaction checks)
API HookingCuckoo's method of intercepting Windows API calls made by the malware to log function names, parameters, and return values
InetSimInternet services simulation tool that responds to malware network requests (HTTP, DNS, SMTP) within the isolated analysis network
Process InjectionMalware technique of injecting code into legitimate processes; detected by monitoring VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory API sequences
Behavioral SignatureRule-based detection matching specific sequences of API calls, file operations, or network activity to known malware behaviors
Analysis PackageCuckoo module defining how to execute a specific file type (exe, dll, pdf, doc) within the guest VM for proper behavioral capture

Tools & Systems

  • Cuckoo Sandbox: Open-source automated malware analysis system providing behavioral reports, network captures, and memory dumps
  • InetSim: Internet services simulation suite providing fake HTTP, DNS, SMTP, and other services for isolated malware analysis networks
  • FakeNet-NG: FLARE team's network simulation tool that intercepts and redirects all network traffic for analysis
  • Suricata: Network IDS/IPS integrated with Cuckoo for real-time signature-based detection of malicious network traffic
  • Volatility: Memory forensics framework used to analyze memory dumps captured during Cuckoo analysis

Common Scenarios

Scenario: Analyzing a Multi-Stage Dropper

Context: Static analysis reveals a packed executable with minimal imports and high entropy. The sample needs sandbox execution to observe unpacking, payload delivery, and C2 establishment.

Approach:

  1. Submit sample to Cuckoo with extended timeout (600 seconds) to capture slow-acting behavior
  2. Review process tree for child process creation (dropper spawning payload processes)
  3. Identify dropped files in %TEMP%, %APPDATA%, or system directories
  4. Extract dropped files and compute hashes for separate analysis
  5. Map network connections to identify C2 infrastructure contacted after initial execution
  6. Check for persistence mechanisms (Run keys, scheduled tasks, services) in registry modifications
  7. Compare behavioral signatures against known malware families

Pitfalls:

  • Using insufficient analysis timeout causing the sandbox to terminate before second-stage payload executes
  • Not configuring InetSim to respond to DNS and HTTP requests, preventing the malware from progressing past C2 check-in
  • Ignoring sandbox evasion detections; if the sample exits immediately, it may be detecting the virtual environment
  • Not analyzing dropped files separately; the initial dropper may be less interesting than the final payload

Output Format

DYNAMIC ANALYSIS REPORT - CUCKOO SANDBOX
==========================================
Task ID:          1547
Sample:           suspect.exe (SHA-256: e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb924...)
Analysis Time:    300 seconds
VM:               win10_x64 (Windows 10 21H2)
Score:            8.5/10

PROCESS TREE
suspect.exe (PID: 2184)
  └── cmd.exe (PID: 3456)
      └── powershell.exe (PID: 4012)
          └── svchost_fake.exe (PID: 4568)

FILE SYSTEM ACTIVITY
[CREATED]  C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\payload.dll
[CREATED]  C:\Windows\System32\svchost_fake.exe
[MODIFIED] C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts

REGISTRY MODIFICATIONS
[SET] HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\WindowsUpdate = "C:\Windows\System32\svchost_fake.exe"
[SET] HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\FakeService\ImagePath = "C:\Windows\System32\svchost_fake.exe"

NETWORK ACTIVITY
DNS:    update.malicious[.]com -> 185.220.101.42
HTTP:   POST hxxps://185.220.101[.]42/gate.php (beacon)
TCP:    10.0.2.15:49152 -> 185.220.101.42:443 (237 connections)

BEHAVIORAL SIGNATURES
[!] [4/5] injection_createremotethread: Injects code into remote process
[!] [4/5] persistence_autorun: Modifies Run registry key for persistence
[!] [3/5] network_cnc_http: Performs HTTP C2 communication
[*] [2/5] antiav_detectfile: Checks for antivirus product files

DROPPED FILES
payload.dll    SHA-256: abc123... Size: 98304  Type: PE32 DLL
svchost_fake.exe SHA-256: def456... Size: 184320 Type: PE32 EXE

适合场景

01

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

03

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

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能力 2

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能力 3

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能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

33.85%
按下载量换算106

Claude

31.33%
按下载量换算98

Cursor

16.68%
按下载量换算52

Gemini CLI

9.71%
按下载量换算30

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

未通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

可疑

权限和风险

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该 Skill 可能需要联网访问来源站点、仓库或外部 API;具体网络访问范围需要结合源码和 README 复核。

安装前确认

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来源信息

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